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 The stability-diversity-complexity debate has persisted as a central 
focus of theoretical ecology for half a century. The debate concerns the 
deceptively simple question of whether there is a causal relationship 
between the complexity and/or diversity of biological communities and 
their stability. Historical analysis of the debate shows that conflicting 
claims different studies seem to support indicate an underlying lack of 
conceptual clarity about the three concepts. 
 The problem of defining these concepts is thus at the debate’s core, 
and finding adequate definitions is one objective of the dissertation. The 
absence of consensus about how ecological stability should be defined, for 
instance, reflects uncertainty about what properties of a community should 
vi 
be considered its stability, resulting in studies that suggest conflicting 
conclusions based on different senses of the concept. For this reason, some 
philosophers have claimed that proposed definitions of ecological stability 
are incompatible and that the concept is itself problematic. I argue, 
however, that three unproblematic concepts are jointly sufficient and 
individually necessary for ecological stability. Another issue concerns 
whether the mathematical concept of Lyapunov stability utilized in physics 
adequately defines ecological stability, as many theoretical ecologists 
assume. I argue that it does not because it cannot adequately represent 
perturbations against which community stability must be assessed. 
 The project of defining these particular concepts raises a more 
fundamental issue: what adequacy criteria should definitions in general 
satisfy? Against the prevailing view that definitions must preserve meaning 
exactly, I argue there are good reasons to require definitions preserve only 
similarity of meaning with the defined concept. Following Carnap, I call 
such definitions ‘explicative’. The prevailing view is clearly unproblematic 
if the definitional goal is simply to clarify the actual meaning of concepts. It 
is problematic, however, if the objective is to provide normative guidance 
about concepts. Concepts play an indispensable role in the acquisition of 
knowledge. As such, definitional modifications of our conceptual apparatus 
vii
should be evaluated by epistemic advantages or disadvantages they procure. 
I argue the advantages afforded by an explicative definition –such as 
enhancing precision, testability, theoretical unification, etc.– justify 
forgoing strong similarity with the concept being defined. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The stability-diversity-complexity (SDC) debate has persisted as a central 
focus of theoretical ecology for half a century. The debate concerns the 
deceptively simple question of whether there is a relationship between the 
complexity and/or diversity of a biological community and its stability. From 
1955, when Robert MacArthur initiated the debate, to the early 1970s, the 
prevailing view among ecologists was that diversity and complexity were 
important, if not the principal, causes of community stability. Robert May, a 
physicist turned mathematical ecologist, confounded this view with analyses of 
mathematical models of communities that seemed to confirm the opposite, that 
increased complexity jeopardizes stability. The praise May’s work received for its 
mathematical rigor and the criticisms it received for its seeming biological 
irrelevance thrust the SDC debate into the ecological limelight, but subsequent 
analyses have failed to resolve it. Different analyses seem to support conflicting 
claims and indicate an underlying lack of conceptual clarity about ecological 
stability, diversity, and complexity. 
 At a coarse level of description, ecologists disagree little about the 
concepts of diversity and complexity. A biological community is a set of 
interacting populations of different species.1 Its diversity is commonly understood 
                                                 
 
 1
to be positively correlated with the number of species it contains (species 
richness), and how evenly individuals are distributed among these species 
(evenness) (Pielou 1975; Margurann 1988, 2004), though other possible 
components of diversity have been considered. Complexity of a community is 
positively correlated with its richness, how many of its species interact 
(connectance), and how strongly they interact. Diversity and complexity are 
similar properties and may be strongly positively correlated, but they are not 
identical. Species of a highly diverse community may interact little and therefore 
exhibit low complexity, and vice versa.  
 Beyond these relatively uncontested claims, disagreement arises over how 
the two concepts should be operationalized. Ecologists have proposed several 
mathematical functions that differ about what properties (species richness, 
evenness, connectance, etc.) are given priority over others in assessing diversity 
or complexity, and which differ in functional form. Currently, there is little 
agreement about what operationalizations, especially of diversity, are ultimately 
defensible (Ricotta 2005; Sarkar 2007). 
                                                                                                                                     
1 Besides this weak condition about being composed of different species that interact, no stronger 
assumption is being made about what biological communities are or how they should be 
individuated. Ecologists typically make such determinations by convention: any biological system 
of scientific interest composed of at least two different species that interact in some way is taken 
to constitute a biological community. Chapter 4, Section 1 discusses the conventional nature of 
community specification in detail. Empirical issues about whether the biological world clusters 
into nonoverlapping sets of species that can be individuated by some nonconventional criterion, 
such as that there is much stronger causal interaction between species within a set than between 
those in different sets, are not addressed (see Sterelny 2001). 
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 Another problematic aspect of the SDC debate is the lack of consensus 
about how ecological stability should be defined. This reflects uncertainty about 
what features of a community’s dynamics should be considered its stability, and 
has resulted in conflicting conclusions about the debate based on studies using 
different senses of ecological stability (e.g. MacArthur 1955; May 1974; Tilman 
1999; Pfisterer and Schmidt 2002). Ecological stability is not, however, unique in 
this regard. As McIntosh (1985, 80) has quipped: “A traditional problem of 
ecology has been that ecologists, like Humpty Dumpty, often used a word to 
mean just what they chose it to mean with little regard for what others said it 
meant.” Disagreements about how to define concepts arise in other sciences as 
well. Careful analysis of the concept of ecological stability (and diversity and 
complexity) would thus help resolve the SDC debate, as well as illuminate the 
general problem of finding adequate definitions for concepts in science. 
 Besides providing insights about how problematic scientific concepts 
should be defined, the SDC debate also has a potential bearing on biodiversity 
conservation. For most senses of stability, more stable communities are better 
able to withstand environmental disturbances, thereby decreasing the risk of 
species extinction. Positive feedback between diversity/complexity and stability 
would therefore support conservation efforts to preserve biodiversity, assuming 
biodiversity and ecological diversity/complexity are closely related (see Goodman 
1975; Norton 1987, Ch. 3 and 4; Izsák and Papp 2000; Sarkar 2007). 
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 Finding adequate definitions for the concepts of ecological stability, 
diversity, and complexity, and defending a general account of definition due to 
Carnap that clarifies the desiderata these definitions should satisfy, are the two 
main objectives of this dissertation. To understand first what the SDC debate is 
about, the philosophical issues it raises, and the conceptual and methodological 
difficulties it faces, the second chapter, “Emergence of the Stability-Complexity-
Diversity Debate: 1955-1975,” introduces the SDC debate by critically tracing the 
history from its inception with MacArthur’s (1955) influential analysis to May’s 
(1974) upending of the near ecological consensus at the time that “diversity 
begets stability.” The idea that there is a “balance of nature” was a staple of the 
schools of natural philosophy from which biology emerged long before the term 
‘ecology’ was even coined (Egerton 1973). Some early ecologists such as 
Fredrick Clements and A. J. Nicholson continued this tradition by attempting to 
derive the existence of a “natural balance” in biological populations from 
organismic metaphors and analogies with physical systems (Clements 1916; 
Nicholson 1933; Kingsland 1995; Cuddington 2001). Not until Robert 
MacArthur’s (1955) work, however, was the concept of a balance of nature 
precisely defined as ecological stability, and the predominantly metaphysical 
speculations about its cause superseded with a scientific hypothesis about its 
basis. 
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 Besides considering MacArthur (1955) and Elton’s (1958) arguments for a 
positive relationship between ecological stability and diversity/complexity, and 
showing why they fail, Chapter 2 also describes the mathematical character the 
debate acquired in the late 1960s and 1970s. Lewontin’s (1969) analysis of the 
relationship between different mathematical concepts of stability and ecological 
stability, and May’s (1974) study of stability and complexity in mathematical 
models of biological communities are especially important in this regard because 
they had a substantial impact on how the SDC subsequently evolved. 
 The problem of defining scientific concepts – ecological stability, 
diversity, and complexity – is at the core of the SDC debate. Part of this problem 
concerns how these specific concepts should be defined, which Chapters 4 and 5 
take up for ecological stability, and diversity and complexity, respectively. 
Undertaking this task raises a more fundamental issue, however: what makes for a 
good definition in science and philosophy and why? The third chapter, 
“Explicative Definition: A Defense,” attempts to answer this question. 
 Chapter 3 first sets the philosophical context by reviewing Carnap’s 
(1950) account of explication, his technical term for one form of definition,2 and 
Strawson’s (1963) criticisms of it. Different definitions of ecological stability 
proposed in the literature illustrate Carnap’s adequacy criteria for explication, and 
different ways they can be satisfied. Contra Strawson, these and other scientific 
                                                 
2 See Carnap (1950, 7) and Chapter 3, Section 2. 
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definitions often sacrifice intuitive accord with the imprecise notion being defined 
to attain (i) formal rigor and integration with well-developed mathematical 
theories; and/or, (ii) easy, or at least feasible, empirical measurement. This differs 
from definitions found in philosophical contexts, which usually attempt to 
maximize intuitive similarity with the imprecise notion being defined (DePaul and 
Ramsey 1998). 
 The reason scientific definitions often accord intuitions less significance is 
that these definitions should help in determining the structure of the world, which 
is not reliably achieved by inspecting intuitions.3 Given this objective, definitions 
should be judged according to how they contribute to scientific practice, which is 
the principal motivation underlying Carnap’s conception of explication. Strawson 
and many other philosophers, however, regard definitions as the end products of 
conceptual analysis in which intuitions should provide the primary guidance, and 
therefore play the main role in constructing definitions. This view of definition, or 
at least the idea that intuitions should play some nontrivial role in the formulation 
of definitions, is unproblematic if the definitional goal is simply to clarify the 
meanings of ordinary concepts of natural language. Besides intuitions, linguistic 
studies of how words are used (Jackson 1998), and studies of the mental 
representation of concepts in the cognitive sciences (Goldman and Pust 1998) also 
                                                 
3 The idea that some concepts better describe or are better aligned with the structure of “the 
world” than others should not be taken to presuppose some type of scientific realism. ‘Better 
aligned’ could be evaluated in terms of empirical adequacy or the generation of new technologies, 
for instance, by antirealists. 
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help achieve this goal, and results of such studies could (and perhaps should) 
inform the defining process on this view of definition. If the goal is to provide a 
better conceptual framework for determining what the world is like, however, 
Chapter 3 argues this conception of definition is indefensible. 
 The fourth chapter, “How Should Ecological Stability Be Defined?” has 
two parts. Numerous definitions of ecological stability have been proposed 
(Orians 1975; Pimm 1984; Grimm and Wissel 1997), so the first part systematizes 
distinct senses of the concept into a comprehensive taxonomy. This classification 
indicates what senses are compatible and reveals other relationships between 
them. The first part of this chapter also argues that the concepts of resistance, 
resilience, and tolerance jointly provide an adequate definition of the concept of 
ecological stability, and rebuts Shrader-Frechette and McCoy’s (1993) criticism 
that it is “conceptually confused” or “inconsistent.” 
 With the conceptual clarification this taxonomy provides, the second part 
of Chapter 4 argues that the common definition of ecological stability as 
Lyapunov stability is flawed. This definition pervades mathematical modeling in 
ecology because it integrates the imprecise concept of ecological stability into a 
well-developed mathematical theory that has been fruitfully utilized in other 
sciences. The theory of Lyapunov stability, however, fails to represent the domain 
of application of ecological stability adequately. This failure illustrates an 
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important limitation of the mathematical theory of Lyapunov stability within 
ecology. 
 The fifth chapter, “Concept Determination within Ecology: Ecological 
Complexity and Diversity,” serves the same function for the concepts of 
ecological diversity and complexity as Chapter 4 did for ecological stability. It 
first reviews and evaluates existing adequacy criteria for diversity indices – such 
as that a diversity index should be maximal when individual organisms are 
equally distributed among species of a community and the more technical 
concavity condition. Two additional criteria are then defended. Based on this 
analysis, common quantitative indices of diversity found in the ecological 
literature are assessed against these criteria to determine which indices have a 
reasonable biological interpretation, identify properties of biological communities 
that should be part of a diversity index, and clarify the relationship between 
statistical indices developed in nonbiological contexts, such as information theory 
(Khinchin 1957), and the concept of ecological diversity. Only those indices that 
satisfy defensible adequacy criteria potentially bear on the SDC debate. 
 Most ecological work has focused on indices of diversity rather than 
complexity. Formulating a complexity index for models of biological 
communities that represent the mechanisms driving community dynamics with 
linear differential equations is unproblematic. An additive or multiplicative 
function of species richness, connectance, and mean linear interaction strength are 
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adequate complexity indices for these models (see May 1974). For models 
representing communities with nonlinear differential equations, however, how 
mean interaction strength should be assessed is unclear because different species 
may interact in disparate ways. Chapter 5 concludes by describing difficulties 
involved in devising a complexity index for nonlinear models of biological 
communities.  
 Together, Chapters 4 and 5 provide a conceptual framework for the 
concluding chapter, “Conclusion: Evaluating Stability-Diversity-Complexity 
Relationships.” The general objective of Chapter 6 is to explain and emphasize 
that only a small and rather unimportant portion of the SDC debate has been 
addressed by the empirical studies and mathematical modeling of biological 
communities conducted thus far. The preceding chapters make clear that there are 
many senses of ecological stability, diversity, and complexity and thus numerous 
stability-diversity-complexity relationships involved in the SDC debate. Complete 
resolution of the debate requires evaluation of all these relationships, only a 
limited subset of which has been analyzed hitherto.  
 To determine what relationships have and have not yet been analyzed, 
Chapter 6 identifies the specific sense of stability and diversity/complexity 
analyzed in previous well-known studies. This helps uncover gaps in existing 
knowledge about stability-diversity-complexity relationships, and helps specify 
goalposts by which the SDC debate can eventually be resolved. It also reveals the 
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limited scope of hypotheses adduced thus far to explain a positive correlation 
between stability and diversity/complexity, such as the insurance hypothesis 
(Yachi and Loreau 1999; Lhomme and Winkel 2002) or the weak interaction 
effect (McCann et al. 1998). Due to the controversy it has generated, Chapter 6 
also examines the dispute about whether David Tilman’s (1996, 1999; Lehman 
and Tilman 2000) widely adopted definition of ecological stability biases the 
stability-diversity debate in the positive (Doak et al. 1998; Tilman et al. 1998). 
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CHAPTER 2: EMERGENCE OF THE STABLITITY-DIVERSITY-
COMPLEXITY DEBATE: 1955-1975 
 
 
1. Introduction.  
 To understand what the stability-diversity-complexity (SDC) debate is 
about and the conceptual and methodological issues it raises, this chapter traces 
its history. Rather than attempt to provide a comprehensive history of work done 
on the debate during this period, the goal is to use some of the most important 
work to illustrate why the debate remains unresolved, and to set the context for a 
detailed analysis of the concepts it involves in later chapters. The historical focus 
is therefore selective, but hopefully illuminative. 
 Section 2 begins by analyzing seminal works by Robert MacArthur, 
Charles Elton, David Pimentel, and others that elevated the previously poorly 
formulated question of whether more complicated biological communities are 
more “balanced” to the status of a scientific debate. Part of what this analysis 
reveals are the formidable theoretical and empirical challenges involved in 
evaluating stability-diversity-complexity relationships. Section 3 examines some 
technical attempts to define the concepts of the debate more precisely in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the most important of which was Lewontin’s (1969) analysis of the 
relationship between the concept of ecological stability and mathematical 
concepts of stability. These attempts to define ecological concepts more precisely 
were part of a general trend towards greater emphasis on theoretical development 
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and mathematical modeling in ecology in the late 1950s and 1960s (Lewontin 
1969; Kingsland 1995, Ch. 8). This section concludes by considering a negative 
response to this trend: Hurlbert’s (1971) incisive critique of the concept of 
ecological diversity and the theoretically sophisticated, but biologically 
ungrounded quantitative indices he believed were being proposed for it. Robert 
May’s analysis of mathematical models of biological communities epitomized 
and in many ways represents the pinnacle of the approach Hurlbert criticized, but 
it unquestionably brought greater mathematical rigor and sophistication to the 
SDC debate. Section 4 concludes this chapter by discussing his influential work 
and how it upended (but should not have) the popular belief among ecologists that 
“diversity begets stability.” The historical scope of this chapter from 1955 to 1975 
therefore represents a time period in which the SDC debate began, a strong 
consensus emerged about it, and this consensus dissolved. 
 
2. Origins of the Debate. 
 Robert MacArthur (1955) published the first precise definition of 
ecological stability while still a graduate student of Yale ecologist G. E. 
Hutchinson. The paper, which was MacArthur’s first publication, was an attempt 
to understand how the food web structure of a community could make it stable, 
and a definition of community stability was required to make the question precise. 
MacArthur’s motivation for doing this analysis, about which the 1955 paper 
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provides little indication, was likely the lack of a scientifically rigorous 
explanation of the widespread view that community diversity enhances stability at 
the time (Ives 2005). 
 In an effort to clarify the vague attributions of a “balance of nature” to 
biological systems with a precise definition of ecological stability, MacArthur 
(1955, 534) first noted that ecologists tended to call communities with relatively 
constant population sizes stable, and those with fluctuating populations unstable. 
Stability in this sense denotes constancy. He thought, however, that this confused 
stability with its effects, and offered another account: 
Suppose, for some reason, that one species has an abnormal abundance. Then we 
shall say the community is unstable if the other species change markedly in 
abundance as a result of the first. The less effect this abnormal abundance has on 
the other species, the more stable the community. (1955, 534) 
 
This account identifies the underlying dynamic responsible for constancy, not 
constancy itself, as the proper defining property of stability. Stability in this sense 
depends on how communities respond to disturbance, in this case the one 
abnormal abundance. Smaller changes in other species abundances are indicative 
of a more stable community. Although MacArthur did not use the term, this type 
of stability is a form of resistance to disturbance because its attribution to a 
community is based on the degree one abnormal abundance changes other species 
abundances – specifically, the degree to which other abundances resist changing – 
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rather than on whether the community returns to equilibrium.4 For a community at 
equilibrium, i.e. its populations remain constant if the community is undisturbed, 
high resistance will ensure relative constancy is retained even if the community is 
disturbed. Highly resistant communities will therefore usually exhibit 
approximately constant species abundances through time, which MacArthur 
believed led many to call them stable. For MacArthur, however, constancy is a 
consequence of resistance, not equivalent to it. 
 MacArthur recognized that two properties could account for high 
resistance: (i) interspecific species interactions, such as predation and 
competition; and, (ii) “intrinsic” properties of species, specifically their 
physiologies. Focusing on (i),5 MacArthur (1955, 534) suggested a “qualitative 
condition” for stability: “The amount of choice which the energy has in following 
the paths up through the food web is a measure of the stability of the community.” 
‘Measure’ in this condition is used in the standard statistical sense to represent the 
type of relationship exhibited between positively correlated properties, in the 
same sense that IQ is claimed to measure intelligence for instance. Thus, the 
qualitative condition assumes rather than supports the claim of a positive 
                                                 
4 Orians (1975) and Webster et al. (1975) were probably the first to give this stability concept a 
distinct label. Orians called it ‘inertia’ and Webster et al. called it ‘resistance.’ 
5 MacArthur (1955) did not discuss (ii). In fact, since MacArthur defined stability as resistance to 
an abnormal abundance of some particular species, intrinsic physiological properties of species are 
only important determinants of ecological stability to the extent they affect interactions between 
them, specifically, on how species abundances affect one another. 
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correlation between community stability (understood as resistance) and food web 
structure.  
 MacArthur justified this assumption with an intuitive argument that a large 
number of links in a community’s food web should make it highly resistant. In a 
food web where species S is atypically abundant, other species abundances are 
affected less the more widely S’s “excess energy” is distributed among different 
predators. Similarly, a wide variety of alternative prey for S’s predators would 
minimize the effects an abnormally low abundance of S would have on them. In 
either case, the number of links in a food web is positively correlated with 
community resistance. If correct, note that this argument only establishes a 
positive correlation. It does not justify conflating properties MacArthur used to 
define ecological stability (response to an abnormal abundance) with those that 
may be positively correlated with them (food web structure). Margalef (1958, 61), 
for instance, misinterpreted MacArthur’s analysis in this way: “In [MacArthur’s 
(1955)] sense, stability means, basically, complexity,” (emphasis added).6
 After noting that resistance can be quantified in several ways, MacArthur 
(1955, 534) proposed two “intuitive” adequacy conditions for doing so: 
(i) resistance should be minimal (e.g. 0) for food webs with exactly one 
species at each trophic level (food chains); and, 
                                                 
6 Ives (2005, 160) seems to adopt the same interpretation: “MacArthur (1955) who assumed that 
greater stability is synonymous with the number of pathways along with energy can flow through a 
food web and the equitability of energy flow among pathways,” (emphasis added). 
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(ii) resistance should increase with the number of food web links. 
Conditions (i) and (ii) refer to properties of food webs, not, as MacArthur defined 
resistance, to how communities change after one species becomes abnormally 
abundant. What do (i) and (ii) have to do with quantifying how communities 
change after one species becomes abnormally abundant? What MacArthur was in 
fact doing was proposing adequacy conditions for quantifying the measure of 
resistance he had just argued for: “the amount of choice which the energy has in 
following the paths up through the food web.” Conditions (i) and (ii) were not 
intended to help quantify the concept of resistance as MacArthur defined it. Thus, 
adequacy conditions (i) and (ii) presuppose, rather than establish the truth of his 
intuitive argument about the relationship between food web links and resistance. 





where pi is the proportion of the community’s “food energy” passing through path 
i in the food web, which does not represent anything about how species 
abundances in a community are affected by the abnormal abundance of one 
species.7 The decision to use this index, which he called “arbitrary,” was intended 
                                                 
7 MacArthur (1955, 534) defined a path as a series of links in a food web from producers to top 
consumers. Notice that MacArthur’s use of Shannon’s index differs considerably from the 
interpretation that became standard later in which pi represents the proportion of individuals of 
species i in the community, and the index is intended to represent the diversity of a community 
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to specify a mathematical function satisfying (i) and (ii), although MacArthur 
(1955, 534) noted that it “may be significant” that (1) has the same form as 
standard measures of entropy and information (cf. Shannon 1948; Shannon and 
Weaver 1949).8
 With this quantification of resistance, MacArthur described what 
properties of food webs would maximize it. For m-species communities, (1) is 
maximized when the species are at m different trophic levels and each level-k 
species (k≤m) consumes all species at all lower levels. It is minimized when one 
species consumes the remaining m–1 species, which are all at a single, lower 
trophic level.9 If the species consumed per consumer is held constant, moreover, 
(1) increases with species richness. This fact and the fact that (1) increases with 
the number of food web links entail either that large numbers of species with 
restricted diets, or small numbers that consume many different species can 
produce a particular value of (1). On this basis, MacArthur hypothesized that 
since species poor communities only have high values of (1) when consumers eat 
a wide variety of species, but consumer diets in species rich communities need not 
be similarly restricted to attain the same (1) value, species rich communities will 
usually be more resistant. This prediction may explain, MacArthur (1955, 535) 
                                                                                                                                     
(see Ch. 5, §4). Good (1953) and Margalef (1958) were the first to use the Shannon index to 
represent diversity in this way. 
8 See Chapter 5, Section 4. 
9 In correspondence with Eric Pianka towards the end of his life, MacArthur alluded to doubts 
concerning this claim about minimization (Eric Pianka, personal communication). MacArthur 
unfortunately died before revealing the reason(s) for these doubts. 
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suggested, why Arctic communities, which usually contain fewer species than 
temperate and tropical ones, seemed to exhibit greater population fluctuations. 
 Compared with other ecological research of the time, MacArthur’s 
analysis was one of the most mathematically sophisticated. Instead of focusing on 
empirical evidence, his primary concern was to formulate intuitive ideas about 
food web structure with mathematical precision and explore their implications. 
Unlike his predominantly data-driven contemporaries, Hutchinson encouraged 
this approach to ecological questions among his students (Kingsland 1995). 
Hutchinson believed speculative but mathematically rigorous analyses were 
crucial to stimulating novel approaches to recalcitrant problems (Hagen 1992). By 
challenging ecologists to pinpoint their shortcomings, which mathematical clarity 
helped facilitate, even those later found wanting would stimulate development of 
improved successors. Hutchinson used this argument, for instance, to defend 
publication of Lindeman’s (1942) now classic paper on energy flow in 
ecosystems against referees of Ecology, who criticized it for being too theoretical 
and thus inappropriate for the journal (Cook 1977). 
 Sometimes, however, this kind of speculative research is uncritically 
accepted and treated as definitive. This was especially true of such work in post-
WWII ecology. At that time, many ecologists thought their discipline suffered 
from a general lack of mathematical precision and the absence of a theoretical 
basis (Slobodkin 1953; Margalef 1958). For this reason, another Hutchinson 
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student, Lawrence Slobodkin, originally encouraged MacArthur to pursue 
graduate work in biology with Hutchinson after MacArthur had finished his 
master’s degree in mathematics in 1953 (Kingsland 1995). Five years later 
Slobodkin (1958), praised MacArthur’s (1955) analysis because he believed 
(erroneously) that it provided a general method for ranking the stability of 
different communities based on their qualitative food web structure,10 and that this 
would in turn improve ecological theory by helping classify and conceptualize 
specific mathematical models. Slobodkin thought development of a “unified 
theory of ecology” required analyses like MacArthur’s, and that they would 
remedy a troubling “trend in theoretical ecology towards each investigator 
developing his own equations and systems as if he were alone in the field” (1958, 
551). But Slobodkin (1958) also accepted MacArthur’s explanation of a positive 
relationship between ecological stability and food web structure without scrutiny. 
Hutchinson (1959, 149) similarly exaggerated and mischaracterized MacArthur’s 
explanation as a “formal proof” based on information theory, and Pielou (1966, 
163-164) cited only MacArthur (1955) to support the “fact” that stable 
communities are more diverse than unstable ones. These strong claims were 
especially unsubstantiated given that MacArthur’s (1955) analysis was concerned 
                                                 
 
10 The belief is erroneous because the value of the Shannon index depends on the quantitative 
value of the pi (see [1] above). 
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only with communities exhibiting strictly predator-prey interspecific relations, not 
competitive, mutualistic, commensualistic, etc. relations. 
 Unfamiliar with MacArthur’s work and more wary of ecological theory 
that was not closely tethered to data, British ecologist Charles Elton (1958) took a 
more empirical approach to the issue. Elton founded the famous Oxford Bureau of 
Animal Population in 1932 and was its director for more than three decades. 
Compared with the work of Hutchinson and his students, the research of the 
Bureau was concerned with more empirical and practical ecological projects, such 
as exhaustive biological surveys of small British islands and forests outside 
Oxford, and improving pest control methods for rodents during WWII (Crowcroft 
1991). Out of this focus came a cautious skepticism of the biological relevance of 
Lotka and Volterra’s mathematical models of biological communities, and similar 
approaches to ecological theory (Leibold and Wootton 2001). Specifically, for 
Elton (1958, 131), “there does not seem much doubt that theories that use the 
food-chain for an explanation of the regulation of numbers are oversimplified.” 
Elton focused instead on empirical evidence that seemed to show that some 
communities were more resistant to invasion by exotic species than others, and 
experienced more population fluctuations than others. Several documented cases 
of biological invasions and pest outbreaks on islands and in ecosystems 
“simplified by man” – such as the giant snail (Achatina fulica) in Hawaii, the red 
deer (Cervus elaphus) in New Zealand, and the European red mite 
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(Metatetranychus ulmi) in orchards worldwide – were the main support for his 
analysis (see below). 
 Elton’s concept of ecological stability had two components: resistance to 
invasion and constancy of populations (1958, 145). This differed from MacArthur 
(1955) in two ways. First, constancy was explicitly part of stability whereas 
MacArthur thought constancy was a byproduct of stability, and not an appropriate 
part of its definition. Second, Elton and MacArthur’s concepts of resistance 
depend upon different types of disturbance. MacArthur’s refers to a community’s 
reaction to an abnormal abundance of one species. Elton did not explicitly define 
his concept of resistance, but it presumably refers to the ability to suppress the 
establishment, reproduction, and spatial spread of invasive species, i.e. to resist 
invasion. Ecological stability therefore involves resistance to disturbance for both 
Elton and MacArthur, but each focuses on different types of disturbance. 
Consequently, although Elton (1958) and MacArthur (1955) are commonly cited 
as analyzing the same relationship between stability and diversity (Pimm 1984; 
Lehman and Tilman 2000; McCann 2000), their analyses presuppose different 
stability concepts. 
 Their analyses also study different properties of a community’s structure. 
Elton (1958, 145) did not explicitly define ‘rich’ and ‘simple’ in his claim that 
“simple communities...[rather than] richer ones...[are] more subject to destructive 
oscillations in populations, especially of animals, and more vulnerable to 
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invasions,” but species richness, not food web structure as in MacArthur’s 
analysis, was the primary focus of the six kinds of evidence he presented in its 
support (1958, 146-150): 
(i) despite his skepticism about their ecological relevance, Elton noted that 
simple mathematical models of one-predator, one-prey communities 
predicted fluctuations of population sizes and often mutual extinction, 
even in the absence of external disturbances; 
(ii) experiments on microscopic one-predator, one-prey communities 
exhibited the same behavior as these mathematical models. Elton (1958) 
cited Gause (1934), who showed that population fluctuations to the point 
of extinction were typical in simple protozoan communities;11 
(iii) small oceanic islands with few species seemed to be more vulnerable to 
invasion than similar continental areas of the same size and, Elton 
assumed, more species;   
(iv) successful invasions and population explosions of invasive species 
occurred more often in communities “simplified by man.” Elton suggested 
four types of simplification as potential causes: (a) cultivation of exotic 
plants without introduction of the fauna normally accompanying them; (b) 
cultivation of these exotics in partial or complete monocultures; (c) 
                                                 
11 Gause (1934) also showed that prey refuges could drastically influence the dynamics of these 
simple communities. Refuges did not end population fluctuations, but they usually did prevent 
extinction. On this basis, Elton (1958) presciently hypothesized that habitat structure and 
metapopulation dynamics may strongly influence the stability of natural communities. 
 22
eradication of species that reputedly harm cultivated plants; and, (d) 
selection of only a few genetic strains for cultivation; 
(v) tropical communities, which contain more species and more complicated 
intra- and inter-specific dynamics than temperate communities, 
experienced fewer population explosions, especially of insects; and, 
(vi) orchards, which are relatively simple ecological systems, were frequently 
successfully invaded. Elton suggested that pesticides usually decrease 
species richness in orchards and eradicate predators of herbivorous insects, 
which in turn facilitates invasions by exotic species and explosions in 
natural pest populations. 
Since Elton included both constancy and invasion resistance in his concept of 
ecological stability, (i)–(vi) address different aspects of the SDC debate. (i) and 
(ii) focus on the lack of constancy, rather than invasibility, of microscopic 
communities and mathematical models of communities that contain few species. 
The lack of constancy, not invasibility, of temperate vs. tropical communities is 
also the focus of (v). On the other hand, (iii), (iv), and (vi) concern the greater 
invasibility of artificially simple or simplified communities – agricultural 
monocultures like orchards, for instance – and islands which contain relatively 
few species compared with continental regions of equivalent size. 
 Along with MacArthur (1955), Elton (1958) has frequently been cited in 
support of a positive stability-diversity relationship. Elton (1958, 146) was careful 
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to emphasize, however, the exploratory nature of his analysis, and he explicitly 
stressed the need for further data collection and study of the issue. An extensive 
review almost twenty years later (Goodman 1975), in fact, revealed some of the 
ways in which subsequent ecological work had failed to support Elton’s 
predictions. 
 Goodman (1975) first pointed out that (i) and (ii) are only compelling if 
community models and microscopic communities with higher species richness 
exhibit less population fluctuation and fewer extinctions than those with fewer 
species, which was (and remains) unestablished.12 Second, (iv) and (vi) were not 
based on controlled experiments and, Goodman further suggested, the simplified 
ecological systems in question may have achieved highly stable equilibria with 
their invasive pests were they not continually disturbed by cultivation. Third, (iii) 
is only compelling if the possibility that island communities are more susceptible 
to invasion than continental communities, irrespective of species richness, can be 
excluded as the cause of the pattern. Elton (1958) had not eliminated this 
possibility and Goodman noted that Preston’s (1968) work on the evolution of 
island species might provide a better explanation of the greater invasibility of 
island communities than their supposed lower species richness. Fourth, the 
observations of population fluctuations in temperate regions and relative 
                                                 
 
12 May’s (1974) analysis of mathematical models of communities, for instance, seems to confirm 
the opposite (see §4). 
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constancy of tropical populations that constituted Elton’s support for (v) had not 
been born out by subsequent studies. By the early 1970s, population fluctuations 
and insect outbreaks in the tropics that rivaled those in temperate regions had 
been observed (Leigh 1975; Wolda 1978). Their apparent preponderance in 
temperate compared to tropical regions was probably an artifact of the greater 
attention and resources devoted to the former. 
 While Elton’s (1958) monograph was in press, Cornell entomologist 
David Pimentel (1961) conducted the first experimental test of a stability-
diversity relationship in fallow fields outside Ithaca, New York. During the 
summers of 1957 and 1958, Pimentel planted wild cabbage (Brassica oleracea) in 
two fields, one containing approximately 300 plant species and another in which 
he removed all other plants. He then observed differences in the insect and 
arachnid communities that developed on individual B. oleracea plants in the two 
fields, and found that the densities of a few pest insects increased dramatically in 
the monoculture and that more herbivores resided on the monoculture plants than 
on those in the multi species community. Although Pimentel did not analyze the 
statistical significance of his results, he and other ecologists (e.g. Connell and 
Orians 1964) believed they showed that insect outbreaks were more severe in the 
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monoculture and thereby confirmed a positive relationship between ecological 
diversity and stability.13
 One shortcoming of Pimentel’s study is that diversity was narrowly 
measured as species richness in his experimental design and data analysis. 
Changes in species richness are relatively easy to measure, but they show nothing 
about changes in the proportions of individual organisms in each species of a 
community, i.e. changes in evenness, and little about community dynamics. 
Evenness is an important component of ecological diversity, so measuring 
diversity as species richness limits what Pimentel’s study, and any other study 
using this diversity measure, can show about stability-diversity relationships.14
 Even with this narrow measure, furthermore, it is unclear the experimental 
results justify Pimentel’s (1961, 84) claim that, “The lack of diversity in...[the] 
single-species [monoculture] planting allowed outbreaks to occur.” The problem 
is that there are two types of diversity in the monoculture field: plant and faunal 
diversity. In fact, the low plant diversity of the monoculture was accompanied by 
increases in insect and arachnid richness on the monoculture plants (higher than 
those on Brassica plants in the other field)15 and the latter may have been a more 
                                                 
13 This claim continues to be made (e.g. Tilman 1999, 1457 and Ives 2005, 172) despite problems 
in Pimentel’s experimental design and analysis discussed below. 
14 Pimentel (1961) should not be singled out for criticism. Almost all empirical studies of 
stability-diversity relationships use species richness as the surrogate for diversity, probably 
because evenness is so difficult to estimate in the field. Nonetheless, richness is a poor measure of 
diversity (see §3 below; Ch. 5; and Sarkar 2007).  
 
15 The differences were 27 taxa versus 50 in 1957, and 39 versus 50 in 1958 (Pimentel 1961, 79). 
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important determinant of outbreaks. Thus, while Pimentel interpreted his data as 
evidence of a positive relationship between diversity (measured as plant richness) 
and stability (absence of pest outbreaks), it could also be interpreted as evidence 
of a positive relationship between diversity (measured as insect/arachnid richness) 
and instability (indicated by the outbreaks). Without separating the effects of plant 
species richness from insect/arachnid richness on outbreak likelihood, Pimentel’s 
results do not provide unequivocal support of a positive stability-diversity 
relationship. 
 Another problem is that Pimentel created the monoculture by removing 
the extant plant community of one field, whereas Brassica individuals were 
comparatively unobtrusively added to the 300 species plant community of the 
other field. Removing extant plants undoubtedly initially eliminated predators of 
Brassica herbivores so that herbivores already on Brassica that were planted or 
that immigrated to the monoculture could reproduce unchecked, while herbivores 
in the other field faced their usual set of predators and did not increase. In other 
words, creation of the Brassica monoculture eliminated an important component 
of the extant animal community in that field, whereas the animal community of 
the other field was relatively undisturbed. The outbreaks may therefore have been 
a consequence of the disturbance that eliminated predators of Brassica herbivores, 
rather than the low plant species richness of the monoculture. Pimentel (1961, 84) 
recognized this potential confounding effect, and responded: 
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the investigator doubts that the time-lag factor [i.e. that fauna had to immigrate to 
the plants in the monoculture] played a major role in the outbreaks, because wild 
Cruciferae were flourishing adjacent to all plots and provided ample sources of 
taxa for invasion of the single-species plots. 
 
Whether this response is adequate or not, the problem could have been avoided if 
Pimentel had eliminated all the plants from both fields and then planted a 
monoculture and a multi-plant species community.16
 In discussing his results, Pimentel’s (1961) proposed two important 
hypotheses about possible causes of a positive relationship between species 
richness and constancy of populations. Pimentel may have been the first biologist 
to recognize that a “portfolio effect” might produce a positive relationship in the 
same way a diversity of investments usually reduces financial risk (1961, 84): 
Each host or prey species reacts differently to the same environmental conditions. 
One host population may decline as another host population increases. This tends 
to dampen the oscillations of the interacting host and parasite populations and 
provides greater stability to the system as a whole. 
 
Although isolated one-predator, one-prey communities may fluctuate, this 
behavior is collectively averaged out in interactions between multiple predator 
and prey species so that these systems exhibit more constant total population sizes 
overall. Tilman (1996, 1999) has recently invoked this mechanism to explain an 
apparent positive correlation between ecological stability and diversity observed 
for Minnesota grasslands (see Ch. 6). 
                                                 
16 On the other hand, if the fauna had been preserved in the monoculture field – by transplanting 
insects and arachnids for instance – outbreaks may not have occurred. 
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 Pimentel’s (1961) second hypothesis assumes that the density of each prey 
species of a particular predator species is controlled by that predator within some 
density range. Perhaps below that range the predator may not detect the prey, and 
above it predation may not sufficiently suppress prey density. Given this 
assumption, Pimentel believed high numbers of different predator species would 
likely control prey densities for greater ranges. Thus, if an environmental 
disturbance favorable to a particular prey species caused its density to exceed a 
particular predator’s control range, another predator species would likely suppress 
it in predator rich communities, especially if the communities contain predators 
that consume a wide variety of prey. Predator species diversity, therefore, 
functions to increase community resistance to environmental disturbance, and this 
in turn increases constancy of the community. This hypothesis has limited scope 
as a general account of putative stability-diversity relationships because it is 
restricted to purely predator-prey communities and depends crucially on the 
nature of the control mechanism exerted by predators on prey. However, the 
underlying idea, that stability increases as the number of species and their 
interconnections increase, was the focus of May’s influential analysis of stability-
complexity relationships (see §4 below). 
 
3. Mathematization of the Stability-Diversity-Complexity Debate.  
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 Although it was probably the first experimental study of the SDC debate, 
Pimentel’s (1961) work received much less attention than the first theoretical 
analysis of the debate by MacArthur (1955). This likely reflected the 
transformation of ecology into a more mathematical and theoretical discipline 
occurring at the time. Largely through the work of Hutchinson and his students 
(most importantly MacArthur), mathematical modeling became more 
sophisticated and prevalent within ecology in the 1960s. Ecologists became 
increasingly concerned with formalization and theoretical systematization of 
ecological concepts (Kingsland 1995). Hutchinson’s (1957) highly abstract set-
theoretic definition of the niche as an n-dimensional hypervolume is one example, 
as were attempts to develop precise definitions and measures of ecological 
stability, diversity, and complexity by mathematically oriented ecologists around 
the same time. Lewontin (1969, 13) captured the intellectual shift within ecology: 
“To many ecologists their science has seemed to undergo a major transformation 
in the last 10 years, from a qualitative and descriptive science to a quantitative 
and theoretical one.” 
In the context of this transformation, the stability theory of linearized 
differential equations might have seemed to provide an adequate framework for 
evaluating stability-diversity-complexity relationships. For instance, the dynamics 
of a biological community near equilibrium could be represented mathematically 
with such equations, and formal stability criteria developed for them could be 
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used to assess whether the community was ecologically stable (see Ch. 4, §2). 
This was one of the methods utilized by Lotka and Volterra, for example, to 
analyze the stability of biological communities (e.g. Lotka 1925, Ch. 6; Volterra 
1939). 
A problem with this specific modeling strategy, however, revealed a 
general difficulty with the new theoretical orientation of ecology: achieving 
mathematical precision and rigor often made empirical measurement more 
difficult. For this reason, Patten (1961) criticized the ecological relevance of the 
stability theory of linear differential equations.17 He pointed out that representing 
ecological systems with these equations involves numerous parameters that 
require extensive quantitative data to estimate accurately, data which are 
practically impossible to obtain in the field. To illustrate the problem, consider a 
community represented by: 
(2) );()( t
dt
td Axx =  
where x(t) is a vector  (i=1,...,n) representing the densities of 
n species, and A is an n×n  matrix of constant real coefficients [a
>< ni xxxx ,...,,...,, 21
ij] representing 
(linear) relationships between species near equilibrium, such as competition, 
predation, mutualism, etc. The problem Patten recognized is that the aij are 
                                                 
 
17 Patten (1961) does not cite any specific ecologist as the target of his criticism, so the intended 
target may just have been a tacit assumption among ecologists that this was a useful method for 
analyzing the stability of biological communities. 
 31
extremely difficult to measure for complex, natural communities. Thus, “[s]ince it 
is usually not possible to obtain sufficient data to represent natural ecosystems 
canonically [as in (2)] and since they are probably not linear, formal stability 
criteria are not generally available for ecological applications” (Patten 1961, 
1011). 
 Patten attempted to rectify this problem by proposing a more empirically 
tractable measure of community stability (S). It is based on time series data for 
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dn pp 18 Patten noted that ,11 ≤≤− S  and suggested that  indicates 
instability and  indicates stability. 
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S can be applied to biological systems, such as ecological communities, as 
well as abiotic systems. Patten illustrated this by calculating S for a community of 
plankton species in the York River of Virginia, and for several abiotic variables 
representing the environment of the plankton: temperature, chlorinity, dissolved 
oxygen, etc. Measurements were made weekly for 10 weeks to estimate the 
transitional probabilities (  from above) of the plankton species and aquatic 
variables. Since these probabilities assume that variable behavior depends only on 
its immediately previous behavior, S treats these systems as Markov processes.
ip
19 
Patten found that the plankton species were 5.4 times more stable than abiotic 
variables representing their environment. 
 Conceptually, Patten suggested S measures “the resistance of the 
communities to change of state” (1961, 1010), which seems to accord with 
MacArthur’s (1955) concept of ecological stability, and that it measures “the 
degree of homeostasis” (1961, 1011), which seems to connote a more general 
                                                 
18 If the variables remain constant,  and  are not well-defined. indp
i
nnp
19 Specifically, the pi do not consider possible dependencies between values of variables that are 
nonsequential. Whether this Markov assumption accurately reflects the dynamics of biological 
communities is currently unclear. It seems to be incompatible, for instance, with the existence of 
delayed density dependence (see Stenseth 1999; Wootton 2001; Turchin 2003). 
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capability to remain unchanging.20 In fact, S measures a property distinct from 
MacArthur’s resistance, but essential to ecological stability.  
 Note that S is greatest when  and  for all i, i.e. 
when each species tends towards its original value after increase or decrease. In 
this case, the system will likely return to its original state following any 
disturbance that causes variables to change. The system will not inevitably return 
to its original state unless the magnitude of the subsequent increase (decrease) 
following decrease (increase) is always less than the initial change. If this is the 
case, the system will exhibit damped oscillations towards its original state. If this 










 The wide variety of different types and strengths of disturbances make it 
highly likely  and  will differ from unity and  and  will differ from 
zero. Some disturbances, for example, cause decreases in species density that 
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that species and makes  The closer  and  are to unity and  and 
 are to zero, however, the higher the probability species i will return to its 


















                                                 
20 Warburton (1955) had analyzed similar feedback mechanisms in the context of evolutionary 
theory. 
21 Patten did not consider this possibility, however, and his understanding of S as a measure of 
homeostasis assumes changes of increasing amplitude will not occur. 
 34
values, the likelihood of this return decreases. These probabilities therefore 
represent the likelihood a species (more generally, whatever the variables 
designate) will return to its initial value following a disturbance. As a function of 
these values, S consequently represents the likelihood a community (more 
generally, any system) will return to its initial state after disturbance. Since the 
likelihood a system returns to an initial state after being disturbed must be judged 
against different types and strengths of disturbances, systems with higher S values 
can sustain a wider variety and stronger disturbances and still return to the initial 
state. They will therefore return to their initial states more often after disturbance. 
Thus, S represents a kind of system tolerance to disturbance, which departed from 
earlier understandings of community stability as resistance or constancy.22
 MacArthur also departed from his early understanding of stability as 
resistance in an analysis of predator-prey interactions. Working with one of his 
students, Michael Rosenzweig, MacArthur showed how different types of 
predator-prey relationships could be represented in graphs of their isoclines 
(Rosenzweig and MacArthur 1963). An isocline of a variable x is the set of its 
values for which 0=
dt
dx . Different predator isocline shapes, they showed, 
represent different kinds of predator-prey systems. Depending on the isocline 
                                                 
 
22 Orians (1975) was probably the first to give this stability concept a distinct label, ‘amplitude.’ It 
is commonly called ‘domain of attraction’ stability by ecologists (e.g. Grimm and Wissel 1997; 
Pianka 2000). 
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shape, the predator could be limited at an equilibrium density by its own density 
(e.g. by density-dependent competition), prey density, or both. Figure 1 illustrates 
an example of their technique.  
On the assumption that predator-prey interactions near equilibrium are 
adequately represented by simple linear differential equations, Rosenzweig and 
MacArthur showed how well-known mathematical facts about stable equilibria 
could be graphically represented, and what the resulting representation indicated 
about predator-prey relationships. Unlike MacArthur’s earlier work (MacArthur 
1955), however, the concept of stability their analysis presupposed was based on 
the rate of return to equilibrium, not resistance. They demonstrated, for instance, 
that: “the prey slope must almost always be negative for stability and the greater 
the negativity of [the slope], the more stable the interaction” (1963, 220). 
Rosenzweig and MacArthur did not elaborate on the second clause of this 
statement, but the basis for it was that predator and prey densities return to 
equilibrium more rapidly the lower the value of the prey isocline slope. As a 
concept of ecological stability this later came to be known as resilience, and 
captures the idea that the quicker a community returns to a reference state after 
being disturbed, the more stable it is.23 This concept of stability was distinct from 
MacArthur’s earlier conception of stability as resistance. It is a stability concept 
                                                 
23 Orians (1975), again, seems to have been the first to give this stability concept a distinct label, 
‘elasticity.’ It is usually referred to as ‘resilience’ by ecologists today (e.g. Pimm 1984, 1991; 
Pianka 2000). 
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encountered frequently in applied mathematics, especially dynamic systems 
theory, however, and MacArthur’s regular perusal of mathematical texts (Pianka 
and Horn 2005) may be responsible for his adopting it (see Ch. 4, §2). 
 With several distinct senses of stability in the ecological literature by the 
mid 1960s – resistance, resilience, tolerance, and constancy – it became clear to 
many ecologists that a critical assessment of the concept was needed.24 The need 
for such an appraisal was not limited to ecological stability. Many fundamental 
but problematically unclear ecological concepts were being examined at that time 
to determine whether they could be reformulated within mathematical 
frameworks used in other sciences, especially physics (e.g. Kerner 1957, 1959; 
Lewontin 1969). Doing so would specify their meaning clearly and possibly 
integrate them into a common mathematical framework. Theoretical unification of 
this kind had proved fruitful in physics, and ecologists had similar aspirations for 
their discipline. The existence of a well-developed mathematical theory of 
stability made such a rethinking of ecological stability seem especially promising 
and in May a symposium at Brookhaven National Laboratory was ostensibly 
devoted to examining the meaning of stability and diversity (Woodwell and Smith 
1969, v). Only one paper seriously addressed this task (Lewontin 1969), but it 
profoundly impacted the subsequent development of the SDC debate. 
                                                 
24 See Chapter 4, Table 1 for a comprehensive list of different senses of stability found in the 
ecological literature.  
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 Lewontin (1969) surveyed various mathematical notions of stability and 
their relation to ecological stability. He began by representing a biological 
community of n species as a vector >=< )(),...,(),()( 21 txtxtxt nx  in an n-
dimensional vector space H where t represents time. Different coordinates of x 
were intended to represent different abundances or densities of the n species in the 
community. A deterministic vector function T over H,  represents the 
mechanisms responsible for the dynamics of the community.
,: HH →T
25 T represents, 
therefore, density-dependencies, interspecific interactions, gene flow, etc. within 
and between the n species and the effects environmental parameters have on these 
species. T is often specified, for instance, in matrix form by a mathematical model 
of the community (e.g. [2] from above). Application of T to x usually induces a 
change in the vector’s coordinates. Points in H for which ,IT =  where I is the 
identity matrix, induce no change in x and are called equilibrium points. A vector 
at such a point will not move from it. 
 Within this framework, Lewontin distinguished “neighborhood” stability 
(also called local Lyapunov stability) from global stability. Let xq be the position 
vector for some equilibrium point. Following the mathematical theory of stability 
pioneered by Lyapunov (1892 [1992]), xq is neighborhood stable if and only if for 
any x arbitrarily close to xq: 
                                                 
 
25 Note that T defines a vector field on H.  
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where  designates n applications of T to x. The subset of H within which 
vectors satisfy (4) defines the domain of attraction of x
)(xTn
q. Restricting attention to 
vectors arbitrarily close to xq allows approximation of T by a linear vector 
function L. In effect, T behaves as a linear vector function arbitrarily close to xq. 
This linearization of T, in turn, allows evaluation of (4) with well-known 
mathematical techniques (see Hirsch and Smale 1974). If (4) holds for all of H 
and not just arbitrarily close to xq, xq is called globally stable. 
 By representing the perturbation of a biological community as a 
displacement from xq to x, the community’s stability can be described by local 
and global stability. The set of perturbations (represented by the displaced vectors 
x) for which the community returns to equilibrium (represented by xq) determines 
its attraction domain. In ecological terms, locally and globally stable communities 
are often informally characterized as those that return to equilibrium after “very 
small” perturbations – such as slight climatic disturbances perhaps – and those 
that return after any perturbation.26
 Lewontin (1969, 16) argued local stability inadequately defines ecological 
stability because it only describes system behavior arbitrarily close to a particular 
point in H. Strictly speaking, therefore, local stability only describes system 
                                                 
 
26 See Chapter 4, Section 2 for a detailed criticism of defining ecological stability in this way. 
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behavior for infinitesimal displacements from xq. Real-world perturbations, 
however, are obviously not infinitesimal in magnitude. Any real perturbation will 
expel a system at a strictly locally stable equilibrium from its infinitesimal 
stability domain. In the same Brookhaven symposium, Preston (1969) also 
emphasized the fundamental obscurity of how infinitesimal displacement can be 
biologically interpreted (or empirically measured). Local stability therefore says 
nothing about system response to real-world perturbation. In contrast, Lewontin 
suggested that the stability of an ecological system depends upon the (non-
infinitesimal) size of its attraction domain. If the formally precise notion of 
‘arbitrarily close’ is informally construed as ‘very close,’ moreover, local stability 
still only describes system behavior for very small perturbations and thus provides 
little or no information about attraction domain size.27 For this reason, local 
stability poorly defines ecological stability. 
 Local and global stability also poorly define ecological stability, Lewontin 
added, because they are dichotomous concepts, whereas biological communities 
seem to exhibit different degrees of stability. Elton and MacArthur’s concepts of 
ecological stability confirm Lewontin’s claim: Elton believed monocultures were 
less stable than “natural” communities, and the Shannon index MacArthur used to 
operationalize stability obviously takes values other than 1 and 0. The concepts of 
                                                 
27 Of course, if T were linear over all of H, local and global stability coincide (May 1974). The 
dynamics of almost all ecological systems, however, are nonlinear. 
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tolerance and resilience underlying Patten’s (1961) and Rosenzweig and 
MacArthur’s (1963) conceptions of ecological stability are matters of degree also.  
 These distinct senses of stability also have natural counterparts in 
Lewontin’s framework. Consider the domain of attraction D of some equilibrium 
xq. Tolerance – roughly, an ecological system’s ability to withstand disturbance 
and still return to equilibrium – can be represented by the size and configuration 
of D. Whether an ecological system represented by x returns to xq after being 
disturbed depends on the strength and type of disturbance. Regions of D far from 
xq represent strong system tolerance to types of disturbance for which it can be 
severely disturbed and still return to xq. Regions of D close to xq represent weak 
system tolerance to types of disturbance for which it can only be disturbed 
slightly and return to xq.28 Resilience – roughly, the rate an ecological system 
returns to equilibrium after being disturbed – can be represented by the 
“steepness” of D.29 A system in a steep domain of attraction like D will return to 
xq rapidly after being disturbed from it. An unperturbed system at xq, furthermore, 
will remain stationary (constant) at xq.  
 Resistance, which Lewontin (1969) did not discuss, can also be 
conceptualized in this framework as the tendency of the system to remain near xq 
following disturbance. MacArthur’s (1955) concept of resistance, for instance, is 
                                                 
28 Determining tolerance therefore requires a distance measure between vectors.  
29 “Steepness” of a domain of attraction is determined by the gradient (∇) of the vector function 
(T) describing the system’s dynamics, ∇T (see Ch. 4, §2.3). 
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measured in terms of how other species abundances change in relation to the 
abundance of one species that has been disturbed to an atypical level. If this 
disturbance is represented by displacement of x in a particular direction of H,30 
resistance can be represented by how x behaves after displacement, specifically, 
by its subsequent deviance from xq or lack thereof.31 Each of these four concepts 
of ecological stability – resistance, resilience, tolerance, and constancy – has a 
counterpart within Lewontin’s vector space framework.32
 Lewontin drew an important distinction between stability as a 
perturbation-based concept, which resistance, resilience, and tolerance are, and 
nonperturbation-based concepts, such as constancy. Constancy, Lewontin (1969, 
21) suggested, “is a property of the actual system of state variables. If the point 
representing the system is at a fixed position, the system is constant. Stability, on 
the other hand, is a property of the dynamical space in which the system is 
evolving.” The two concepts are therefore different and not necessarily 
coextensive. A system in a large, steep domain of attraction, for instance, may be 
in constant flux due to frequent external perturbations. Conversely, an 
                                                 
30 Specifically, the abnormal abundance of one species would be represented by a change in one 
coordinate of x. 
31 Notice, however, that MacArthur’s (1955) concept of resistance does not require the 
community return to a predisturbance state like an equilibrium. 
32 The stability concepts of resistance, resilience, and tolerance have counterparts in Lewontin’s 
framework, but they are not adequately definable within it. The problem is that only disturbances 
of a particular kind – those that affect only system variables and leave system parameters 
unchanged – are representable in Lewontin’s framework. Chapter 4, Section 2 argues resistance, 
resilience, and tolerance must be defined with respect to a broader, more realistic conception of 
disturbance that recognizes that disturbances can change system parameters. 
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unperturbed system may be constant at an unstable equilibrium. Partly for this 
reason, Chapter 4 argues ecological stability should not be defined in terms of 
constancy. 
 Lewontin briefly described one additional stability concept, structural 
stability. Andronov and Pontrjagin (1937) introduced this concept in an analysis 
of vector fields on the Euclidean plane, and Peixoto (1959) generalized the 
concept for n-dimensional systems. Informally, the property the concept 
represents is that small changes in the parameters of the equations describing a 
vector field do not change the topology of the vector field. Within biology, little 
or no work was devoted to this concept until the mathematician René Thom 
(1970, 1975) made it the basis of catastrophe theory. This theory categorized 
different ways systems may fail to be structurally stable, i.e. bifurcate, into 
distinct qualitative types. Thom then attempted to explain a wide variety of 
putative bifurcation processes in nature with this classification, for example, in 
geology, crystal formation, and biological morphogenesis.33
 In an ecological context, if R is a set of equations that describe a vector 
field T representing the dynamics of a biological community, T is structurally 
stable if and only if, “a very small change in parameters [of R] will make a very 
small change in the configuration of the vector field [T]” (Lewontin 1969, 21). 
                                                 
33 A better understanding of the structural stabilities and instabilities involved in the concept of a 
morphogenetic field within embryology, however, was Thom’s (1975) main focus of application 
of catastrophe theory. The well-known embryologist C. H. Waddington, for instance, wrote the 
foreword to Thom’s text. 
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Specifically, very small changes in parameters of R should produce little change 
in the number, position, or configuration of equilibrium points, limit cycles, and 
other attractors of T.34 The resulting vector field should be, May (1974, 17) later 
clarified, topologically isomorphic to the original vector field. 
 Neither Lewontin nor May pursued the project of defining ecological 
stability as structural stability, and both focused on Lyapunov stability instead. 
Rather than reflect a judgment that structural stability is irrelevant to ecology,35 
their decision more likely reflects the fact that structural stability is a much more 
technically complex mathematical concept than Lyapunov stability, and that its 
application within ecology therefore appeared to be much more difficult.36
 Compared to the concept of ecological stability, less attention was devoted 
to clarifying the concept of ecological diversity or complexity in the early SDC 
debate. Significant disagreement about how the concept of diversity should be 
measured, however, emerged during the 1960s (Magurran 1988, 2004).37 By the 
early 1970s, moreover, enough attention was being devoted to common indices of 
                                                 
34 A limit cycle corresponds to a periodic solution of a set of differential equations towards which 
the system is asymptotically attracted. An attractor is any solution set towards which a system is 
asymptotically attracted (see Ch. 4). 
35 May (1974, 18) suggested that structural stability “is likely to be one of the growth points of 
theoretical ecology.”  
36 Lewontin’s (1969, 22) hope that, “structural instabilities will prove to be the exception,” rather 
than the norm, in any case, had been invalidated by Smale’s (1966) proof, cited by May (1974), 
that structurally stable systems are rare (more precisely, not dense) among systems with more than 
three variables. 
37 In contrast, the issue of how the complexity of a biological community should be measured 
received little or no attention within ecology during this period. Chapter 5 addresses this issue and 
analyzes the concept of ecological diversity in detail. 
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diversity to spark criticism, perhaps the most incisive from Hurlbert (1971) (see 
below).  
Conceptually, ecologists at the time widely agreed that diversity has two 
main components: species richness and evenness (see Ch. 1 and 5). Distinct 
quantitative diversity indices result from different ways of quantifying and 
integrating these two notions. For a clearer understanding of these concepts, 
consider two simple communities, A and B, both composed of two species s1 and 
s2. A and B have the same species richness. If the percentages of individuals 
distributed among the two species are .02% and 99.98% for A and 50% and 50% 
for B, respectively, B seems more diverse than A. This can be represented by a 
higher evenness value for B. Besides that a diversity index should increase with 
species richness, therefore, another reasonable adequacy condition seems to be 
that it should increase with evenness. Many distinct quantitative indices, however, 
satisfy these two adequacy conditions (see Ch. 5, Table 2). 
 Probably the most popular index of community diversity, then and now, is 
the Shannon index (H) (see equation [1], §2). The index was originally intended 
to quantify the amount of information in a communicated message (Shannon and 
Weaver 1949). Good (1953) and Margalef (1958) were the first to use it as an 
index of diversity. In the ecological context, pi designates the proportion of 
individuals in the i-th species of a community, so that H is at its maximal value 
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for a given species richness n (H = ln(n)) when the individuals are equally 
distributed among the species.  
 Another common diversity index (D) is the complement of Simpson’s 









Simpson (1949) explained that his concentration index represents the probability 
that two individuals chosen at random (with replacement) from a community will 
belong to the same species, so D represents the probability the two individuals 
will belong to different species. This probability, like Shannon’s index, is at its 
maximal value for a given species richness n (
n
D 11−= ) when individuals are 
equally distributed among the species. D is more sensitive to the abundances of 
species and less sensitive to species richness than Shannon’s index (May 1975; 
Magurran 1988, 2004).39 Hurlbert (1971) later proposed, furthermore, that if D is 
multiplied by ,
1−N
N  the resulting index represents the probability of interspecific 
encounter in the community.40
                                                 







 is also a common index of diversity 
(Levins 1968). 
39 Rényi (1961) showed that the Simpson and Shannon indices are members of a family of entropy 
measures (see Ch. 5). 
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 By the late 1960s, a large number of diversity indices had been developed, 
and numerous empirical studies of different ecological systems were being 
conducted to estimate diversity using these indices (Pielou 1975; Magurran 1988, 
2004; Sarkar 2007). In an influential critique of this ecological research agenda, 
Hurlbert (1971, 577) argued that, “the term ‘species diversity’ has been defined in 
such various and disparate ways that it now conveys no information other than 
‘something to do with community structure’,” and that this indicated a 
fundamental vagueness of the underlying concept. He thought ecologists had 
further exacerbated this problem by appropriating statistical measures of diversity 
developed in nonbiological contexts with dubious ecological relevance. Rather 
than attempt to rehabilitate the concept by proposing adequacy conditions by 
which to evaluate the relative merits and weaknesses of different indices,41 
therefore, Hurlbert suggested the search for stability-diversity relationships should 
be refocused on the relationship between community stability and indices that 
reflect biologically meaningful properties that might influence community 
dynamics. His index of the probability of interspecific encounter is one example. 
Species richness seems to fail this test since it is generally unlikely that extremely 
rare species (e.g. s1 in community A above) play an important role in community 
                                                                                                                                     
40 Sugihara (1982) later pointed out that this interpretation of D assumes that the frequencies of 
interspecific encounters are proportional to the relative abundances of the species (see Ch. 5, §3).  
41 Chapter 5 takes this project up in detail.  
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dynamics.42 Species richness was and remains, however, the predominant 
measure of diversity in analyses of stability-diversity relationships (e.g. Tilman 
1996, 1999). 
 
4. The End of the Consensus.  
 By the early 1970s, a strong consensus had emerged that ecological 
diversity/complexity is positively correlated with, and probably causally 
responsible for, the stability of communities (May 1974, 37; Levins 1974, 129; 
DeAngelis 1975, 238; Pimm 1991, 9-10).43 In a textbook on environmental 
science, for instance, Watt (1973) deemed the claim that biological diversity 
promotes population stability a core principle of the discipline. A half decade 
later, the consensus had evaporated. The main reason for its demise was the 
publication of rigorous analyses of mathematical models of communities that 
seemed to show increased complexity actually decreased stability. 
 In a one-page Nature paper, Gardner and Ashby (1970) initiated the first 
doubts with an analysis of the relationship between complexity and asymptotic 
                                                 
42 This is not to deny there are cases in which very rare species play an important role in 
community dynamics. 
43 At that time, a clear distinction between diversity – which depends upon how individuals are 
distributed among the species of a community – and complexity – which depends upon how 
species interact in a community – had not been made within the context of the SDC debate. Recall 
from Chapter 1 that both diversity and complexity increase with species richness, but complexity 
may decrease with increasing evenness (and vice versa) and diversity may decrease with 
increasing connectance and species interaction strength (and vice versa). See Chapter 5.  
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Lyapunov stability in linear models such as (2) from above.44 Understood as a 
model of a biological community, the coefficient aij from (2) represents the effect 
of species j on species i. Its quantitative value represents the effect’s magnitude 
and its sign represents whether the effect is positive or negative. For these models, 
complexity was defined in terms of the number of variables (n) and connectance 
(C). Gardner and Ashby defined connectance as the percentage of nonzero 
coefficients in A. 
Values of the diagonal elements of A were randomly chosen from the 
interval [–1, –0.1] to ensure each variable was “intrinsically stable,” i.e. self 
damped. In models of biological communities, a diagonal element (aii) of A 
represents the intra-specific effect of species i on itself. Since its quantitative 
value represents the effect’s magnitude and its sign represents whether the effect 
is positive or negative, negative values represent a self-damping effect, as could 
be caused by overcrowding as a population increases, for example. For given 
values of n and C, Gardner and Ashby then randomly distributed an equal number 
of –1 and +1 values within the off-diagonal parts of A in accord with the C value. 
Whether systems represented by (2) are stable depends upon the eigenvalues of A. 
These are scalar value roots λi of the characteristic polynomial of A, |A−λI|=0, 
                                                 
44 Gardner and Ashby (1970) analyzed linear models. Since nonlinear models can be linearized in 
the local neighborhood of an equilibrium if they are differentiable, the relationship Gardner and 
Ashby found between stability and complexity for linear models also holds between local stability 
and complexity of linearized models. 
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where I is the identity matrix. Lyapunov ([1892] 1992) proved an equilibrium of a 
system represented by (2) is asymptotically stable iff: 
(6) Reλi(A)<0 for i=1,…,n; 
where Reλi(A) designates the real part of λi, the i-th eigenvalue of A. Whether (6) 
holds depends on the pattern of nonzero values within A. Different 
randomizations specify different patterns, which may produce different stability 
results as evaluated by (6). The probability of stability for given values of n and C 
can therefore be approximated with results from a sufficiently large number of 
randomizations. Contrary to most expectations, Gardner and Ashby found the 
probability of local stability was negatively correlated with n, and with C. 
Interpreted ecologically, their analysis seemed to show that more species (greater 
n) and a higher the frequency of species interaction in a biological community 
(greater C) makes it less likely to be (locally) stable. 
The study that inverted the opinion of most ecologists, however, was 
published by Robert May three years later (May 1974). One reason for its 
influence was that May generalized Gardner and Ashby’s analysis by randomly 
assigning non-diagonal elements values from a distribution with a zero mean and 
mean square value of s2 for different values of s. s represents the interaction 
strength between variables, which had been restricted to +1 and –1 by Gardner 
 50
and Ashby.45 May then analyzed how the probability of (local Lyapunov) stability 
changed with different values of n, C, and s; Gardner and Ashby had not analyzed 
how s affects the probability of stability. The main result was that for systems in 
which n>>1, there is a sharp transition from high to low probability of stability as 
s or C exceeds some threshold. He found, for instance, that the probability of 
stability for these systems is approximately 1 if 1<nCs  and approximately 0 if 
.1>nCs  His analysis also confirmed Gardner and Ashby’s finding that for fixed 
C and s the probability of local stability decreases with increasing n. In general, 
these results seemed to demonstrate that high connectance, species richness, or 
strong species interactions preclude communities from being stable. May defined 
complexity in terms of connectance, richness, and interaction strength, so the 
results seemed to confirm a negative stability-complexity relationship.46
 One compelling feature of May’s result was its generality. Besides 
requiring the entries of the diagonal be negative, no assumption was made about 
the coefficients of A from (2). In the parameter space representing all possible 
linear systems, therefore, May’s results seemed to demonstrate that stability is 
                                                 
45 In another respect, May’s analysis was narrower than Gardner and Ashby’s given that he set  
diagonal elements of A to –1 rather than allowing them to take values on [–1, –0.1]. 
 
46 Besides specifying that complexity increases with species richness, connectance, and mean 
interaction strength, May (1974) did not explicitly define complexity. Defining complexity as a 
simple additive or multiplicative function of these three properties (with equal weights) would 
accord each property equal import in assessing complexity. 
 51
exceedingly rare. It remained possible, May (1974, 173) recognized, that actual 
biological communities primarily inhabit a rare stable realm of parameter space: 
Natural ecosystems, whether structurally complex or simple, are the 
product of a long history of coevolution of their constituent plants and 
animals. It is at least plausible that such intricate evolutionary processes 
have, in effect, sought out those relatively tiny and mathematically 
atypical regions of parameter space which endow the system with long-
term stability. 
 
To address this possibility, May analyzed several common mathematical models 
of communities. Two patterns emerged. First, generalizations of simple models 
representing few species, such as one-predator, one-prey Lotka-Volterra models, 
to more complicated n-species models were generally less likely to be stable than 
the simple models. This underscored Goodman’s (1975) criticism of the first type 
of evidence Elton (1958) cited in favor of a positive stability-diversity 
relationship (see §2) because it seemed to show multi-species predator-prey 
models are generally less, rather than more, stable than predator-prey models of 
fewer species. 
 Second, many modifications that made models more realistic also made 
them less stable. For instance, community models often unrealistically assume an 
unvarying deterministic environment and thereby set parameters to constant 
values. May showed that if some or all parameters are allowed to vary 
stochastically to represent environmental fluctuation, the resulting model is 
generally less likely to be stable. Similarly, most community models represent 
birth and death as continuous processes, even though their occurrences are 
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discrete events in nature. May (1974, 29) found that that more realistic models 
with discrete variables are likely to be less stable than their continuous 
counterparts, as well as chaotic dynamics from relatively simple models (May 
1976).47 The disparity between models with discrete and continuous variables also 
becomes more pronounced as the number of variables increases. 
 The upshot of May’s work was that stability is rare both in the “parameter 
space” of possible models and for more realistic community models, and that its 
probability decreases with model complexity. What it showed about actual 
biological communities, as opposed to models of them, remained unclear. 
Lewontin (1969) had argued, for instance, that the relationship between local 
stability and ecological stability is tenuous at best (see §3).48 May’s analysis could 
therefore be an interesting mathematical exercise with little or no biological 
application. For this reason, in fact, May (1974, 75-76) hedged about the proper 
interpretation of his results: “the balance of evidence would seem to suggest that, 
in the real world, increased complexity is usually associated with greater 
stability.” Thus, for May, the results “suggest that theoretical effort should 
concentrate on elucidating the very special and mathematically atypical sorts of 
complexity which could enhance stability, rather than seeking some (false) 
‘complexity implies stability’ general theorem” (1974, 77). May recognized that 
                                                 
47 Surprisingly, May (1976) also found that these simple difference equations sometimes exhibit 
chaotic dynamics.  
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most natural biological communities may have evolved a specific structure (the 
“atypical complexity”) that generates stability. For May, what this structure is 
should be the focus of ecological modeling. 
 On the methodological details of May’s approach to the relationship 
between complexity and stability, furthermore, some ecologists were 
unconvinced. Given the myriad of systems that can be randomly constructed 
using his methodology, e.g. 10764 for systems with 40 variables, and the 
“miniscule fraction” of those that represent biologically realistic systems, Lawlor 
(1978, 446) argued that, “it is extremely unlikely that any of the random systems 
generated by May and analyzed in terms of their eigenvalues even remotely 
resemble biologically acceptable ecological systems.”49 DeAngelis (1975) took 
this argument a step further and showed that for systems constructed according to 
several biologically plausible principles – that the assimilation efficiency of 
predator-prey interactions is less than 100%; that some species have a tendency to 
increase near equilibrium in the absence of interactions with other species (true of 
some autotrophs), etc. – the probability of stability actually increases with 
increasing connectance. 
                                                                                                                                     
48 Chapter 4 considers the question of the relationship between ecological stability and Lyapunov 
stability, local, asymptotic, global, etc. in detail. 
49 Lawlor calculated the proportion of the total set of randomly constructed systems that were 
biologically realistic by determining the fraction that exhibited certain biologically plausible 
properties, such as having no more than 5-7 trophic levels, no food chain loops, or having at least 
one producer. 
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 Despite May’s (1974) qualifications and these criticisms, his work was 
widely accepted (Lawlor 1978) and taken to overturn the consensus about a 
positive correlation between community complexity and stability in favor of a 
negative one (DeAngelis 1975). Earlier work on the SDC debate, however, did 
not concern the relationship between local stability and complexity, which was 
May’s main focus. MacArthur (1955), Elton (1958), and Pimentel (1961), for 
instance, whose work set most ecologists’ initial expectations about the debate, 
were concerned with resistance and constancy, not local stability, and focused 
primarily on species richness rather than complexity. May’s analysis only 
provides insights into the stability-diversity relationship, therefore, if local 
stability and ecological stability (despite Lewontin’s [1969] objections) and 
ecological diversity and complexity are closely related. Diversity and complexity 
are related in the weak sense that species richness is a component of both, but this 




Figure 1. Example of the graphical technique for evaluating stability of predator-








 The problem of defining concepts – ecological stability, diversity, and 
complexity – is at the core of the stability-diversity-complexity (SDC) debate. 
Part of the problem concerns how these three particular concepts should be 
defined. What properties of biological communities are they intended to capture 
and why? What definitions would accurately represent these properties and what 
form should they take? Can concepts developed in other scientific contexts (e.g. 
information theory and physics) help formulate such definitions? Adequately 
defining these concepts requires careful evaluation of these and other specific 
issues, which Chapter 4 undertakes for ecological stability and Chapter 5 
undertakes for ecological diversity and complexity. This task raises a more 
fundamental issue, however, about how concepts should be defined. Specifically, 
what adequacy criteria should definitions found in science and philosophy, 
opposed to a dictionary, satisfy? This chapter attempts to answer this question. 
 There are disagreements about the appropriate answer to this question, and 
they reflect fundamentally different views of the purpose of definition, and 
philosophical analysis in general. The main divergence about definition concerns 
the relationship between the meaning of the definiendum (the concept being 
defined) and its definiens (the concept(s) doing the defining). Should they be 
strongly similar, for instance extensionally identical or perhaps intensionally very 
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similar, or may the relationship be weaker? Rudolf Carnap (1950) answered this 
question in favor of a weaker relationship, and Section 2 sets the context of the 
debate about definition by describing his account of ‘explication’, Carnap’s 
technical term for definition. This conception of definition underlies, for instance, 
Millikan’s (1989) “theoretical definition” of the concept of function and Dowe’s 
(2000) “empirical analysis” (rather than conceptual analysis) of the concept of 
causation. 
 Carnap (1950) presented explications of some simple empirical concepts, 
but the primary emphasis there and throughout his career was the explication of 
theoretical concepts such as analyticity, degree of confirmation, semantic 
information, etc. (e.g. Carnap 1937, 1947, 1950; Carnap and Bar-Hillel 1953). 
Section 3 illustrates Carnap’s most important adequacy criteria for explication – 
precision, fruitfulness, and similarity between the concept being explicated (the 
explicandum) and those providing the explication (the explicata) – with respect to 
the explication of a complex empirical concept, ecological stability.50 Different 
definitions of this concept proposed in the ecological literature show how these 
criteria can be satisfied in different ways, and this section also suggests priority 
relations between the criteria. 
                                                 
 
50 Carnap suggested another adequacy criterion, simplicity, but emphasized that its import was 
secondary to precision, fruitfulness, and similarity (1950, 7). 
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 Section 4 considers P. F. Strawson’s (1963) criticisms of explication. His 
main objection was that Carnap’s similarity criterion is too weak. Without strong 
similarity, perhaps even synonymy between explicandum and explicata, Strawson 
(1963, 505) argued that Carnapian explication is “utterly irrelevant” to the goal of 
philosophical clarification of concepts. Carnap, on the other hand, was willing to 
sacrifice strong similarity to increase precision or fruitfulness with an explication. 
Their disagreement therefore turned on the relative import of different adequacy 
criteria for definition, specifically similarity vs. precision and fruitfulness. 
 This disagreement about how definitional adequacy should be assessed, 
Section 5 argues, stems partly from different views of the purpose of definition 
and partly from disagreements about what best achieves those purposes. 
Definitions found in philosophical contexts often attempt to maximize intuitive 
similarity with the imprecise concept being defined (DePaul and Ramsey 1998) – 
usually an ordinary concept of natural language that philosophical scrutiny has 
shown to be problematic in some way – in an attempt to clarify and systematize 
relations between these and other natural language concepts. Analyses of 
intuitions about these concepts, though they often diverge significantly among 
philosophers (REFs), are therefore assumed to provide the main guidance about 
definitional content here. 
 Definitions within scientific contexts, on the other hand, often sacrifice 
intuitive accord with the imprecise concept being defined to enhance formal rigor, 
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experimental testability, measurability in the field, theoretical unification, 
integration with well-developed mathematical theories, etc. The objective here is 
to improve our ability to describe the world by establishing a relationship between 
concepts used to do this in nonscientific contexts or in previous stages of 
scientific development, and concepts (ideally of well-confirmed scientific 
theories) that provide the best or at least a better description of the world thus far. 
In other words, definitions should help facilitate in discovering the structure of the 
world, which is not reliably achieved by inspecting intuitions, at least according to 
recent criticisms (e.g. Harman 1994; Cummins 1998; Goldman and Pust 1998; 
Hintikka 1999).51 Given this goal, definitions should be judged according to how 
they contribute to scientific practice – in helping generate predictions for instance 
– because science, rather than philosophical intuition, has best accomplished this 
goal. This was the principal motivation underlying Carnap’s conception of 
explication. 
 Strawson (1963, 1992) and others (e.g. Moore 1942; Sorenson 1991), 
however, regard definitions as the end products of conceptual analysis in which 
intuitions provide the primary guidance, and therefore should play the main role 
in constructing and evaluating definitions.52 This view of definition, or at least the 
                                                 
51 The idea that some concepts better help describe the structure of the world than others should 
not be taken to presuppose some type of scientific realism. ‘Better description’ could be evaluated 
in terms of empirical adequacy or the generation of new technologies, for instance, by antirealists. 
52 “Paradigmatic conceptual analyses offer definitions of concepts that are to be tested against 
potential counterexamples that are identified via thought experiments” (Margolis and Laurence 
2006, §2.1). 
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idea that intuitions should play some nontrivial role in the formulation of 
definitions, is unproblematic if the definitional goal is simply to clarify the 
meanings of ordinary concepts of natural language.53 Besides intuitions, linguistic 
studies of how words are actually used by speakers of natural language (Jackson 
1998), and studies of the mental representation of concepts in the cognitive 
sciences (Goldman and Pust 1998) also help achieve this goal. The results of such 
studies therefore could (and should) inform the defining process on this view. If 
the purpose of the definition is to improve our conceptual framework’s ability to 
describe and determine what the world is like, however, Section 5 argues this 
conception of definition is indefensible. 
 
2. Carnapian Explication. 
 One of the most sophisticated philosophical discussions of definition is 
found in the first chapter of Carnap’s (1950) Logical Foundations of Probability. 
The chapter’s objective was a preliminary clarification of the nature of 
                                                 
 
53 This analysis presupposes no account of what concepts or meanings are. The claim that 
intuitions may help clarify the meanings of natural language concepts does not, therefore, entail 
they or their meanings exist as mind-independent intensional objects, or that a clear distinction 
between a concept’s intension and extension is defensible. As empirical evidence about how 
competent natural language speakers understand and employ terms of a language (see §5.1), even 
a deflationist about meaning such as Quine could thereby recognize the role intuitions could have 
in developing a better scientific account of the linguistic activity of humans (see Quine 1953; 
Margolis and Laurence 2003). Despite their disagreement about intentions, moreover, Quine 
agreed with Carnap about the import of explication within philosophy (Quine 1960, pp. 257-262). 
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explication, Carnap’s technical term for definition,54 before Carnap explicated the 
concept ‘degree of confirmation’ with a logical relation between hypothesis and 
evidence statements as the basis of a system of inductive logic. 
 Explication is the transformation or replacement of an imprecise concept 
(explicandum) with a new concept (explicatum) or concepts (explicata) subject to 
four adequacy criteria: 
(i) similarity (of meaning) to the explicandum; 
(ii) exactness; 
(iii) fruitfulness; and,  
(iv) simplicity. 
 
The first criterion was much weaker than what most philosophers required of 
definition. Russell’s (1919, Ch. 16) theory of descriptions,55 for instance, required 
synonymy between a proposition containing a description and the propositions 
defining it and Moore (1942, 663) required synonymy between a concept and the 
concept(s) defining it. Carnap, however, only intended the similarity criterion to 
ensure the explicatum could be used in most cases in which the explicandum was 
normally used; the explicatum was not required to preserve the explicandum’s 
                                                 
54 ‘Definition’ is being used here in the broad sense that corresponds to Carnap’s conception of 
‘explication.’ This is the sense of ‘definition’ used in discussions of the problem of defining the 
species concept in biology, for instance (see Ruse 1969; Kitcher 1984; Ereshefsky 2001), and the 
one recognized by Carnap (1950, 7) in his statement that: “A good explicit formulation is given by 
Karl Menger in connection with his explication of the concept of dimension (“What is 
dimension?” Amer. Math. Monthly, 50 [1943], 2-7; see p. 5: §3 “Criteria for a satisfactory 
definition” [explication, in our terminology]),” emphasis added. When it is unclear from the 
context, ‘explicative definition’ (Belnap 1993, 116) is used to specify this sense of definition 
below.  
55 Incidentally, Russell called his analysis a “theory of descriptions” only once, in the last 
paragraph of the essay (1919, 180). Throughout the rest of the essay his analysis was characterized 
as a “definition of descriptions” (emphasis added). 
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meaning exactly. Carnap would probably accept an explicatum that could be used 
in most of the important cases since (i) permitted “considerable differences” 
(1950, 7) in meaning.56 Explication is therefore distinct from lexical definition 
(Loomis and Juhl 2006), which at least in principle requires identity of meaning. 
It is also distinct from stipulative definition if the stipulation involved is not 
required to preserve any relationship between meanings (Belnap 1993; cf. Loomis 
and Juhl 2006, 287). Explicative definitions, Belnap (1993, 116) notes, are 
“perhaps the most distinctively philosophical acts of definition,” in which, “one 
wants both to rely on an old, existing meaning and to attach a new, proposed 
meaning.” 
 Why allow such latitude between explicandum and explicatum? For 
Carnap, sacrificing close similarity was sometimes justified by the increase in 
fruitfulness afforded by departing from the explicandum meaning. This accorded, 
Carnap emphasized, with scientific practice. As an example, Carnap discussed 
how the “prescientific” concept of ‘Fish’, which roughly meant ‘animal living in 
water’ and included marine mammals among its referents, was replaced as a 
science of zoology emerged by a narrower concept (Piscis) that excluded 
                                                 
56 Carnap’s descriptions of the relationship sometimes suggest that the “similarity” required could 
be extremely weak. In the example of explicating ‘fish’, for instance, he says the explicatum and 
explicandum “do not even approximately coincide,” and are, “far remote” (1950, 6). Since this 
seems to be incompatible with the explicatum being used in the important cases in which the 
explicandum was used, and is certainly incompatible with the claim that it could be used in most 
cases,  the similarity criterion will be assumed to preclude such a weak relationship. 
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mammals. According to Carnap, the reason the original meaning was not retained 
was that: 
zoologists found that the animal to which the concept Fish applies, that is, those 
living in water, have by far not as many other properties in common as the 
animals which live in water, are cold-blooded vertebrates, and have gills 
throughout life. Hence the concept of Piscis defined by these latter properties 
allows more general statements than any concept defined so as to be more similar 
to Fish; and this is what makes the concept Piscis more fruitful. (Carnap 1950, 6) 
 
From a contemporary perspective, this example is somewhat outdated since 
phylogeny, rather than phenotypic similarity is the primary reason mammals are 
excluded from the concept Piscis today.57 The example nonetheless illustrates that 
Carnap (1950, 7) understood the fruitfulness of a concept in terms of how many 
“universal” statements it helped facilitate. For nonlogical concepts, specifically, 
Carnap suggested fruitfulness be gauged by how many law-like generalizations 
the explication makes possible; for logical concepts, logical theorems.58 
Explicative definition therefore violates the “conservativeness” or 
“noncreativeness” criterion commonly invoked in theories of definition within 
formal languages: a definition should not extend the set of theorems (other than 
those involving the defined concept) derivable within the language (see Rantala 
1991; Belnap 1993). 
                                                 
57 See Ereshefsky (2001) for a detailed discussion of this issue. 
58 Frege, Carnap’s teacher at Jena in the 1910s (Carnap 1963c), shared the view that definitions of 
logical and mathematical concepts should be judged according to their fruitfulness. Frege (1980, 
100-101) believed definitions should “extend our knowledge” by “drawing boundary lines that 
were not previously given at all.” Logical and mathematical concepts are of course one and the 
same for a logicist like Frege. 
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 Some philosophically inclined scientists who had considered this issue 
came to the same conclusion. Lotka (1925, Ch. 1), for instance, argued that exact 
meaning preservation is secondary to fruitfulness in defining concepts because 
there is little reason to expect the concepts that have emerged in ordinary 
language for everyday communication will correspond to the concepts that best 
describe the world. It may be, he further suggested, that a concept of ordinary 
language assumed to describe the world in fact has no role to play in its best 
description provided by science, possibly due to its ambiguity or vagueness. 
Lotka (1925, 16) suggested this was true of the concepts ‘life’ and ‘causality’. 
 The most important criterion for Carnap was exactness of the 
explicatum.59 Carnap described this criterion as requiring that, “rules of [the 
explicatum’s] use...be given in an exact form, so as to introduce the explicatum 
into a well-connected system of scientific concepts” (1950, 7). Carnap was 
envisaging the system as a formal language in which explicit meaning postulates 
and transformation rules specify relations between terms of the language 
representing concepts precisely, and in which scientific theories are represented 
by sets of axioms, as described in Logical Syntax of Language for instance 
(Carnap 1937). An explicatum could be introduced into such a language by an 
explicit definition that would specify relations between it and concepts designated 
                                                 
 
59 Carnap (1963, 936) called it “the only essential requirement” in his reply to Strawson (1963). 
‘Precision’ and ‘exactness’ will be used interchangeably below. 
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in the axioms, as well as theorems of different theories. Exactness is maximized 
in this kind of explication, and Carnap (1950, 16-17) cited recursive definition of 
arithmetical operations with Peano’s axioms, and Frege’s definition of numerals 
(1963b, 935) as examples.  
 The explicatum need not, however, be introduced into such a formal 
language by an explicit definition. Rather, an explication may simply identify a 
concept represented in a set of formal axioms as an explicatum for a given 
explicandum. Satisfaction of the similarity criterion would then depend upon what 
the axioms say about the explicatum – as interpreted in a model of the axioms – 
evaluated against the meaning of the explicandum. The explicatum’s fruitfulness 
could be assessed in terms of the theorems entailed by the set of axioms in which 
it is found. In this case, the nature of the explication of the explicandum depends 
considerably upon the “implicit definition” the axioms furnish for the explicatum. 
Muller (2004), for instance, has recently argued that the implicit definition of the 
set concept furnished by axiomatic set theory provides a highly fruitful 
explication of the concept. 
 But as Carnap was well aware, such systematicity is rare among empirical 
rather than formal sciences. His discussion of exactness for explication of 
empirical concepts correspondingly focused less on integration of an explicatum 
into an axiomatized theory, and more on making concepts more precise, 
especially through quantification or formalization (see §3). In his reply to 
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Strawson (1963), Carnap conceded this point explicitly. He (1963b, 935-6) 
clarified that the exactness criterion only required that the explicatum be more 
precise than the explicandum, and permitted that the explicatum may belong to a 
“more exact” part of ordinary rather than formal or scientific language. This 
constitutes a weakening of his previous claim that an explication should integrate 
an explicatum into a well-connected system of scientific concepts for two reasons. 
First, the more exact part of ordinary language is presumably more exact because 
it contains more precise ordinary rather than scientific concepts. Two, Carnap 
believed that relations between concepts of ordinary languages were generally 
opaque compared to these relations in scientific languages (cf. Carnap 1932). To 
the extent fruitfulness requires precision (see §3), however, the fruitfulness of 
explications within ordinary language may be limited. 
 Carnap distinguished three general types of concepts (in order of 
increasing precision): classificatory, comparative, and quantitative. In the normal 
progress of science, concepts typically evolve towards greater precision.60 Carnap 
(1950, 12) used the concept of temperature as an example. He hypothesized that 
in an early, undocumented stage in the development of natural language only 
classificatory concepts like hot, warm, and cold existed. Later, comparative 
concepts like warmer and colder appeared. Not until science emerged, however, 
                                                 
60 Carnap was careful to emphasize that the evolution towards concepts with greater precision was 
typical, not inevitable within science. For example, Carnap (1950, 14) suggested adequate 
quantitative explicata for some psychological concepts do not exist, and finding comparative 
explicata should be the focus of explication. 
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was a quantitative concept of temperature introduced to describe phenomena of 
heat and cold precisely. 
  Differences between the quantitative concept of temperature and the 
comparative concepts of warmer and colder also made clear to Carnap why 
explication need not ensure that the explicatum can be used in all cases in which 
the explicandum was used, and thereby preserve meaning exactly. An organism 
might experience an object to be warmer or colder at two different times due to 
changes in its physiology even though the quantitative temperature of the object 
remains constant. Disparities of this kind did not indicate that temperature is an 
inadequate explicatum for warmer or colder for Carnap because, “we have 
become accustomed to let the scientific concept overrule the prescientific one in 
all cases of disagreement” (1950, 12-13). It is certainly true that the scientific 
concept has supplanted the prescientific one in this case, but Carnap intended the 
claim to be fully general: if a prescientific concept and its explicatum differ in 
meaning, the latter takes priority over the former. For Carnap, this was justified 
by gains in precision and fruitfulness afforded by the explicatum. For Strawson 
(1963), however, these advantages of the explicatum were irrelevant if its 
meaning differed from the explicandum, and worse, they were often detrimental 
to the goal of “philosophical illumination” of the explicandum. This was the basis 
of Strawson’s critique of explication and the focus of Section 4. 
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 The remainder of this chapter focuses on the precision, fruitfulness, and 
similarity criteria. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that simplicity 
was subsidiary to the other three adequacy criteria for Carnap. Carnap (1950, 7) 
correctly pointed out that many important concepts that are fundamental 
components of well-confirmed scientific theories are quite complicated, so 
simplicity should only be a consideration when deciding between explicata of 
roughly the same precision, fruitfulness, and similarity to the explicandum. The 
utility of simplicity in explication is therefore context-dependent for Carnap, 
similar to the context-dependent view of the utility of simplicity in scientific 
explanation held by Sober (1988). 
 
3. Adequacy Criteria for Explicative Definition: Precision and Fruitfulness. 
 Before considering Strawson’s critique, this section illustrates Carnap’s 
adequacy criteria for proposed definitions of a complex empirical concept. 
Specifically, two common, but very different definitions of the concept of 
ecological stability show how his exactness and fruitfulness criteria can be 
satisfied in distinct ways.  
 The first definition is frequently found in mathematical modeling in 
ecology (e.g. May 1974; Goh 1977; Hallam 1986; Logofet 1993; Kot 2001; 
Rozdilsky and Stone 2001). Let a vector x(t) (t designates time) represent an 
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ecological system like a biological community and let x* represent the system at 
equilibrium.61 The system at equilibrium is Lyapunov stable if and only if: 
(1) (∀ε>0)(∃δ>0)(|x(t0)−x*|<δ⇒(∀t≥t0)(|x(t)−x*|<ε)),  
where ε and δ are real numbers, x(t0) represents the system at some initial time t0, 
and ‘|·|’ designates a Euclidean distance metric. Informally, (1) says x* is 
Lyapunov stable if systems beginning in a neighborhood of x* remain near it after 
being perturbed to the state x(t0) at t0. 
 The second definition of ecological stability is more frequently found in 
recent empirical studies of stability-diversity-complexity relationships (e.g. 
Tilman 1996, 1999; Johnson et al. 1996; Lehman and Tilman 2000; Cottingham 
et al. 2001). Let Bi be a random variable designating the biomass of species i in an 
n-species community C assayed during some time period, and let iB  designate 
the expected value of Bi for the time period it is assayed. Tilman (1996, 1999) 



























                                                 
61 The components of x(t) are variables that usually represent densities, abundances, or biomasses 
of species in the community. Components of x* therefore represent these densities, abundances, or 
biomasses at equilibrium. 
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where Var designates variance and Cov designates covariance. Unlike the last 
definition, St defines ecological stability in terms of the variability of biomasses of 
species in the community. The motivating intuition for this definition is the idea 
that if two series of abundances are plotted across time, the more stable one 
exhibits less fluctuation (Lehman and Tilman 2000). 
 Both definitions satisfy the exactness criterion by eliminating the 
vagueness of the concept of ecological stability in favor of a precise explicatum, 
but they do so in different ways. The first definition increases precision by 
proposing that the formal statement (1) is necessary and sufficient for ecological 
stability. Alternatively, if ecological stability is understood as a matter of degree 
rather than dichotomous (as it should be, see Ch. 2, §3), it also seems to be 
definable within the mathematical framework developed for Lyapunov stability 
(see Ch. 4, §2).  The second definition, on the other hand, increases precision by 
proposing that ecological stability is a quantitative property of a community 
whose value is determined by the mathematical function (2). 
 Although explication requires increasing precision, the epistemic value of 
explication does not derive from precision itself. Rather, increasing precision is 
required because it usually enhances fruitfulness. Vague concepts are rarely if 
ever components of the type of law-like universal statements that were the target 
of Carnap’s fruitfulness criterion. The problematically vague concept ‘cause’, for 
instance, is not a technical term of contemporary science (Dowe 2000) and 
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currently plays no role in any recognized scientific theory.62 The same can 
arguably be said of concepts like ‘life’, ‘germ’, or ‘natural kind.’ Making a 
concept more precise, on the other hand, often facilitates in the development of 
such law-like statements, as Carnap’s simple examples of ‘fish’ and 
‘temperature’, and the precise characterizations of ‘energy’ that emerged in 
mechanics and electrodynamics illustrate. Without sufficiently precise concepts, 
for instance, it becomes difficult or impossible to derive predictions from sets of 
statements containing them. Without such predictions, in turn, the sets of 
statements containing them cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed. Since testing 
predictions of hypotheses and theories against data is a staple of scientific 
methodology that the history of science has obviously proved to be an 
epistemically reliable basis for making inferences, and precision facilitates the use 
of this methodology, the exactness criterion is therefore justified on inductive 
grounds.  
 Although increasing precision has usually enhanced fruitfulness, in some 
cases it may not, as Carnap noted was the case for some psychological concepts.63 
                                                 
62 The qualifiers ‘contemporary’ and ‘currently’ are intended to grant that the concept could have 
some such role in the future. Salmon (1997) and Dowe’s (2000) account of causal interactions as 
intersections of world lines that involve exchange of conserved quantities like momentum and 
energy constitutes a promising candidate among extant analyses of causation. The reason it does is 
that the account offers a characterization of the concept precise enough to make possible, for 
instance, its empirical detection, and even empirical measurement of the strength of causal 
interaction. The concept of causation analyzed by Clark Glmour et al. in studies of Bayes net is 
also promising for the same reasons (see Spirtes et al. 2001 for a review). 
63 See footnote 52. Two cases of greater precision not producing greater fruitfulness should be 
distinguished. It may be that increasing precision does not now enhance fruitfulness given the 
current state of scientific knowledge. The law-like statements more precise explicata make 
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Since there are serious doubts, moreover, about whether law-like generalizations 
have been discovered in canonical sciences like biology and psychology, the 
notion of fruitfulness should be broadened to recognize the improvement an 
explicatum can have in enhancing experimental testability, measurability in the 
field, theoretical unification, mathematical rigor, etc. rather than just in the 
production of law-like generalizations. 
 Since (1) and (2) increase precision in different ways, they are fruitful in 
different ways. The first integrates the concept of ecological stability into a well-
developed mathematical theory that provides analytic methods for evaluating the 
stability of mathematical models of biological communities (see Ch. 4, §2.4). This 
increase in mathematical rigor, however, has a significant cost. Highly accurate 
mathematical models describing the dynamics of communities are usually not 
available. Without such models, evaluation of whether (1) holds must be done 
with time series data on the variables of x(t), which is extremely difficult. Strictly 
speaking, for instance, the universal quantification in the consequent of (1) 
[∀t≥ t0] requires monitoring of the system behavior over indefinite time periods. 
Another difficulty is that whether (1) holds depends on the behavior of the system 
after one perturbation (represented by the displacement from x* to x(t0)), but 
                                                                                                                                     
possible may just fail to be recognized by scientists at given time. Greater precision does not 
produce greater fruitfulness in a stronger sense, however, if what the concept being explicated 
represents is essentially imprecise to some degree. Beliefs states of humans, for example, may be 
best described with imprecise, rather than fully quantitative probabilities (Walley 1991, Ch. 5). In 
this case greater precision may not increase, and even decrease fruitfulness due to facts about the 
world, rather than just limitations of scientists’ epistemic acumen (see Justus 2006). 
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empirical evaluation of this behavior in the field can be obscured when, as is often 
the case, the environment frequently subsequently perturbs the system.  
 In fact, the infeasibility of empirical evaluation of (1), was one of the 
advantages Lehman and Tilman (2000, 535) cite in favor of (2). They suggest 
temporal stability is “readily observable in nature” because evaluation of (2) only 
requires empirical measurement of biomasses, rather than the difficult empirical 
assessment of system behavior required by (1). Greater measurability with (2), 
however, also comes at a cost. Unlike Lyapunov stability, temporal stability has 
no theoretical underpinning in a mathematical theory of system dynamics (see Ch. 
4, §2). (2) also does not define ecological stability in terms of how a biological 
community responds to perturbation, which seems to be an indispensable feature 
of the concept, and therefore threatens to violate the similarity criterion as well as 
the fruitfulness criterion (see Ch. 4, §1.3). Ideally, one would like an explication 
to enhance all types of fruitfulness while retaining sufficient similarity to the 
explicandum, without tradeoffs. The tradeoffs in fruitfulness between (1) and (2), 
however, indicate that this may be rare within science.64
 (1) and (2) therefore define ecological stability in different, nonequivalent 
ways. Lyapunov stability, for instance, is a dichotomous concept whose 
application requires a community initially be at equilibrium, whereas temporal 
                                                 
64 The most plausible candidates are probably definitions of concepts that are part of well-
confirmed, mathematical, and quantitative theories in physics, such as the concept of energy in 
mechanics or entropy in thermodynamics. 
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stability is a matter of degree and places no restrictions on the initial state of the 
community.65 The existence of nonequivalent definitions for the same concept 
would typically be taken to indicate an underlying ambiguity of that concept. 
Chapter 4 argues that the concept of ecological stability has three components, so 
this multifacetedness may account for the disparity between (1) and (2).66 In 
general, however, the existence of multiple, distinct explicata for an unambiguous 
explicandum is permissible on Carnap’s account of explication (Loomis and Juhl 
2006, 288). Since preservation of strong similarity of meaning is not required, 
different explicata can be proposed that differ from the meaning of the 
explicandum in distinct ways. Pursuing several distinct explications for a given 
explicandum may even be useful since different explicata could be fruitful in 
distinct ways, similar to exploring the merits of different logics (e.g. Carnap 
1937). It was this permissive view of the relationship between the meaning of the 
explicatum and explicandum, however, that prompted Strawson’s criticism of 
explication. 
 
4. Strawson’s Criticism. 
 As a method of conceptual clarification, Carnap placed no restriction on 
the scope of application of explication. It was intended to help clarify concepts of 
                                                 
65 Chapter 4 discusses differences between the concepts in detail.  
 
66 Chapter 4 also argues that neither (1) nor (2) adequately define ecological stability. 
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the empirical and formal sciences, as well as those found in ordinary language and 
philosophy. Explication contrasts sharply, however, with another method of 
conceptual clarification adopted by P. F. Strawson (1963, 1992) and widely 
utilized and defended within contemporary analytic philosophy (e.g. Sosa 1983, 
1998; Bealer 1996a, 1996b, 1998). Instead of searching for a suitable explicatum 
for an imprecise explicandum or constructing an entire artificial system of precise 
explicata to clarify a set of ordinary concepts of natural language, Strawson 
(1963, 514-518) advocated trying to determine the underlying principles assumed 
to govern the use of these concepts in everyday communication, or the principles 
that would govern their use in a highly idealized, maximally rational and 
philosophically informed version of this communication. Finding such principles 
would clarify the underlying “logical” nature of these concepts, and supply the 
best basis for a philosophically defensible definition of them. Consequently, 
Strawson believed this method, not explication, provided the best way to resolve 
philosophical problems and confusions generated by these concepts. For the sake 
of brevity and to distinguish it from explication, call this method ‘conceptual 
analysis.’  
 With this method of conceptual clarification in mind, Strawson’s main 
criticism of explicative definition was that it is not “philosophically illuminative”: 
however much or little the constructionist technique [i.e. explication] is the right 
means of getting an idea into shape for use in the formal or empirical sciences, it 
seems prima facie evident that to offer formal explanations of key terms of 
scientific theories to one who seeks philosophical illumination of essential 
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concepts of non-scientific discourse, is to do something utterly irrelevant–is a 
sheer misunderstanding, like offering a text-book on physiology to someone who 
says (with a sigh) that he wished he understood the workings of the human heart. 
(Strawson 1963, 504-505) 
 
Part of his basis for this claim was the observation that: 
it seems in general evident that the concepts used in non-scientific kinds of 
discourse could not literally be replaced by scientific concepts serving just the 
same purposes; that the language of science could not in this way supplant the 
language of the drawing-room, the kitchen, the law courts and the novel. 
(Strawson 1963, 505) 
 
Since nonscientific concepts cannot be replaced by scientific ones and retain the 
same functionality, there is no reason to expect a “well-connected system” of the 
latter would shed any light on the former. It follows, Strawson asserted, “that 
typical philosophical problems about the concepts used in non-scientific discourse 
cannot be solved by laying down the rules of exact and fruitful concepts in 
science. To do this last is not to solve the typical philosophical problem, but to 
change the subject” (1963, 506). Instead of providing insights about concepts that 
generate philosophical puzzles, explication pursues the project of finding precise 
substitutes for them, thereby abandoning the only subject matter that he believed 
could help resolve the puzzles. The philosophical illumination furnished by 
explication is therefore negligible. 
 Strawson located Carnap’s motivation for explication, as opposed to 
conceptual analysis of ordinary language, in an untenable, even dogmatic 
(Strawson 1963, 517) dismissal of traditional philosophical problems. For 
Strawson, if explicata are to provide any insights about the concepts (explicanda) 
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that generate philosophical puzzles, a clear account of the relations between the 
two is necessary. Such an account is only possible, however, with an accurate 
description of the explicanda, as would be provided by the type of conceptual 
analysis Strawson endorsed. One could only think otherwise, Strawson (1963, 
513) suggested, “if one is led away from the purpose of achieving philosophical 
understanding by the fascination of other purposes, such that of getting on with 
science.”  
 The alternative to explication is careful analysis of the ordinary concepts 
of natural language that generate philosophical problems and confusions 
themselves. As an instance or end product of conceptual analysis, the goal of 
definition for Strawson was thus the elucidation of the underlying nature of the 
concepts being defined. This elucidation would resolve or at least help clarify any 
philosophical puzzles generated by these concepts. The way these concepts are 
used in everyday communication, intuitions about them, and thought experiments 
that probe the limits of their range of defensible application would provide the 
raw material from which the elucidation is derived. Judicious scrutiny of these 
factors would uncover the “logical behavior which ordinary concepts exhibit” 
(Strawson 1963, 513) that may be masked by the “elusive, deceptive modes of 
functioning of unformalized linguistic expressions” (1963, 512). Strawson (1992, 
7) later clarified this conception of conceptual analysis with an analogy: 
Just as we may have a working mastery of the grammar of our native language, 
so we have a working mastery of [our] conceptual equipment. We know how to 
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handle it, how to use it in thought and speech. But just as the practical mastery of 
the grammar in no way entails the ability to state systematically what the rules 
are which we effortlessly observe, so the practical mastery of our conceptual 
equipment in no way entails the possession of a clear, explicit understanding of 
the principles which govern our handling of it, of the theory of our practice. So –
to conclude the analogy– just as the grammarian, and especially the model 
modern grammarian, labours to produce a systematic account of the structure of 
rules which we effortlessly observe in speaking grammatically, so the 
philosopher labours to produce a systematic account of the general conceptual 
structure of which our daily practice shows us to have a tacit and unconscious 
mastery. 
 
On this view of conceptual analysis, it is clear why it is imperative that definitions 
faithfully preserve and not distort the current meaning of concepts. Only with an 
exact account of the actual meaning of ordinary concepts of natural language is it 
possible to elicit their supposed underlying structure and potentially resolve any 
philosophical puzzles they generate. That more precise explicata for these 
concepts can be formulated that possess the virtues Carnap extolled is therefore 
irrelevant to the proper function of definition within philosophy. 
 
5. Definition and Philosophical Method. 
 The fundamental disagreement between Carnap and Strawson about 
definition concerned the similarity criterion. Carnap was willing to sacrifice close 
similarity between explicatum and explicandum to achieve greater precision and 
fruitfulness with the former. For Strawson, to the extent one deviates from the 
meaning of the explicandum, one abandons the goal of philosophically 
illuminating concepts in favor of another, replacing them.  
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5.1. Common Ground. 
 It is important to recognize that Carnap could agree with Strawson about 
one aspect of this issue: construed as an empirical method of inquiry about 
concepts, conceptual analysis can help clarify the actual meanings of ordinary 
concepts. Exploiting Strawson’s (1992) analogy (see §4), just as a linguist 
analyzes the linguistic practices of speakers of natural languages in an attempt to 
determine their syntax and semantics, a philosopher can analyze how concepts are 
used in an attempt to identify their meanings and elucidate relationships between 
them. Moreover, how terms of natural language that designate concepts are used 
in everyday communication can help pinpoint these meanings and relationships.67 
Linguistic studies of how terms are used (Jackson 1998), as well as studies of the 
mental representation of concepts in the cognitive sciences (Goldman and Pust 
1998; Ramsey 1998), should therefore play an important role in conceptual 
analysis understood in this empirical sense. In fact, Carnap (1963a, 920) explicitly 
advocated this kind of empirical approach to determining meaning: 
It seemed rather plausible to me from the beginning that there should be an 
empirical criterion for the concept of the meaning of a word or a phrase, in view 
of the fact that linguists traditionally determine empirically the meanings, 
meaning differences, and shifts of meanings of words, and that with respect to 
these determinations they reach a measure of agreement among themselves…In 
[Carnap 1955], I tried to show the possibility of giving operational rules for 
testing hypotheses concerning the intensions of predicates of a natural language, 
on the basis of responses by the users of this language. 
 
                                                 
67 This assumes a weak version of the use theory of meaning: the way terms of natural language 
are typically used provides reliable information about (but does not necessarily determine) their 
meaning, and the meaning of the concepts they designate (see Wittgenstein 1953). 
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‘Intension’ is Carnap’s technical term for the meaning of a predicate. This 
passage and the method for determining predicate intensions in natural languages 
developed by Carnap (1955) were responses to Quine’s criticisms of the analytic-
synthetic distinction. If intensions can be determined using this method, it is 
plausible statements concerning these intensions, such as ‘All bachelors are 
males,’ can be identified as analytic. Given their disparate philosophical 
commitments, the significant congruence in Carnap and Strawson’s response to 
Quine’s criticisms is striking (e.g. Grice and Strawson 1956). 
 This type of empirical conceptual analysis has a natural place in Carnap’s 
account of explication as a means of “clarifying the explicandum” (Carnap 1950, 
3-5). Before proposing an explicatum for an explicandum, Carnap stressed that 
the meaning of the latter should be clarified as much as possible through informal 
methods. This preliminary clarification would help determine whether the 
explicandum is ambiguous, in which case more than one explicatum would be 
appropriate, or whether the meaning of the explicandum is too vague to even be 
explicated.68 If an explicandum is too vague, presumably its similarity to potential 
explicata cannot be evaluated, and attempts to explicate it would therefore be 
pointless.69 Carnap (1963b, 936) allowed, furthermore, that the analysis of 
                                                 
68 “[Philosophers] often immediately start to look for an answer [to questions like ‘What is X?’ 
where X is some concept] without first examining the tacit assumption that the terms of the 
question are at least practically clear enough to serve as the basis for an investigation, for an 
analysis or explication” (Carnap 1950, 4). 
 
69 Carnap (1950) did not make this argument explicitly. 
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ordinary language may sometimes be sufficient to resolve some philosophical 
confusions that emerge when terms of ordinary language are used outside their 
normal contexts in everyday communication. 
 Carnap could even grant that proverbial “armchair” conceptual analysis – 
in which philosophers focus on what their intuitions about concepts reveal about 
them – helps clarify the actual meaning of ordinary language concepts. 
Philosophers are (usually) competent speakers of natural languages and are also 
usually especially keen to subtle differences in meaning, so their understanding of 
a concept at a minimum counts as relevant empirical data about its meaning 
(Goldman and Pust 1998; Graham and Horgan 1998). Since philosophers’ 
intuitions about concepts will likely reflect their philosophical commitments 
involving them, however, it is unlikely their intuitions will agree (because their 
commitments often diverge) or that their intuitions will reflect those of the general 
populace (because the populace arguably does not share most of these 
commitments) (Dowe 2004).  
 
5.2. The Epistemic Limitations of Intuition. 
 Despite their potential accord on these points, “clarification of the 
explicandum” was only intended as a preparatory step before explication. 
Although Carnap could endorse attempting to determine the exact meaning of the 
explicandum with the methods considered above as a pre-explication preliminary, 
 82
explication allowed departure from the actual meaning of the explicandum, and 
this was the core of the disagreement between Carnap and Strawson. 
 As Section 4 made clear, Strawson’s criticism of explication was based on 
a more substantive conception of conceptual analysis than discussed above (§5.1). 
This view of conceptual analysis and the conception of definition that 
accompanies it are commonly found within contemporary analytic philosophy 
(e.g. Sosa 1983, 1998; Bealer 1996a, 1996b, 1998).70 Conceptual analysis is taken 
to be something more than an empirical inquiry into what individuals trained in 
philosophy introspect about the meaning of concepts. Results of such inquiries, 
and definitions built upon them, would seem to lack any normativity; they would 
merely describe the way a fairly small set of individuals (likely unrepresentative 
of the general populace) understand certain concepts, not prescribe the way those 
concepts should be understood. 
 Rather than accept this attenuated view, the intuitions about concepts 
appealed to in such analyses are considered to have a special status: “[conceptual 
analysis] attempts to show the natural foundations of our logical, conceptual 
apparatus, in the way things happen in the world, and in our own natures” 
                                                 
70 One prominent exception is Jackson (1998, 44), who is “suspicious” about the view that 
conceptual analysis provides insights about the world. He calls this “immodest” conceptual 
analysis, and expresses doubts about his earlier use of it in the knowledge argument (e.g. Jackson 
1986). Jackson (1998) defends instead a “modest” conceptual analysis that merely attempts to 
determine the folk theory he assumes underlies the use of ordinary concepts in natural language. If 
this is the goal, however, it is unclear what legitimate role modest conceptual analysis has, as 
Jackson believes it does, in metaphysics which, as traditionally understood, is concerned with 
uncovering the fundamental nature of the world (cf. Jackson 1998, Ch. 3). 
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(Strawson 1963, 516). The purpose of conceptual analysis is therefore to uncover 
the “foundation of our concepts in natural facts, and to envisage alternative 
possibilities, it is not enough to have a sharp eye for linguistic actualities” (1963, 
517).71 A definition of a concept should accordingly reveal its connections to 
other concepts as determined by intuitions about this “natural foundation,” and it 
is this foundation that supplies a definition with prescriptive force. Deviation from 
intuitions about meaning for the sake of increasing precision or enhancing 
fruitfulness, regardless of how epistemically useful this has proved to be in the 
past, is therefore indefensible. For this reason, definitions developed on the basis 
of this kind of conceptual analysis have been identified with the now out of favor 
notion of a “real definition” in which the intended goal was to capture the alleged 
“essence” of the concept being defined (Anderson 1993, 200).72  
 There is an obvious question to raise about this view of conceptual 
analysis and the conception of definition that accompanies it. What, if anything, 
do intuitions about concepts demonstrate beyond merely how a set of humans 
understand and use a particular set of concepts?73 The remainder of this chapter 
                                                 
71 This statement suggests there is a divergence between the structure of our concepts as grounded 
in “natural facts” about the world, and the conceptual structure underlying our linguistic practices. 
The statement therefore seems to be in tension with Strawson’s (1992) analogy with the 
grammarian (see §4). 
72 See Robinson (1950, Ch. 6) for a detailed discussion of real definition. 
73 There is another potential problem with Strawson’s view of conceptual analysis, which will not 
be pursued here. Strawson assumed an underlying “system” or “structure” exists that governs our 
concepts and explains how terms of ordinary language that refer to them are used in everyday 
communication (1963, 513; 1992, Ch. 2). Unfortunately, Strawson never made clear what the 
form of this conceptual system or structure was. He did call it “logical” (1963, 513), however, and 
this seems to suggest conceptual analysis should reveal logical relations between concepts, i.e. 
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considers what implications recent compelling criticisms of the epistemic status of 
intuitions have for how definition should be understood. A comprehensive review 
of these criticisms cannot be undertaken here, but an appreciation of their 
consequences for definition requires a clear account of the main weaknesses they 
reveal about relying on intuitions in philosophical inquiry.  
 Two goals must be kept distinct in evaluating the epistemic status of 
intuitions. One, discussed above, is whether intuitions can help clarify the 
meaning of concepts, which there is little reason to doubt (see §5.1).74 The other, 
more problematic goal is that intuition provides reliable insights about the world. 
 Given their poor track record (Harman 1994; Hintikka 1999), the burden 
of proof is on proponents of intuitions to defend their epistemic utility. Different 
kinds of attempts have been made to establish this, and the problems with one of 
the most cogent (Sosa 1998) reveals the fundamental difficulties of the position.  
                                                                                                                                     
necessary and sufficient conditions. Whether there is such a structure that governs our concepts is 
an empirical question. Experiments within psychology, especially those of Eleanor Rosch (e.g. 
Rosch and Mervis 1975), cast doubt on the plausibility of this account as a description of the 
actual conceptual structure possessed by humans. Based on psychological evidence that context-
sensitive prototypes govern the use of concepts, for instance, Ramsey (1998) points out that the 
traditional goal of finding necessary and sufficient conditions that are resistant to intuitive 
counterexamples through conceptual analysis is indefensible. 
 
74 There is room for controversy about even the weak claim that intuitions can help clarify 
meanings. If meanings are mental entities, for instance, behaviorists claim that they can only be  
clarified and explained by agent behavior, not by appeal to other mental events like intuitions. 
More importantly, there are also serious reasons to doubt that appeals to intuition will be sufficient 
to resolve disputes between incompatible philosophical positions about the proper meaning of 
some concepts, such as ‘free act,’ ‘cause,’ ‘personal identity,’ ‘knowledge,’ etc. (see Stich 1998; 
Sider 2001; Unger 2002; Dowe 2005). 
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 Sosa first gives an explicit definition of intuition in terms of inclination to 
believe: 
At [time] t, it is intuitive to [subject] S that [proposition] p iff (a) if at t S were 
merely to understand fully enough the proposition that p (absent relevant 
perception, introspection, and reasoning), then S would believe that p; (b) at t, S 
does understand the proposition that p. (1998, 259)75
 
With this definition, Sosa then argues that there is a strong analogy between 
intuitions on the one hand, and perception and introspection on the other. The 
latter are fallible, prone to serious and sometimes systematic error, even under 
normal circumstances, and, Sosa (1998, 263) suggests, there is currently no well-
developed theory of introspection. Intuition is in the same lot. Sosa mentions 
well-known paradoxes and the intuitive, but problematic naïve comprehension 
axiom of set theory as specific examples of the fallibility of intuition, and admits 
that recent psychological literature shows that, “even in conditions of apparent 
full normality, with high alertness and ample reflection time, subjects 
systematically go wrong in their reasoning and the intuitions involved” (1998, 
261). Despite their deficiencies, however, perception and introspection are 
typically and rightly, Sosa contends, relied upon as sources of justified true 
beliefs. According to the analogy, to the extent perception and introspection are 
                                                 
75 Sosa (1998, 258) includes the clause that p be “abstract” but refrains from defining what it for p 
to be abstract, saying, “our working concept of the concept [of being abstract] seems good enough 
for present purposes.” He clarified, however, that the restriction to abstract propositions was 
intended to focus on “the sort of intuition that seems important for the armchair theorizing of 
philosophers,” (1998, ff. 1), so ‘abstract’ has a broad connotation beyond merely logical or 
mathematical propositions. It includes, for instance, the intuition that space is Euclidean (1998, 
258). In any case, Sosa’s argument does not depend upon p being abstract (see below). 
 86
epistemically trustworthy sources of justified true belief, intuition should be 
similarly trusted. 
 One virtue of Sosa’s argument is that it does not rely on p being necessary, 
any ontological view of what p designates, or any commitment to how S is 
acquainted with or “grasps” what p designates (1998, 260). The argument 
therefore avoids contentious issues about the objectivity of necessity, or how what 
p designates generates S’s inclination to believe p. 
 Aside from serious worries about the epistemic status of perception and 
introspection especially (cf. Schwitzgebel 2006), there are glaring disanalogies 
with intuition that Sosa does not address. First, introspection and intuition involve 
fundamentally different kinds of belief. Intuitions concern beliefs about extra-
mental facts or properties of some form, whereas introspections are about 
subjective conscious states for Sosa (1998, 260). What may warrant the claim that 
introspections are a source of justified true beliefs about one’s subjective 
conscious states –for instance the privileged access the one exhibiting such states 
has to them– suggests nothing by itself about how intuitions could be a source of 
justified true beliefs about extra-mental facts of properties. Absent a bridge 
between them, which Sosa does not supply, the proposed analogy is inapt. 
 The proposed analogy between intuition and perception avoids this 
difficulty because both involve extra-mental facts or properties, but it suffers from 
others. If perception is considered a source of justified true beliefs, it is for at least 
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two reasons. One is that perception has an overall strong inductive basis. It has for 
most humans and organisms of other species provided an effective means for 
interacting with the external world.76 The second is that much is known about the 
physiological and psychological mechanisms underlying perception, and that this 
understanding can often explain why and how perception is sometimes erroneous. 
The fact that perception is sometimes misleading does not threaten the belief that 
it is usually epistemically reliable precisely because errors in perception can be 
explained by appeal to a theory of the mechanisms that underlie veridical 
perception (Graham and Horgan 1998). Even if the current understanding of 
perception falls short of this goal, it seems highly implausible that a “completed” 
theory of perception would fail to provide such explanations. 
 Intuition shares neither of these epistemic advantages. With respect to the 
first point, several critics of intuition have pointed out that its inductive basis is 
extremely poor (e.g. Harman 1994; Cummins 1998; Goldman and Pust 1998; 
Hintikka 1999). “The history of philosophy,” Levin (2004, 195) notes, “abounds 
with well-known examples of now-abandoned theses that once seemed obvious.” 
Typical examples include Kant’s claim that space necessarily has the structure 
described by Euclidean geometry, the idea of absolute, frame-invariant time and 
                                                 
76 This claim is uncontroversial, but whether it provides grounds for the claim that perception is a 
source of justified true beliefs depends on the meaning of ‘justification’ and ‘truth,’ and what they 
are taken to require.  
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space, or the widely held pre-Gettier intuition that knowledge is justified true 
belief. 
 Second, although Sosa avoids contentious issues by not presupposing a 
particular view of how intuitions yield justified true beliefs, the lack of such an 
account constitutes a significant difference between the epistemic status of 
perception and intuition. Without it, there is no defensible way to delineate cases 
where intuition is erroneous from those where it can be trusted, as there is for 
perception. Unlike perception, therefore, the fallibility of intuition poses a serious 
threat to its epistemic status. In addition, this is a particularly pressing problem for 
intuition because of its poor track record compared with perception.  
 Sosa’s position seems to be that the intuitive appeal of some propositions 
alone is sufficient to justify believing them. About propositions with intuitive 
appeal like ‘2+2=4,’ ‘no cube is a sphere,’ even Descartes’ cogito, Sosa suggests: 
presumably it cannot be just a coincidence that we are right in believing them. It 
must be more than a coincidence that, with regard to these facts, we get it right: 
that we would believe that p only were it so that p. Not only must we be so 
constituted and positioned, so related to the subject matter, that we would get it 
right, or tend to get it right; in addition, it cannot be just an accident that we are 
now so constituted and related. (1998, 262) 
 
It can be agreed that beliefs about these propositions (possibly excepting the 
cogito) are not accidental without agreeing that this lends any epistemic credence 
to intuition. Unless a compelling account of how one is “related to the subject 
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matter” is provided that shows how these beliefs are justified by intuition, the idea 
that it must be intuition is merely a supposition, not a warranted conclusion.77
 It is unlikely, moreover, that such an account will be forthcoming. What is 
required, Goldman and Pust (1998) point out, is a convincing explanation of how 
intuitions, which are mental events of some kind (dispositions to believe for Sosa, 
for instance), are a reliable indicator of facts about extra-mental objects or 
properties, whether they are the abstract “universals” Platonists attempt to access 
or the “natural kinds” supposedly discovered in science. With visual perception, 
for instance, this is supplied by the causal relationships between the objects being 
perceived, the light reflected from them, the perceiver’s retinas, and the visual 
cortex. Some details of these relationships and those involved in other types of 
perception may be currently unknown, but it is clear what kind of connection 
exists between the extra-mental objects or properties perceived and our 
perceptions of them. The same, Goldman and Pust (1998) correctly stress, cannot 
be said for intuition.78
  
5.3. Against a Strong Similarity Criterion. 
                                                 
77 The idea that intuitive appeal is sufficient to justify belief also has a problematic implication: in 
cases where intuitions diverge –e.g. about free will, consciousness, etc.– the disputants would both 
be justified in their beliefs, even though these beliefs are incompatible. This problem is especially 
troubling if substantial cognitive diversity, and hence diversity of intuitions, exists across cultures 
(Stich 1998; Weinberg et al. 2001). 
78 Goldman and Pust (1998, 187-188) emphasized, however, that intuitions can provide reliable 
data about the meaning of concepts, assuming a concept is a “psychological structure or state that 
underpins a cognizer’s deployment of a natural-language predicate” (see §5.1). 
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 Although it is not a comprehensive review of recent criticisms of intuition, 
the previous subsection illustrates some serious problems with the view that 
intuition constitutes an epistemically reliable source of facts about the world. 
Assuming these criticisms are sound, what are the implications for definition? If 
the definitional objective is simply to clarify the actual meaning of concepts, the 
prevailing view is unproblematic. Given this goal, definitions are not normative; 
they are merely intended to elaborate the meanings of concepts as determined by 
how they are used in ordinary language and conceived of by individuals. 
Intuitions have a part to play in this undertaking, usually in assessing through 
thought experiments whether concepts are applicable in various hypothetical 
scenarios far removed from the everyday contexts in which the concepts are 
normally employed (see §5.1). The results of such analyses do not definitively 
determine the meanings of ordinary concepts, however. They must be gauged, for 
instance, against data on how the concepts are actually used in everyday 
communication and arguably about how the concepts are cognitively represented. 
 The critique of intuitions has an important implication for definition, 
however, if its goal is to provide normative guidance about our concepts by 
playing a role in helping determine what the world is like. If, specifically, the 
objective of definition is to help align our concepts with a conceptual structure 
that better describes and better facilitates in discovering the structure of the world, 
then the absence of a credible epistemic basis for intuition entails that definitions 
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need not treat them as strongly binding. In particular, definitions need not 
preserve intuitive identity of meaning between definiendum and definiens. 
Intuitive similarity, assuming it accords with other sources of information about 
the actual meaning of concepts (see §5.1), must be retained, of course, to satisfy 
the similarity criterion, but definitions can and should deviate from identity or 
strong similarity to enhance precision and fruitfulness given the epistemic utility 
of these properties. Such definitions have a normative purpose and specify what 
the meaning of a concept should be rather than what it does mean. In other words, 
since the conceptual apparatus underlying everyday communication, which partly 
generates intuitions about the meaning of ordinary concepts, is not epistemically 
privileged, explicative definitions need not be significantly constrained by it. 
 Freed from strong constraints imposed by intuitions, definition becomes 
just another cognitive tool that should be evaluated according to the function it, 
and the broader conceptual and linguistic structure of which it is a part, is 
intended to serve. This was the view Carnap (1963b, 938-939) advocated: 
In my view, a language, whether natural or artificial, is an instrument that may be 
replaced or modified according to our needs, like any other instrument…A 
natural language is like a crude, primitive pocketknife, very useful for a hundred 
different purposes. But for certain specific purposes, special tools are more 
efficient, e.g., chisels, cutting-machines, and finally the microtome. If we find 
that the pocket knife is too crude for a given purpose and creates defective 
products, we shall try to discover the cause of the failure, and then either use the 
knife more skillfully, or replace it for this special purpose by a more suitable tool, 
or even invent a new one. [Strawson’s] thesis is like saying that by using a 
special tool we evade the problem of correctly using the cruder tool. But would 
anyone criticize the bacteriologist for using a microtome, and assert that he is 
evading the problem of correctly using a pocketknife? 
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For this reason, Strawson (1963, 505) was correct to emphasize that precise 
concepts like those found in science will probably never replace most of those 
used in ordinary communication (see §4). Loomis and Juhl (2006, 291) are 
similarly right to point out in response to Carnap’s analogy that, “pocketknives 
are not replaceable by microtomes for most ordinary uses” (emphasis added). The 
fact that ordinary concepts are sufficient for ordinary uses and provide an 
effective means for everyday communication does not, however, entail that they 
are the best or even adequate conceptual tools for accurate description of the 
world. If this is the ‘specific purpose’ to which Carnap alludes above, then 
transforming our ordinary concepts into more precise and fruitful ones is 
warranted, even if it requires departing somewhat from the meanings of ordinary 
concepts. 
 Loomis and Juhl (2006, 291) raise another, related criticism of Carnap’s 
analogy: “someone who was having trouble using a pocket-knife in an ordinary 
circumstance would not be helped in the least by being shown the workings of a 
microtome” (emphasis added). Although this is probably usually true, it is unclear 
it critically reflects on explication and Carnap’s instrumental view of language in 
general. Continuing the analogy, if the pocketknife corresponds to the ordinary 
concept and the trouble arises in an ordinary circumstance –i.e. one in which the 
concept is normally used– then it seems the troubled individual does not 
understand the actual meaning of the concept and should consult a lexical 
 93
definition that elaborates that meaning. If the confusion persists, it is likely the 
individual is expecting more of the concept than it delivers in ordinary 
circumstances where it functions unproblematically. The microtome 
corresponding to the more precise explicatum was, after all, only recommended as 
a “special tool” invoked for “certain specific purposes.”  
 The claim that definitions intended to provide normative guidance about 
concepts (rather than describe their meanings) must preserve their current 
meaning exactly seems to assume that these meanings (especially as determined 
by intuitions particular philosophers, instead of how most individuals understand 
the concepts) reflect or reveal something about the structure of the world 
inaccessible to or independent of science (Bealer 1998). If this view is 
indefensible as recent criticisms have suggested (§5.2), then it appears there is no 
reason to require strong similarity between definiendum and definiens, and thus 





How Should Ecological Stability Be Defined? 
 
 
 One fundamental obstacle to resolving the stability-diversity-complexity 
(SDC) debate is finding an adequate definition of ecological stability. Numerous 
definitions and categorizations of the concept have been proposed (Lewontin 
1969; Orians 1975; Pimm 1979, 1984, 1991; Grimm and Wissel 1997; Lehman 
and Tilman 2000) and this plurality has been responsible for much of the 
confusion and lack of progress in resolving the debate. As part of their argument 
that ecological theory has failed to provide a sound basis for environmental policy 
– they believe the SDC debate provides a clear example of this failure – Shrader-
Frechette and McCoy (1993) have also criticized that several proposed definitions 
of ecological stability are incompatible and that the concept is itself “conceptually 
confused” or “inconsistent.” 
 The first part of this chapter presents a comprehensive taxonomy of 
distinct concepts of ecological stability. The taxonomy indicates what concepts 
are compatible and reveals other relationships between them. The first part also 
argues that the concepts of resistance, resilience, and tolerance jointly provide an 
adequate definition of ecological stability. Roughly speaking, a community 
exhibits these concepts to a high degree if it: changes little after being perturbed 
(resistance); returns rapidly to a reference state or dynamic after being perturbed 
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(resilience); and will return to that reference state or dynamic after most 
perturbations (tolerance) (see §1.3). The first part of the chapter ends by rebutting 
the criticisms of Shrader-Frechette and McCoy (1993).  
 With the concept clarified, the second part of the chapter argues that the 
common definition of ecological stability as Lyapunov stability is flawed. This 
definition pervades mathematical modeling in ecology because it integrates the 
imprecise concept of ecological stability into a well-developed mathematical 
theory fruitfully utilized in other sciences. Lyapunov stability theory was 
developed in dynamical systems theory and has been used in applied mathematics 
to study several subjects, for instance, mechanics, electrical circuits, and 
economic systems (Hirsch and Smale 1974; Hinrichsen and Pritchard 2005). 
Lyapunov stability, however, fails to represent the domain of application of 
ecological stability adequately. This failure illustrates an important limitation of 
the theory of Lyapunov stability within mathematical ecology. 
 
1. The Many Senses of Ecological Stability. 
1.1. Contextualization and Classification of Ecological Stability.79  
 As the history recounted in Chapter 2 shows, ‘stability’ has been used to 
designate several different concepts in ecology. Before considering these concepts 
                                                 
79 In the following, ‘ecological stability’ designates stability of a biological community unless 
otherwise specified, though most of the discussion also applies to the stability of a biological 
population. 
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in more detail, it should first be noted that their attribution must be made with 
respect to two evaluative benchmarks. The first is a system description (M) that 
specifies how the system and its dynamics are represented. The second is a 
specified reference state or dynamic (R) of that system against which stability is 
assessed. In most ecological modeling, M is a mathematical model in which: 
(i) variables represent system parts, such as species of a community;  
(ii) parameters represent factors that influence variables but are (usually) 
uninfluenced by them, such as solar radiation input into a community; 
and, 
(iii) model equations describe system dynamics, such as interactions among 
species and the effect environmental factors have on them. 
M therefore delineates the boundary between what constitutes the system, and 
what is external to it. Relativizing stability evaluations to M is a generalization of 
Pimm’s (1984) relativization of stability to a “variable of interest” because 
stability is assessed with respect to (i)–(iii) rather than a subset of (i). 
 The specification of M partially dictates how R should be characterized, 
and vice versa. A biological community, for instance, is usually described as a 
composition of populations of different species. R must therefore reference these 
populations in some way. For example, R is often characterized in terms of the 
“normal” population sizes of each species. Since ecological modeling in the late 
1960s and 1970s was dominated by the development of mathematically tractable 
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equilibrium models (Holling 1973; Chesson and Case 1986; DeAngelis and 
Waterhouse 1987), “normal” population sizes were often assumed to be those at 
equilibrium, i.e. constant population sizes the community exhibits unless 
perturbed. This is not the only possible reference specification, however. A 
community may be judged stable, for instance, with respect to a reference 
dynamic the populations exhibit. Common examples are a limit cycle –a closed 
path C that corresponds to a periodic solution of a set of differential equations and 
towards which other paths asymptotically approach (Kot 2001, Ch. 8)– or a more 
complicated attractor dynamic (Hastings et al. 1993). Ecological stability can also 
be assessed with respect to some specified range of tolerated fluctu ation (Grimm 
and Wissel 1997). R may also be characterized solely in terms of the presence of 
certain species.80 Only extinction would constitute departure from this reference 
state. 
 The details of M and R are crucial because different system descriptions –
e.g. representing systems with different variables or representing their dynamics 
with different functions– may exhibit different stability properties or exhibit them 
to varying degrees relative to different specifications of R. Specifying R as a 
particular species composition vs. as an equilibrium, for instance, can yield 
different stability results. Similarly, different M can produce different assessments 
                                                 
 
80 To illustrate the partial dependence of M on R, notice that the species referred to in R must be 
part of the system description M.  
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of a system’s stability properties. Describing a system with difference versus 
differential equations is one example (May 1974). May (1976), for instance, 
showed that the logistic difference equation: 
(1) ;)1( 21 ttt NK
rNrN −+=+  
where t is time; r is the intrinsic growth rate; K is the carrying capacity; and N is 
the population size, exhibits dramatically different behavior than the logistic 
differential equation. For  the logistic differential equation has an 
asymptotically Lyapunov stable equilibrium  (see §2.2). This is also an 
asymptotically Lyapunov stable equilibrium of the logistic difference equation, 
but only for  For 
,0>r
KN =*
.20 << r 526.22 << r  the system exhibits a 2-period limit 
cycle. As r increases beyond 2.526 a 4-period limit cycle emerges, and the system 
exhibits chaotic behavior for  Thus, although the logistic differential 
and difference equations appear to describe very similar dynamics, the seemingly 
inconsequential choice of representing time as a discrete or continuous variable 
has a substantial effect on evaluating stability properties of the system. 
.692.2>r
Details of M and R are also important because they may specify the spatial 
and temporal scales at which the system is being analyzed, which can affect 
stability assessments. Systems with low resistance but high resilience, for 
example, fluctuate dramatically in response to perturbation but return rapidly to 
their reference state R (see §1.2 below). Low resistance is detectable at fine-
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grained temporal scales, but systems may appear highly resistant at coarser scales 
because their quick return to R prevents detection of fluctuation. Similarly, 
significant fluctuations in spatially small areas may contribute to relatively 
constant total population sizes maintained through immigration and emigration in 
larger regions. 
 Once (and only once) M and R are specified, the stability properties of a 
system can be determined. These properties fall into two general categories, 
depending on whether they refer to how systems respond to perturbation (relative 
to R) or refer to system properties independent of perturbation response (see §1.2, 
§1.3). A perturbation of an ecological system is any discrete event that disrupts 
system structure, changes available resources, or changes the physical 
environment (Krebs 2001). Typical examples are flood, fire, and drought. 
Perturbations are represented in mathematical models of communities by 
externally induced temporary changes to variables that represent populations, to 
parameters that represent environmental factors, and/or to model structure. Many, 
perhaps most, real-world perturbations of communities should be represented by 
changes to both variables and parameters. A severe flood, for instance, eradicates 
individual organisms and changes several environmental factors affecting 
populations. In the following, let Pv, Pp, and Pvp designate perturbations that 
change only variables, change only parameters, and those that change both, 
respectively.  
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 Perturbations may cause other changes, such as alteration of the functional 
form of species interactions, that are not adequately represented by changes to 
variable or parameter values of typical community models, but which should be 
included in a comprehensive assessment of community’s stability. Since these 
perturbations change community dynamics, they change M. How the altered 
community responds to these (and subsequent) perturbations must then be 
assessed against the new description of the community’s dynamics as long as 
those dynamics remain altered. Although a completely adequate assessment of the 
ecological stability of a community requires consideration of all such changes 
caused by perturbations, most ecological modeling focuses on changes to variable 
and parameter values. 
 
1.2. Resistance, Resilience, Tolerance, and Ecological Stability.  
 There are four plausible adequacy conditions for a definition of ecological 
stability: 
(A1) the ecological stability of a biological community depends upon how it 
responds to perturbation ([A2]–[A4] specify the form of the required 
dependency); 
 
(A2) of two communities A and B, the more ecologically stable community is 
the one that would exhibit less change if subject to a given perturbation P; 
 
(A3) if A and B are in a pre-perturbation reference state or dynamic R, the more 
ecologically stable community is the one that would most rapidly return to 
R if subject to P; and, 
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(A4) if A and B are in R, the more ecologically stable community is the one that 
can withstand stronger perturbations and still return to R. 
 
Before considering these conditions in detail, a few remarks help clarify their 
general basis. First, (A2)–(A4) only place comparative constraints on the concept 
of ecological stability and therefore require only a rank ordering of the stability of 
biological communities, rather than a particular quantitative valuation. The reason 
for requiring only comparative constraints is that quantitative valuation of 
ecological stability depend upon the system description (M) and reference state or 
dynamic (R) specified for a community, both of which may vary. Second, 
conditions (A2) and (A3) order the stability of communities based on their 
behavior following a particular perturbation P. As adequacy conditions, they 
therefore do not require a measure of the strength of perturbations. This reflects 
the difficulties facing the formulation of a measure of perturbation strength (see 
below), although such a measure is needed to evaluate the resistance of 
communities when only their responses to perturbations of different strength are 
known. If a quantitative measure of perturbation strength for different types of 
perturbation were available, two further noncomparative adequacy conditions 
could be formulated: 
(A2′)  a highly stable biological community should change little following weak 
 perturbations; and, 
 
(A3′)  a highly stable biological community should rapidly return to its reference 
 state or dynamic following weak perturbations. 
 
In contrast, condition (A4) does require a measure of perturbation strength.  
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 Condition (A1) captures the idea that a community’s behavior is a reliable 
indicator of its ecological stability only if the behavior reflects how perturbation 
changes the community. If unperturbed, a community may exhibit great constancy 
throughout some period.81 It may be, however, that if it had been even weakly 
perturbed, it would have changed dramatically. Constancy of this community 
surely does not indicate ecological stability when it would have changed 
substantially if perturbed slightly. Similarly, variability of a community does not 
necessarily indicate lack of ecological stability if it is the result of severe 
perturbations, perturbations that would cause greater fluctuations or even 
extinctions in less stable communities.  
 The reason for (A2) is that more stable communities should be less 
affected by perturbations than less stable ones. Communities that can withstand 
severe drought with little change, for instance, are intuitively more stable than 
those modified dramatically. This was the idea, for example, underlying 
MacArthur’s (1955) definition of community stability (see Ch. 2, §2). The 
justification for (A3) is that more stable communities should more rapidly return 
to R following perturbations than less stable ones. This adequacy condition 
captures the idea that lake communities that return to R quickly after an incident 
of thermal pollution, for instance, are more stable than those with slower return 
rates following similar incidents. This idea was the implicit basis of the concept of 
                                                 
81 As assessed by a lack of fluctuations in the biomasses of species in the community, for instance. 
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stability used by Rosenzweig and MacArthur (1963) to analyze predator-prey 
interactions (see Ch. 2, §3). The ground for the last condition is that communities 
that can sustain stronger perturbations than others and still return to R should be 
judged more stable. (A4) was the underlying basis, for instance, of Patten’s 
(1961) measure of community stability (see Ch. 2, §3). 
 Three concepts – resistance, resilience, and tolerance – represent the 
properties required of ecological stability by (A2′)–(A4).82 Resistance is inversely 
correlated with the degree a system changes relative to R following perturbation 
(Pv, Pp, or Pvp). Since perturbations vary in magnitude, resistance must be 
assessed against perturbation strength. Large changes after weak perturbations 
indicate low resistance; small changes after strong perturbations indicate high 
resistance. Resistance is thus inversely proportional to perturbation sensitivity.  
 Depending on M and R, changes in communities can be evaluated in 
different ways, each of which corresponds to a different measure of resistance. 
Community resistance is typically measured by changes in species abundances 
following perturbation. It could, however, be measured by changes in species 
composition following perturbation, or in some other way. Pimm’s (1979) concept 
of species deletion stability, for instance, measures resistance by the number of 
subsequent extinctions in a community after one species is eradicated. 
                                                 
82 The second part of this chapter (§2) argues ecological stability should not be defined as 
Lyapunov stability, local, global, or otherwise, and discusses structural stability.  
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 A simple example illustrates the contextual import of M and R in assessing 
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where xd and xy represent predator and prey populations; a represents prey birth 
rate; b represents predator death rate; and 0, >βα  represent the effect of prey 
individuals on predator individuals and vice versa. Equation (2) is the description 
of the system, M. There is one nontrivial equilibrium, 
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is usually specified as the reference state, R.  
 For this M and R, resistance to a Pv perturbation that eradicates, say, half 
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83  decreases because  is its only food source according to (2). A more complete measure of 
resistance would also consider the subsequent deviation of  from  after being perturbed to 






this perturbation. Similarly, if R were different, assessments of resistance may 
change. If R were the species composition  and  (i.e. ) rather than 
their equilibrium values, for instance, resistance would be assessed in terms of 
changes from this composition, i.e. in terms of species extinction. The equilibrium 






*  is globally stable for this simple community, so only a Pv 
perturbation strong enough to eradicate one of the species will cause extinction; 
this community returns to equilibrium after all other Pv perturbations. For 
communities with many species and more species dynamics, however, a Pv 
perturbation that eradicates half or less of one species may cause the extinction of 
that, or other species. 
 Different types of perturbations, moreover, yield different measures of 
resistance. Since evaluating resistance requires considering perturbation strength, 
strengths of different types of perturbations must be comparable for there to be a 
single measure of resistance for a system. Such comparisons are sometimes 
straightforward. If one perturbation eradicates half of species x in a community, 
for instance, another that eradicates 75% of x is certainly stronger. If another 
perturbation eradicates 25% of 3 species or 5% of 15 species in the community, 
however, it is unclear how its strength should be ranked against the perturbation 
that eradicates 75% of x. What criteria could be used to compare strengths of Pv, 
Pp, or Pvp perturbations, to which systems may show differential sensitivity, is 
 106
even less clear. Systems that are highly resistant to Pv perturbations may be 
extremely sensitive to even slight Pp. Comparing the resistance of communities is 
therefore only unproblematic with respect to perturbations of comparable kind. 
 Resilience is the rate at which a system returns to R following perturbation 
(Pv, Pp, or Pvp). Like resistance, resilience must be assessed against perturbation 
strength unless, although unlikely for many types of perturbation, return rate is 
independent of perturbation strength. Slow return rates after weak perturbations 
indicate low resilience and rapid rates following strong perturbations indicate high 
resilience.84 Systems may not return to R after perturbation, especially following 
severe perturbation, so, unlike resistance, resilience is only assessable for 
perturbations that do not prevent return to R. Note that resilience and resistance 
are independent concepts: systems may be drastically changed by weak 
perturbations (low resistance) but rapidly return to R (high resilience), and vice 
versa. 
 Resilience is commonly measured as the inverse of the time taken for the 
effects of perturbation to decay relative to R. For a specific mathematical model, 
this can be determined analytically or by simulation. For the community described 
by equation (2) above, for instance, resilience to a Pv perturbation that eradicates 
half of one species could be simply measured by 
peq tt −
1  where  is the time at pt
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which the community is initially perturbed and  is the time at which the 
community reestablishes equilibrium. Resilience to P
eqt
v perturbation is determined 
by the largest real eigenvalue part for systems modeled by linear differential 
equations if it is negative, and analytic methods have been developed to assess 
resilience to Pv perturbation for nonlinear models (see §2.3). Empirical 
measurement of resilience for communities in nature, however, is often thwarted 
by subsequent perturbations that disrupt return to R. This difficulty can be 
avoided if subsequent perturbations can be evaded with controlled experiments. If 
the return rate is independent of perturbation strength, estimation of resilience is 
also more feasible because only the decay rate of the perturbation effects need be 
measured before the system is further perturbed; measurement of perturbation 
strength is not required (Pimm 1984). Like resistance, furthermore, different types 
of perturbations yield different measures of resilience since return rate to R may 
depend upon the way in which systems are perturbed. A system may be highly 
resilient to Pv perturbation and poorly resistant to Pp perturbation, for instance, or 
more resilience to some Pv or Pp perturbations than others. 
 Tolerance, or “domain of attraction” stability, is the ability of a system to 
be perturbed and return to R, regardless of how much it may change and how long 
its return takes. More precisely, tolerance is positively correlated with the range 
                                                                                                                                     
84 If return rate does not depend on perturbation strength, however, resilience can be evaluated by 
the return rate independent of the perturbation strength, although the rate may vary across different 
types of perturbations. 
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and strength of perturbations a system can sustain and still return to R. The 
magnitudes of the strongest perturbations it can sustain determine the contours of 
this range. Note that tolerance is conceptually independent of resistance and 
resilience: a system may be severely perturbed and still return to R (high 
tolerance), even if it changes considerably (low resistance) and its return rate is 
slow (low resilience), and vice versa. 
 Similar to resistance and resilience, different kinds of perturbations yield 
different measures of tolerance. Tolerance to Pv perturbations, for instance, is 
determined by the maximal changes variables can bear and not jeopardize the 
system’s return to R. With respect to Pv perturbations that affect only one species 
of a community, for instance, tolerance can be simply measured by the proportion 
of that species that can be eradicated without precluding the community’s return 
to R. If a nontrivial equilibrium of equation (2) from above is globally stable, for 
instance, the community described by the equation is maximally tolerant to Pv 
perturbations relative to this reference state because the community will return to 
it after any Pv perturbation that does not eradicate one of the species. Variables of 
a system may be perturbed, however, in other ways. A Pv perturbation may 
change all variables, several, or only one; it may change them to the same degree, 
some variables more severely than others; and so on. How exactly variables are 
perturbed may affect whether the system returns to R. System tolerance must 
therefore be evaluated with respect to different types of perturbation. The same 
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goes for assessing tolerance to Pp or Pvp perturbations. Note that local asymptotic 
Lyapunov stability corresponds to tolerance to Pv perturbation in the infinitesimal 
neighborhood of an equilibrium, and global asymptotic Lyapunov stability 
corresponds to tolerance to any Pv perturbation (see §2). 
 Although resistance, resilience, and tolerance do not adequately explicate 
ecological stability individually, they do so collectively. In fact, they constitute 
jointly sufficient and separately necessary conditions for ecological stability, 
notwithstanding Shrader-Freschette and McCoy’s (1993, 58) claim that such 
conditions do not exist. Consider sufficiency first. Since these three concepts 
represent the properties underlying conditions (A2)–(A4) [and (A2′) and (A3′)], 
communities exhibiting them to a high degree would change little after strong 
perturbations ([A2]), return to R rapidly if perturbed from it ([A3]), and return to 
R following almost any perturbation ([A4]).85 As such, these three properties 
certainly capture ecologists’ early conceptions of ecological stability (see Ch. 2), 
and there seems to be no further requirement of ecological stability that a 
community exhibiting these properties would lack. 
 Each concept is also necessary. Highly tolerant and resistant communities, 
for instance, change little and return to R after most perturbations. In regularly 
perturbing environments, however, even a highly resistant and tolerant 
                                                 
 
85 If R is a point equilibrium, moreover, a community exhibiting high resistance, resilience and 
tolerance will be relatively constant. 
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community may be iteratively perturbed to the boundary of its tolerance range and 
“linger” there if its return rate to R is too slow. Subsequent perturbations may then 
displace it from this range, thereby precluding return to R. If this community 
rapidly returned to R after most perturbations (high resilience), it would rarely 
reach and would not linger at its tolerance boundary. In general, low resilience 
preserves the effects perturbations have on communities for extended, perhaps 
indefinite durations, which seems incompatible with ecological stability.  
 Similar considerations show tolerance and resistance are necessary for 
ecological stability. A highly resilient and tolerant but weakly resistant 
community rapidly returns to R following almost any perturbation, but changes 
significantly after even the slightest perturbation, which seems contrary to 
ecological stability. The dramatic fluctuation such communities would exhibit in 
negligibly variable environments is the basis for according them low ecological 
stability. A highly resilient and resistant but weakly tolerant community changes 
little and rapidly returns to R when perturbed within its tolerance range, but even 
weak perturbations displace it from this range and thereby preclude its return to R, 
which also seems contrary to ecological stability. 
 Resistance, resilience, and tolerance are independent concepts and thus 
biological communities may exhibit them to different degrees. Alhough the 
necessity of each concept for ecological stability does not strictly entail they are 
equally important in evaluations of a community’s stability, nothing about the 
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pre-theoretic concept of ecological stability seems to suggest otherwise. As a 
concept composed of resistance, resilience, and tolerance, ecological stability 
therefore imposes only a partial, not complete, ordering on communities. 
Moreover, since communities may differentially exhibit resistance, resilience, 
and/or tolerance for different types of ecological perturbations (see §1.1), each 
property also imposes only a partial ordering on communities. This twofold 
partiality entails inferences from analyses of stability-diversity and stability-
complexity relationships are limited by the property and type of perturbations 
analyzed, beside the particular system description (M) and reference state or 
dynamic (R) specified. 
 
1.3. Constancy and Ecological Stability.  
 Compared with resistance, resilience, and tolerance, constancy is a 
fundamentally different kind of concept. Unlike them, it is not defined in terms of 
response to perturbation, and thus violates adequacy condition (A1), as well as 
(A2)–(A4). Rather, constancy of a biological community is typically defined as a 
function of the variances and/or covariances in species biomasses.86 Tilman 
(1996, 1999; Lehman and Tilman 2000), for instance, defined ecological stability 
as “temporal stability” (St): 
                                                 
86 If R refers to a specific set of species, constancy can also be measured by the variability of the 




























where C designates an n-species communities; Bi is a random variable designating 
the biomass of species i in an n-species community C assayed during some time 
period, and let iB  designate the expected value of Bi for the time period it is 
assayed; Var designates variance; and Cov designates covariance. The motivating 
intuition for this definition is the idea that if two series of abundances are plotted 
across time, the more stable one exhibits less fluctuation (Lehman and Tilman 
2000). In particular, if a community becomes more variable as judged by 
variances and covariances between its biomasses, regardless of what causes the 
variability, the denominator of (3) increases and its temporal stability decreases. 
One counterintuitive feature of this definition is that a community could become 
more stable solely because mean biomasses increase.87 This problem is easily 
avoided by measuring constancy strictly in terms of biomass variability [e.g. 
reformulating (3) with a numerator of 1], but this does not circumvent the 
fundamental difficulty that defining ecological stability as constancy does not 
satisfy (A1), irrespective of how constancy is measured. Contrary to the intuition 
motivating this definition, however, constancy is neither necessary nor sufficient 
                                                 
87 Tilman’s definition also initiated a controversy about whether it biases the stability-diversity 
debate in the positive See Doak et al. 1998, Tilman et al. 1998, and Chapter 6. 
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for ecological stability. It is insufficient because a community may exhibit great 
constancy if unperturbed, but change dramatically if it were even weakly 
perturbed.88 Unless constancy is a result of how a community responds to 
perturbation, it can mask extreme sensitivity to perturbation, which is 
incompatible with ecological stability. By itself, therefore, constancy is not a 
reliable indicator of ecological stability. 
 Constancy is not necessary for ecological stability for two reasons. First, 
although a highly stable community at equilibrium remains relatively constant, it 
may fluctuate if subject to severe perturbations, perturbations that would 
drastically modify or eradicate weakly stable communities. It would be 
unjustifiable to regard these fluctuations as evidence of low ecological stability. 
The problem is that because constancy is not defined relative to perturbation 
response, it cannot distinguish between fluctuations that are a consequence of 
strong perturbation, which are consistent with ecological stability, and those that 
reveal susceptibility to weak or moderate perturbations, which are incompatible 
with ecological stability. 
 The second reason constancy is not necessary is that a highly stable 
system will not be constant if R is not an equilibrium reference state. 
Communities may be highly resistant, resilient, and tolerant with respect to 
                                                 
 
88 The extreme case is that a system at a Lyapunov unstable equilibrium remains constant if 
unperturbed. 
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regular limit cycles or more complicated attractor dynamics. In this case, the 
community changes little relative to the limit cycle or attractor after strong 
perturbation, rapidly returns to the limit cycle or attractor after strong 
perturbation, and returns to the limit cycle or attractor even after severe 
perturbation. Lack of constancy of such a community does not detract from the 
fact that any adequate conception of ecological stability should judge it highly 
stable relative to R.89
 Most classifications of ecological stability include an additional non-
perturbation based stability concept, persistence: the time a community remains in 
R irrespective of whether or not it is perturbed. Retaining a particular species 
composition or biomasses within delimited ranges are typical reference states for 
gauging persistence. Persistence is usually measured by how long they do or are 
predicted to exhibit these states. It could, for instance, be measured by the time 
minimum population levels have been sustained (e.g. non-zero levels), or will be 
sustained based on predictions from mathematical models (Orians 1975). As such, 
persistence is in fact only a special case of constancy in which constancy is 
measured by the time R has been or will be exhibited, rather than variability with 
respect to R. Understood as the absence of species extinction, persistence is 
                                                 
89 This problem can be avoided by relativizing constancy to R. In this case, constancy would be 
equivalent to variability from R. This relativization does not circumvent the first problem 
discussed above, however. 
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certainly a necessary condition for ecological stability, but certainly not 
constitutive of it.  
 Table 1 presents a taxonomy of the stability concepts: resistance, 
resilience, tolerance, constancy, local and global Lyapunov stability, and 
structural stability. The taxonomy classifies these concepts into two general 
categories, defines each, and lists some of their properties. 
 This taxonomy subsumes other classifications in the ecological literature. 
Lewontin’s (1969) was the first and included local and global Lyapunov stability, 
structural stability, constancy, and, though not by these labels, resilience and 
tolerance to Pv perturbations (see Ch. 2). Orians’ (1975) was the second. He left 
Lyapunov and structural stability out of his classification, but included constancy, 
resistance under the label ‘inertia,’ resilience under the label ‘elasticity,’ tolerance 
under the label ‘amplitude,’ as well as persistence as a distinct stability concept. 
Orians’ classification also included two additional concepts that have counterparts 
in the above framework. The first, ‘cyclic stability,’ is equivalent to resistance, 
resilience, and tolerance relative to a limit cycle reference state. Orians intended 
the second, ‘trajectory stability,’ to capture the idea of the stability of community 
succession. It is equivalent to tolerance with R specified as the hypothesized 
climax community. 
 Pimm (1984) presented the same classification as Lewontin (1969) except 
resistance was included and structural stability was not. Pimm (1984) also first 
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recognized that attributions of ecological stability must be made with respect to a 
“variable of interest.” The system description (M) specifies the variables that 
represent the system in our framework. Pimm did not, however, relativize 
ecological stability to an explicit reference state or dynamic. Grimm and Wissel 
(1997) were probably the first to make this contextualization explicit, thereby 
allowing communities exhibiting limit cycles or strange attractor dynamics to be 
judged ecologically stable. They resolved ecological stability into six concepts: 
constancy, persistence, resistance, resilience under the label ‘elasticity’, tolerance 
under the label ‘domain of attraction’, and a concept representing that the system 
returns to R after perturbation under the label ‘resilience’. Whether a system 
returns to R after perturbation depends upon the type and strength of the 
perturbation and the system’s tolerance, so the last of Grimm and Wissel’s 
stability concepts (‘resilience’) seems to be a special case of tolerance.  
 
1.4. The Conceptual Status of Ecological Stability.  
 It is worth pausing over what the framework for ecological stability 
presented above shows about the general concept. It certainly shows that 
ecologists have used the term ‘stability’ to describe several distinct features of 
community dynamics, although only resistance, resilience, and tolerance 
adequately define ecological stability. This plurality does not manifest, however, 
an underlying vagueness, “conceptual incoherence,” or “inconsistency” of the 
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concept, as Shrader-Frechette and McCoy (1993, 57) suggest in their general 
critique of basic ecological concepts and ecological theories based on them. 
 Two claims seem to ground their criticism. First, if ‘stability’ is used to 
designate distinct properties, as it has been in the ecological literature (see Ch. 2), 
this indicates the concept is itself conceptually vague and thereby flawed. 
Although terminological ambiguity is certainly undesirable, most ecologists 
unambiguously used the term to refer to a specific property of a community and 
accompanied the term with a precise mathematical or empirical operationalization 
(see §§2–4). Since these were in no sense vague, in no sense was ecological 
stability “vaguely defined” (Shrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993, 40). Ecologists 
quickly appreciated this terminological ambiguity, moreover, and began explicitly 
distinguishing different senses of ecological stability with different terms 
(Odenbaugh 2001). Lewontin’s (1969) review was the first example, and 
subsequent analyses of the concept did not abandon this insight. 
 Shrader-Frechette and McCoy’s second claim is that, “There is no 
homogeneous class of processes or relationships that exhibit stability,” (1993, 58). 
The underlying assumption seems to be that concepts in general, ecological 
stability in particular, must refer to a homogeneous class to be conceptually 
unproblematic. That ecological stability does not, and worse, that ecologists have 
supposedly attributed inconsistent meanings to it, shows the concept is incoherent, 
they believe, much like the vexed species concept (1993, 57).  
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 Shrader-Frechette and McCoy do not offer an argument for this 
assumption, and it is indefensible as a general claim about what concepts must 
refer to. Common concepts provide clear counterexamples. The concepts 
‘sibling,’ ‘crystal,’ and ‘field,’ for instance, refer to heterogeneous classes, but 
there is nothing conceptually problematic about them. There is debate about the 
idea of disjunctive properties in work on multiple realization (Fodor 1974; Kim 
1998; Batterman 2000), but criticisms raised against disjunctive properties do not 
necessarily apply to disjunctive concepts, nor were they intended to. Kim (1999, 
110) emphasizes this point: 
Qua property, dormativity is heterogeneous and disjunctive, and it lacks 
the kind of causal homogeneity and projectability that we demand from 
kinds and properties useful in formulating laws and explanations. But 
[the concept of] dormativity may well serve important conceptual and 
epistemic needs, by grouping properties that share features of interest to 
us in a given context of inquiry. 
 
Even if criticisms of disjunctive properties were sound, it therefore would not 
follow that the disjunctive concepts such as ecological stability are also 
problematic.90 Shrader-Frechette and McCoy’s criticism of ecological stability is 
therefore indefensible. The conceptual and epistemic utility of a concept is 
enhanced, furthermore, if clear guidelines for its application exist, which Sections 
1.2 and 1.3 have attempted to describe. 
 Moreover, the definitional status of the concepts of ecological stability and 
species is not analogous. Biologists have proposed plausible, but incompatible 
                                                 
90 No assumption about whether ecological stability is or is not a property is being made. 
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competing definitions for the species concept because it is problematically 
ambiguous (Ereshefsky 2001). That resistance, resilience, and tolerance have been 
referred to under the rubric ‘stability,’ however, do not show ecological stability 
is similarly problematically ambiguous because they are conceptually independent 
and therefore compatible, as different senses of ‘species’ are not.91 In addition, as 
classifications of different stability concepts attest (e.g. Lewontin 1969; Orians 
1975; Pimm 1984), most ecologists recognized that there are several components 
of ecological stability, and individual stability concepts such as resistance, 
resilience and tolerance, or measures thereof, were rarely proposed as the 
uniquely correct definition of ecological stability. Rather, they were and should be 
understood as distinct features of ecological stability or ways of measuring it, not 
competing definitional candidates. Like many scientific concepts, ecological 
stability is multifaceted, and the distinct referents ecologists attributed to it 
accurately reflect this. Conceptual multifacetedness alone does not entail 
conceptual incoherence or inconsistency. 
 
2. Ecological and Lyapunov Stability. 
2.1. Introduction. 
                                                 
 
91 As noted above, different quantitative measures of resistance, resilience, and tolerance may be 
incompatible. This does not establish, however, that the corresponding concepts are incompatible. 
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 The first part of this chapter presented a comprehensive classification of 
different features of ecological stability and argued that resistance, resilience, and 
tolerance collectively define the concept of ecological stability adequately while 
constancy is neither necessary nor sufficient for it. The second part of the chapter 
shows why ecological stability should not be defined as Lyapunov stability, as is 
commonly assumed in mathematical modeling of biological communities. 
 Lyapunov stability is named after the Russian mathematician who first 
precisely defined the concept to describe the apparently stable equilibrium 
behavior of the solar system (Lyapunov 1892). His definition has found 
widespread application outside this context and is frequently used to analyze 
mathematical models of biological communities (Logofet 1993). Robert May 
(1974) used this definition, for instance, in his influential analysis of the 
relationship between the stability and complexity of such models (see Ch. 1, §4).  
 The definition has some clear advantages. Unlike other definitions, it 
integrates ecological stability into a thoroughly studied mathematical theory that 
has proved fruitful in the analysis of mechanics, electrical circuits, economic 
systems, and other systems in applied mathematics. It also seems to formalize the 
intuition that ecological stability depends on community response to perturbation. 
Despite these apparent advantages, ecological stability should not be defined as 
Lyapunov stability.  
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Sections 2.3 and 2.3 describe the concept of Lyapunov stability, its 
underlying mathematical theory, and show why this theory is so successful within 
physics. Section 2.4 considers the apparent advantages of the definition and 
illustrates how Lyapunov stability applies to mathematical models of biological 
communities. Section 2.5 argues this definition is problematic, focusing 
specifically on biological interpretation of Lyapunov stability. Based on this 
analysis, Section 2.6 draws some general conclusions about scientific definition 
and illustrates an important limitation of the theory of Lyapunov stability within 
mathematical ecology. 
 
2.2. Lyapunov Stability.  
 To ensure sufficient generality, represent a system by a position vector x(t) 
(t represents time) in an abstract n-dimensional state space E. Assume E is 
governed by a vector function F representing the magnitude and change of 
direction it induces on x(t). F represents, therefore, the dynamics of the system 
x(t). Points in E for which F=0 are called equilibrium points, and unperturbed 
position vectors at such points remain stationary. 
 Lyapunov stability is a property of system behavior in neighborhoods of 
equilibria. Specifically, an equilibrium x* is Lyapunov stable in Ex (x*∈Ex⊆E) iff: 
(4) (∀ε>0)(∃δ>0)(|x(t0)−x*|<δ⇒(∀t≥t0)(|x(t)−x*|<ε));  
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where ε and δ are real values, x(t0)∈Ex represents the system at some initial time 
t0, and ‘|·|’ designates a distance metric on E. Informally, (4) says x* is Lyapunov 
stable if systems beginning in x* neighborhoods remain near it after perturbations 
that do not displace them from Ex. x* is asymptotically Lyapunov stable in Ex iff 
(4) and  The subspace E.)(lim *xx =
∞→t
t x of E within which systems are 
(asymptotically) Lyapunov stable is called the (attraction) stability domain of x* 
(see Figure 2). If the (attraction) stability domain of x* is all of E, x* is 
(asymptotically and) globally Lyapunov stable. 
 In general, Lyapunov stability cannot be assessed with (4) because explicit 
solutions for x(t) can seldom be found. Scientific models often characterize x(t) in 
terms of differential equations: 
(5) );),(()( Ω= t
dt
td xFx  
where Ω is a set of parameters designating factors that influence system dynamics 
but are uninfluenced by them, and F  is a n×n  matrix [aij].92 For the complex 
systems modeled by equation (5) that scientists study, explicit solutions for x(t) 
are rarely available. Without such solutions, system behavior as required by (4) 
cannot be directly evaluated. 
 
                                                 
 
92 Since F is not a function of t, (5) represents autonomous dynamic systems that do not explicitly 
depend on time. These models are common in science and the focus of the following analysis. 
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2.3. The Direct and Indirect Methods.  
 Lyapunov (1892) recognized this difficulty and developed two methods 
for assessing (4) indirectly. The first ‘indirect method’ involves linearizing F at 








t  be the Jacobian matrix of F evaluated at 
x*. The eigenvalues of A determine whether x* is stable. These are scalar values λi 
such that det(A−λiI)=0, i.e. the roots of the characteristic polynomial of A. 
Lyapunov proved x* is asymptotically Lyapunov stable iff: 
(6) Reλi(A)<0 for i=1,…,n; 
where Reλi(A) designates the real part of the ith eigenvalue of A, λi. Since A is 
only defined at x*, stability determined by the indirect method is restricted to 
infinitesimal neighborhoods of x*. For this reason, it is called local stability. The 
indirect method is prevalent in mathematical modeling because it is almost 
universally applicable: it applies to any system representable by differential 
equations like (5) and some difference equations (Hinrichsen and Pritchard 2005). 
Stability criteria based on the indirect method such as (4) have a serious 
limitation: they provide no information about the extent of (attraction) stability 
domains. This prompted Lyapunov (1892) to develop a “direct method” for 
evaluating (4). It involves constructing a differentiable scalar Lyapunov function 
V(x) with an origin at x* (i.e. x*=0) such that: 
(i) V(x) is positive definite: (a) V(0)=0; (b) V(x)>0 for all x≠0; and, 
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(ii) ∇V(x)·F(x,Ω)≤0 for all x; 
where ‘·’ designates the dot product, and ‘∇’ designates the gradient vector 
function. Lyapunov (1892) proved the existence of a Lyapunov function on Ex⊆E 
(x*∈Ex) is sufficient for Lyapunov stability of x* in this region, and with strict 
inequality in (ii), x* is asymptotically Lyapunov stable. This condition was also 
later proved necessary (Hahn 1963). Thus, the ability to construct Lyapunov 
functions is a stability criterion. As a methodology, it is labeled direct because its 
success depends directly upon the mathematical form of equations like (5), unlike 
the indirect method, which relies on their linearization, and unlike direct 
evaluation of (4), which requires explicit solutions to (5). 
Although no general method for constructing Lyapunov functions is 
known, the direct method has proven to be an extremely useful tool for analyzing 
physical systems, especially in the classical framework governed by only 
Newtonian mechanics and friction. Across scientific fields, this is the exception 
rather than the rule. Constructing Lyapunov functions is difficult if not impossible 
for the predominantly nonlinear systems scientists study (Goh 1977). The reason 
for its utility in the classical framework is twofold. First, there are highly 
confirmed mathematical models describing numerous kinds of systems in this 
framework. The likelihood is therefore high that application of the direct method 
to these models will reveal the true stability properties of the systems they 
represent. Second, in the classical framework certain quantities, such as total 
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energy, are conserved or monotonically dissipated in such systems, depending on 
whether they are characterized as open or closed. These quantities ensure 
Lyapunov functions exist for models of these systems. Lyapunov, in fact, 
developed the Lyapunov function to generalize the classical energy concept and 
his proof about its connection to stability depends essentially on energy 
conservation (Lyapunov [1892] 1992). 
 To illustrate, consider a closed particle mass system governed by a 
conservative force field G in a frictionless Newtonian framework. The system 
energy, V(x,v), is: 
(7) V(x,v)=½m|v|2+U(x); 
where x is a position vector, v is a velocity vector, m represents particle mass, ‘|·|’ 
designates the magnitude of ·, and U is a scalar potential energy function such that 
G(x)=–∇U(x).93 Energy conservation ensures: 
(8) V(x,v)=c; 
where c is a constant real value. At an equilibrium x*, v=0, G=0  and hence 
gradU(x)=0. If, furthermore, x* is a local minimum of U(x), an “energy 
difference” function V*(x,v) can be defined such that V*(x,v)=V(x,v)–V(x*,0). 
V*(x,v) is a Lyapunov function and, therefore, x* is stable. In this case, energy 
conservation entails (ii) from above is satisfied by equality. If, however, energy 
                                                 
93 Note that V(x,v) is the Hamiltonian of this system. 
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were continually decreasing instead of conserved, by friction for instance, (ii) 
would be satisfied by strict inequality and x* would be asymptotically stable. 
 Within the classical framework, stability properties of models of more 
complicated systems that include and disregard friction can be evaluated with the 
direct method. The method is also useful in non-classical frameworks with similar 
properties, such as mass-energy conservation in special relativity theory. The 
equations characterizing systems in these and the classical framework are often 
too complex to solve analytically, and the direct method provides the only means 
by which the attraction domains of asymptotically stable equilibria can be 
determined. In a wide variety of frameworks within physics, therefore, the direct 
method and the concept of Lyapunov stability are indispensable. 
 
2.4. Lyapunov Theory and Community Modeling.  
 The brief outline of Lyapunov theory above suggests some important 
advantages of defining ecological stability as Lyapunov stability. First, the 
definition formalizes the concept and integrates it into a well-developed 
mathematical theory. Stability properties of mathematical models of communities 
can then be assessed with thoroughly studied analytical techniques. 
 Besides the virtues of formalization, Lyapunov stability also seems to 
capture precisely the intuition that ecological stability depends upon community 
response to perturbation. Consulting (4), think of a community perturbed at time 
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t0 from x* to x(t0) such that |x(t0)−x*|<δ. If x* is Lyapunov stable, (4) states that 
the perturbed community will remain in an ε-neighborhood of x* for ∀t≥ t0, i.e. 
the effects of the perturbation are circumscribed. Some other popular definitions 
of ecological stability are mathematically precise in that they are statistical 
functions of model variables (e.g. Lehman and Tilman’s [2000] ‘temporal 
stability’), but they do not, as Lyapunov stability does, provide a mathematical 
characterization of equilibrium system dynamics. If x* is Lyapunov stable in some 
region of the state space E, for instance, the conditional in (4) ensures predictions 
can be made about system behavior after perturbation from x*. Mathematical 
definitions in the statistical sense cannot ground such predictions unless future 
values of variables depend upon past values in some systematic way, and the 
precise form of the dependency is known. The concept of Lyapunov stability is an 
important analytic tool within physics because (1) provides a mathematically 
precise description of the equilibrium dynamics of systems. 
In addition, properties of community response to perturbation that are 
fundamental components of ecological stability seem to be formalizable with the 
direct method. The size of attraction domains of asymptotically Lyapunov stable 
equilibria and the rate systems return to them, for instance, are definable in terms 
of Lyapunov functions (Hahn 1963, §§12, 22-25). The larger the attraction 
domain, for instance, the stronger the perturbations of variables a system can 
sustain and return to x*, which is often called system ‘tolerance’. Similarly, the 
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“steeper” the Lyapunov function V(x) (as gauged by ∇V(x)), the faster it returns 
to x*, often called system ‘resilience’. If Lyapunov stability adequately defined 
ecological stability, it would therefore be possible to formalize the properties of 
tolerance and resilience and their relation to the stability of biological 
communities. Specifically, the intuitive ideas that ecological stability increases 
with the strength of perturbation from which a system can return to equilibrium 
(see [A4], §1.2), and with the speed of return to equilibrium after perturbation 
(see [A3], §1.2), would be formalizable. 
 Finally, the direct method adequately characterizes the equilibrium 
dynamics of many systems studied in physics (and other sciences), and it is 
reasonable to expect the method will fare similarly for ecological systems since 
their models share a similar mathematical structure. Like systems studied in 
physics, biological communities are usually modeled by differential equations. 
The only difference is that components of the vector x(t)=<x1(t),…,xi(t),…,xn(t)> 
represent biological variables, usually population sizes of species in a community, 
instead of typical physical variables. 
 This expectation seems to be supported, for instance, by the classical 
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where xd and xy represent predator and prey population sizes; a represents prey 
birth rate; b represents predator death rate; and α,β>0 represent the effect of prey 
individuals on predator individuals and vice versa. Setting 
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where c1,c2>0 are constants, so x* is globally stable by the direct method (Logofet 
1993). 
 An interesting property of equation (9) discovered by Vito Volterra 
reveals a structural similarity between models of ecological and physical systems, 
which in turn seems to justify the utility of Lyapunov theory in ecology. Equation 
(9) can be rewritten as: 
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where c is a constant real value. Volterra believed (9) corresponded to a form of 
energy conservation [compare with (4) and (5) above].94 He called the first two 
terms “actual demographic energy,” and the second two “potential demographic 
energy” (Scudo 1971).95 If this structural similarity generalizes broadly across 
mathematical models of ecological systems, a view shared by another prominent 
founder of mathematical ecology Alfred Lotka (1956), it would seem to indicate 
that the stability definition used in physics is appropriate for ecology. 
 
2.5. Lyapunov Stability in an Ecological Context.  
 The adequacy of a definition depends upon what it requires of the defined 
concept. If ecological stability is defined as Lyapunov stability, for instance, the 
latter stipulates conditions biological communities must satisfy to be ecologically 
stable. If these conditions are unreasonable – if they are biologically unrealistic, 
too weak, or too strong for instance – the definition is inadequate. Such a 
definition would violate the similarity or fruitfulness criteria, or both. Despite its 
apparent advantages, interpreting Lyapunov stability in ecological terms furnishes 
strong reasons for rejecting the definition. 
                                                 
94 (12), in fact, is the underlying basis of (10). See Logofet (1993, 111-114). 
95 At least for the first two terms, the resemblance with energy conservation is somewhat weak. 
The “actual demographic energy” corresponds closely with the mathematical form for the 
momentum of two particles, not their kinetic energy. 
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There are four types of Lyapunov stability to consider as definitional 
candidates for ecological stability. In order of increasing strength, they are local 
Lyapunov stability, nonasymptotic stability within a nontrivial stability domain, 
asymptotic stability within a nontrivial domain, and global asymptotic stability. 
Consider the weakest form first. Although the frequent focus of community 
modeling, perhaps because it is relatively easy to evaluate with the indirect 
method (Hastings 1988), local stability clearly defines ecological stability poorly. 
Differentiable models of systems can be linearized with the Jacobian matrix at 
any point of state space, such as at an equilibrium (see §2.3). By itself, however, 
linearization only provides information about local system behavior, i.e. only in 
an infinitesimal neighborhood of the linearization point. Local stability therefore 
says nothing about system behavior outside this extremely restricted domain. 
Besides it being fundamentally unclear how perturbation within an infinitesimal 
domain can be biologically interpreted (or empirically measured), real-world 
perturbations are clearly not of infinitesimal magnitude. Any real perturbation 
will expel a system at a strictly locally stable equilibrium from its stability 
domain. Local stability of nonlinear systems like biological communities 
consequently provides no information about their response to common 
perturbations like drought, fire, population reduction by disease, etc. Application 
of the indirect method to mathematical models of communities, which can only 
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evaluate local stability, therefore yields negligible insight into the dynamics of 
biological communities relevant to ecological stability.96
 For different reasons, Mikkelson (1997) reaches a similar conclusion 
about local stability. His argument is based on the principle: “Do not employ a 
definition that turns what was originally thought to be an important empirical 
matter into a generic a priori exercise” (1997, 483). Applying this principle to the 
task of defining ecological stability, Mikkelson continues (1997, 485): 
Requiring that every single species in a fifty-species community have a 
given property –any property– is a much stricter criterion than requiring 
that every species in a ten-species community have the same property. 
This means that as the number of species increases, the probability that the 
criteria are met almost certainly decreases. This leads to a default 
expectation that stability will decline with increasing diversity. 
 
Since local stability requires every species return to its preperturbation value, 
Mikkelson claims that defining ecological stability as local stability decreases the 
likelihood species rich communities will be stable. It thereby biases a priori the 
debate about the relationship between community stability and diversity 
(construed as species richness) towards an inverse relationship, and violates his 
principle. On this basis, Mikkelson concludes the definition is indefensible. 
 The first problem with this argument is Mikkelson’s assumption (the 
“default expectation”) that the likelihood of local stability of communities 
generally decreases with increasing species richness (1997, 494). This assumption 
                                                 
96 Food web modeling of community stability is based on the indirect method, and has been 
criticized for this reason (Hastings 1988). 
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is the underlying basis of the long quote above, but its truth is, however, an 
empirical rather than a priori issue. Interspecific interactions that emerge with 
greater species richness often increase the likelihood of stability, as the stabilizing 
effect of adding species to some community models shows (May 1974).  
 The second problem is that Mikkelson’s principle is an unjustifiable 
adequacy condition for definitions in science because it confers too much import 
to unresolved scientific questions, regardless of how poorly formulated they may 
be. According to the principle, scientific concepts should not be defined in ways 
that resolve, even partially, outstanding questions that involve them. Yet scientific 
questions may themselves be ill-formed or confused due to ambiguity or 
vagueness of the concepts they concern. In fact, Shrader-Frechette and McCoy 
(1993) argue the stability-diversity-complexity debate of community ecology is 
itself such an example. Although it would plainly be indefensible for a definition 
to stipulate a resolution of a conceptually unproblematic, clearly empirical 
scientific question, apparently intractable scientific debates and recalcitrant 
questions are sometimes justifiably resolved or, more accurately, dissolved when 
precise definitions of concepts reveal their misguided nature.97  
 The stronger concept of nonasymptotic Lyapunov stability within a 
nonlocal domain also inadequately defines ecological stability. Without 
                                                 
97 Einstein’s definition of simultaneity, for instance, arguably settled a number of scientific 
questions about temporal relations between events. Thanks to Mark Colyvan for bringing this 
example to my attention. 
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asymptotic dynamics driving systems perturbed from equilibrium to return to it, 
successive weak perturbations can displace communities from their stability 
domains and, in the extreme case, cause species eradication. Ecological stability 
undeniably requires, however, persistence of the species of a community subject 
to successive weak perturbations. 
 Even with asymptotic dynamics, however, Lyapunov stability does not 
define ecological stability adequately. To see why, consider defining ecological 
stability as the strongest Lyapunov stability property: global asymptotic stability. 
Unlike the Lyapunov stability properties considered thus far, global asymptotic 
stability appears to be much stronger than ecological stability because it seems to 
entail that a community will return to equilibrium following any perturbation that 
does not eradicate its species. Model variables of systems at asymptotically and 
globally stable equilibria that are perturbed to 1% of their equilibrium values, for 
instance, will deterministically return to their initial values.98 This response to 
such severe perturbations is not required for a biological community to be 
ecologically stable, but it certainly seems sufficient. 
 Despite its apparent plausibility, the idea that global asymptotic Lyapunov 
stability is sufficient (but not necessary) for ecological stability is unjustified. It is 
based on a flawed conception of ecological perturbation. Real-world perturbations 
                                                 
98 If the model includes stochastic processes, they may further propel variables to zero. The 
possibility of such a chance occurrence, however, does not detract from the underlying stability of 
this system’s dynamics. 
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to biological communities do not merely affect the population sizes of their 
species, represented by variables in models like (5). They also change 
environmental factors that influence community dynamics, represented by model 
parameters, as well as affect community structure, represented by model structure. 
As May (1974, 216) creatively put it:  
in nature, population perturbations are driven not by the stroke of a 
mathematician’s pen resetting initial conditions [i.e. resetting 
variable values to represent perturbations], but by fluctuations and 
changes in environmental parameters such as birth rates, carrying 
capacities, and so on. 
 
 Perturbations may induce, for instance, changes in the strength and qualitative 
nature of interspecific and intraspecific community interactions. Initially 
noninteracting species may begin competing or exhibiting other non-neutral 
interactions, and vice versa. Since real-world perturbations may affect 
environmental factors that influence community dynamics as well as population 
sizes of species, they should be represented by corresponding changes in variable 
and parameter values. Ecological stability should then be evaluated with respect 
to system behavior following both types of changes. 
 Lyapunov stability, however, only assesses system response to temporary 
changes in variable values (Pv perturbations; see [4] above). It does not consider 
system responses to changes in parameters (Pp perturbations) and thus provides 
only a partial account of the type of system response to perturbation ecological 
stability requires. Lyapunov’s direct method is therefore not a suitable 
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methodology for analyzing ecologically relevant nonlocal stability properties of 
standard community models, although it accurately estimates stability to Pv 
perturbations that affect only model variables (see below). 
 This difference between the two stability concepts consequently leads to 
different evaluations of the stability of mathematical models of biological 
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where ri designates the intrinsic growth rate of species i; γij designates the effect 
of species j on species i; and 1≤ i, j≤n. Equation (13) can represent several 
realistic features of biological communities. The γii designate intraspecific 
interactions and the γij (i≠j) can represent any type of interspecific interaction: 
predator-prey γijγji<0, competition γij,γji<0, mutualism γij,γji>0, etc. 
 Two kinds of systems, called “conservative” and “dissipative,” have been 
studied with (13) and highlight the difference between ecological and Lyapunov 








the system is dissipative with strict inequality, and conservative with equality. 
Informally, equation (14) says interspecific interactions do not influence total 
 137
community dynamics in conservative communities and retard them in dissipative 
communities. Dissipative and conservative communities, Logofet (1993) 
suggests, are analogous to mechanical systems with and without friction.  
 In conservative (dissipative) communities: (i) γii=0 (γii>0) for all i; and, 
(ii) γij=–γ ij  for all i≠ j. (i) entails there is intraspecific self-damping in dissipative 
communities, and none in conservative communities. (ii) entails the communities 
only exhibit antisymmetric interspecific predator-prey interactions. Note that 
equation (13) is not necessarily a two trophic level model of 
2
n  predators and 
2
n  
prey. Species i may be the predator and prey of different species, and part of k-
length (k≤n) food chains. 
 The direct method shows x* is a nontrivial equilibrium, i.e. ( )( )0* >∀ ixi , of 
conservative n-species community models iff x* is globally Lyapunov stable; it is 
asymptotically and globally Lyapunov stable iff the community model is 
dissipative. These results only hold, however, if n is even. As an indication of 
what defining ecological stability as global Lyapunov stability would require of 
communities modeled by (13) and (14), this restriction seems arbitrary and 
counterintuitive. Without any empirical evidence or a biological reason to 
suppose there is a relationship between evenness or oddness of species richness 
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and ecological stability, of which there seems to be none, this requirement is 
unreasonable.99
 A second, more revealing feature of these results is their dependence on 
the exact anti-symmetry of [γij]. If jeopardized even slightly, they no longer hold 
and the system may become unstable. Small changes in values of these 
parameters caused by realistic but weak perturbations may therefore undermine 
asymptotically globally stability and initiate instability (Levin 1981). This occurs 
because Lyapunov stability defines stability strictly in terms of system behavior 
after changes to variables, not after changes to parameters as well. For this 
reason, asymptotic global stability and weaker Lyapunov stability concepts poorly 
define ecological stability. 
 The disparity between what the direct method says about the stability 
properties of biological communities and what ecological stability seems to 
require is not limited to conservative and dissipative models of communities. A 
wide range of community models the direct method shows are asymptotically 
stable in nonlocal domains are similarly sensitive to slight changes in parameters 
(see Hallam 1986 and references therein). 
 In general, therefore, Lyapunov stability inadequately captures the idea 
that ecological stability depends on community response to perturbation because 
                                                 
99 Of course, it is possible such a relationship exists, but has not yet been found. Most ecologists 
highly doubt this claim. May (1974, 53), for instance, suggested it, “border[s] on the ridiculous,” 
and Volterra, who first recognized the fact, was similarly skeptical (Scudo 1971). 
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it inadequately represents real-world perturbations. As such, Lyapunov stability 
fails to capture principal features of ecological stability like resilience and 
tolerance. With respect to abiotic Pp perturbations such as temporary temperature 
or precipitation anomalies, for instance, resilience and tolerance cannot be 
assessed using Lyapunov’s direct (or indirect) method (see §2.4). Temporary 
changes in model parameters representing these environmental variables, not 
changes to model variables, best represent these types of perturbation. Resilience 
and tolerance should be gauged by the subsequent changes in variables caused by 
these parameter changes. Specifically, in more resilient systems, variables return 
more rapidly to preperturbation values following temporary changes in 
parameters. Similarly, the greater the parameter change the system can sustain 
and have its variables return to equilibrium, the more tolerant it is. Lyapunov 
stability, however, cannot represent these features of ecological stability properly 
because it cannot correctly represent community responses to perturbations that 
affect factors represented by model parameters (Pp perturbations) rather than 
model variables (Pv perturbations).  
 With respect to the account of concept determination defended in Chapter 
3, this failure can be understood in two related ways. First, since many, if not 
most, perturbations affect factors represented by parameters as well as variables, 
it seems to show defining ecological stability as Lyapunov stability fails the 
similarity criterion. A critical part of the pre-theoretic concept of ecological 
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stability, it might be argued, is that the concept describes a community’s response 
to such perturbations. The imprecision of the pre-theoretic concept somewhat 
dilutes the overall cogency of this claim, but the failure clearly constitutes a 
violation of the fruitfulness criterion (see Ch. 3, §3). It reveals, specifically, that 
defining ecological stability as Lyapunov stability would preclude using the 
former in accounts of communities’ responses to many, if not most, ecological 
perturbations. In addition, since tolerance and resilience of biological 
communities depend upon how communities respond to perturbations that affect 
model variables and parameters, they therefore cannot be defined in terms of 
properties of Lyapunov functions (see §2.3). Whereas Lyapunov stability focuses 
strictly on system behavior in state space, ecological stability essentially concerns 
system behavior in parameter space as well. Consequently, Lyapunov stability is 
not a sufficient condition for ecological stability, as some ecologists have 
explicitly suggested (e.g. Logofet 1993, 109) and many ecologists assume. 
 
2.6. Conclusion.  
 That ecological stability should not be defined as Lyapunov stability does 
not entail the latter should play no role in mathematical modeling of biological 
communities. For a community at equilibrium, asymptotic Lyapunov stability 
within nonlocal attraction domains adequately represents ecologically stable 
response behavior of biological communities to perturbations that alter population 
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sizes of community species but leave community structure and parameter values 
unchanged. Lyapunov stability is therefore a plausible necessary condition for 
ecological stability. Moderate culling of populations in some communities or 
temporary cessation of plant or animal harvesting in ecosystems where it has a 
long history are plausible examples of such perturbations. In fact, the effects 
fishing cessation during WWI would subsequently have on fish populations 
motivated Volterra to begin developing mathematical models of biological 
communities (Scudo 1971). 
 This analysis also does not detract from the obvious gains in precision, 
rigor, and other scientific virtues afforded by dynamic systems modeling within 
ecology. It does expose, however, a limitation of the stability definition that 
usually accompanies this type of modeling. If ecological systems like 
communities were completely analogous to systems studied within applied 
mathematics for which Lyapunov’s methods are so successfully applied, defining 
ecological stability as Lyapunov stability would be entirely justifiable. Section 2.5 
makes clear there is, however, a crucial difference in how perturbations should be 
represented in the two contexts. Scientific definitions that make an initially vague 
concept precise by integrating it into a systematically developed mathematical 
theory, even one fruitfully utilized in other sciences, are therefore not always 
satisfactory. 
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 Within classical mechanics, for example, force fields governing 
interactions between bodies, such as gravitation, are usually invariant. Masses of 
bodies in the system, overall system structure (e.g. mass-spring system, damped 
pendulum, mass-pulley system on an inclined plane, etc.), and other system 
features are also usually held or assumed fixed in this framework. Model features 
representing these system properties, such as parameter values and model 
structure, are correspondingly fixed. With the background held constant in this 
way, perturbations are represented by temporary finite changes in model variable 
values, for example, by displacements of position vectors and alterations to 
velocity vectors. Energy is conserved or monotonically dissipated for these 
systems depending on whether they are closed or open, so Lyapunov functions 
can always be constructed for them and their stability properties evaluated. Since 
perturbations of such systems are not taken to change the system properties 
represented by parameters and model structure, Lyapunov stability captures the 
important stability properties of these systems. 
 Within ecology, however, parameters representing external factors 
affecting species and their interactions are much more likely to change than in 
systems studied within classical mechanics because they are regularly altered by 
real-world perturbations.100 An appropriate definition of ecological stability 
                                                 
100 The difference between ecological systems and those studied in physics generally should not 
be overstated, however. In fluid mechanics, for instance, the background structure of the systems 
studied is highly variable. For the reasons discussed in section 5, therefore, Lyapunov stability 
would not be an appropriate representation of the stability of these systems. 
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therefore requires integrating Lyapunov stability with a concept representing how 
communities respond to these types of structural change: a structural stability 
concept. This would adequately account for how communities respond to real-
world perturbations represented by temporary changes in variable and parameter 
values. Resilience and tolerance to real-world perturbations would be 
representable with such a concept. 
 This suggestion poses a formidable challenge to mathematical ecologists 
because structural stability is a much more technically complex mathematical 
concept than Lyapunov stability (see Peixoto 1959). The dearth of biologically-
oriented work devoted to structural stability concepts (Lewontin 1969; May 
1974), however, may explain its lack of application within mathematical ecology, 
not any essential mathematical intractability of applying the concept within 
ecology. 
 The first prominent mathematical ecologists, Lotka and Volterra, were 
physicists by training and this significantly influenced their approach to modeling 
biological systems (Kingsland 1995). Their work, moreover, subsequently set 
much of the agenda of twentieth century mathematical ecology. Not surprisingly, 
most mathematical ecologists have used the concept of Lyapunov stability and the 
direct and indirect methods to analyze community models. A stability concept that 
incorporates structural stability, however, constitutes a more defensible definition 
of ecological stability, and would better characterize the dynamics of ecologically 
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stable biological communities. 
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Table 1. Different concepts of ecological stability. R designates a reference state 
or dynamic. Pv designates perturbations to system variables; Pp designates 
perturbations to parameters; and, Pvp designates perturbations that affect both 
variables and parameters. 
 
Type Definition Properties 
Resilience 
Rate a system returns to R 
following Pv, Pp, or Pvp. 
(Rosenzweig and MacArthur 1963) 
comparative concept 
Resistance 
Inverse of the magnitude a system 
changes relative to R following Pv, 




Range of Pv, Pp, or Pvp a system can 






A system returns to R following 
“small” Pv. 
(Hirsch and Smale 1974) 
(i) dichotomous concept 





A system returns to R following 
any Pv. 
(Hirsch and Smale 1974) 
(i) dichotomous concept 





1. small changes in parameters produce 
small changes in system dynamics 
(Lewontin 1969) 
 
2. continuous changes in parameters 
produce topologically isomorphic 

















CHAPTER 5: CONCEPT DETERMINATION WITHIN ECOLOGY: 




 Some biological communities are more complicated than others. For 
instance, tropical communities usually contain more species (Pianka 1966; Willig 
et al. 2003), their species are thought (by some) to interact more intensely (Janzen 
1970; Møller 1998), these interactions are more variegated in form (Dyer and 
Coley 2001), and they exhibit more trophic levels than tundra communities 
(Oksanen et al. 1981; Fretwell 1987). Ecologists often use two concepts, diversity 
and complexity, to represent differences in the “complicatedness” of 
communities; specifically, tropical communities are often said to be more diverse 
and/or more complex than tundra communities. 
 At a coarse level of description, the vague connotations that accompany 
the terms ‘diversity’ and ‘complexity’ adequately capture the imprecise 
judgments that some communities are more complicated than others. 
Disagreement arises, however, over how the two concepts should be 
operationalized. As early as 1969, for example, Eberhardt (1969, 503) 
characterized the ecological literature on diversity as “a considerable confusion of 
concepts, definitions, models, and measures (or indices).” MacArthur (1972, 197) 
similarly suggested that the term ‘diversity’ should be excised from ecological 
vocabulary as doing more harm than good, and that ecologists had, “wasted a 
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N  or some other measure is ‘best’.”101 As these remarks indicate, 
ecologists have proposed several mathematical measures that differ about what 
properties are given priority over others in assessing diversity and which differ in 
mathematical form. Disagreements about these issues raise the question of what 
properties of a community should be considered part of its diversity or complexity 
and, in turn, what adequacy conditions these concepts should satisfy. This chapter 
attempts to answer this question. 
 The chapter first considers the concept of the ecological diversity of a 
biological community. Following the strategy proposed by Sarkar (2007) for 
analyzing the concept, Section 2 proposes seven adequacy criteria for the concept 
and argues that some of those found in the ecological literature are untenable. The 
focus is on adequacy criteria for indices, such as Shannon’s and Simpson’s, that 
make no assumption about the underlying distribution of individual organisms 
among species in a community. For this reason, these indices are sometimes 
called nonparametric (e.g Lande 1996) to distinguish them from indices derived 
from parameters of statistical models of species abundance, such as the log series 
(Fisher et al. 1943) and log normal (Preston 1948), or from biological models, 
such as the broken stick and overlapping niche model (MacArthur 1957).102 
                                                 
101 See Sections 3 and 4 for a discussion of these diversity measures. 
102 See Preston 1962a, 1962b, May 1975, and Rosenzweig 1995 for reviews. 
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Unlike parametric indices, nonparametric diversity indices are applicable to any 
biological community, and since the stability-diversity-complexity debate 
concerns all communities, nonparametric indices are the appropriate focus of 
diversity here.103 The analysis also assumes that communities have been 
exhaustively sampled, thereby avoiding complex issues about the adequacy of 
diversity indices given imperfect and incomplete sampling to focus on the 
problem of specifying the concept of ecological diversity when complete 
knowledge about the community’s properties is available.104
 Like most ecological literature on the concept of diversity, the primary 
focus of the chapter is on species richness and evenness as components of 
diversity, although issues about how other information (e.g. taxonomic 
information) should be integrated into diversity are occasionally touched upon. A 
myriad of diversity indices that combine species richness and evenness exist in 
the literature, the two most popular being Simpson’s and Shannon’s. Sections 3 
and 4 describe these two indices and evaluate how they fare against the adequacy 
criteria described in Section 2. Despite its greater popularity, Shannon’s index 
performs worse on these criteria than Simpson’s. Section 5 presents a table of 
these and less popular diversity indices found in the ecological literature, and 
                                                 
103 In fact, Lande (1996, 5) suggests that being nonparametric, and thus applicable to all biological 
communities, is a defensible adequacy condition for a diversity index. Moreover, some ecologists 
have also criticized that there is no theoretical justification for statistical models of species 
abundance distribution, and only poor ones for most biological models (Krebs 1989, Ch. 10). 
104 See Horn 1966; Pielou 1975, 1977; and Patil and Tallie 1982a for extensive discussions of 
these issues. 
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assesses an influential criticism of the role of the concept of diversity within 
ecology due to Hurlbert (1971). 
 The last section considers the concept of the ecological complexity of a 
biological community. Diversity and complexity are similar properties and may 
be strongly positively correlated, but they are not identical. Species of a highly 
diverse community may interact little and therefore exhibit low complexity, and 
vice versa. After explaining why the formulation of a quantitative complexity 
index is straightforward for models of biological communities in which linear 
differential equations represent community dynamics, Section 6 describes the 
significant difficulty involved in devising a complexity index for nonlinear 
models of communities. Since the mechanisms responsible for community 
dynamics – interactions within and between species in a community – are 
undoubtedly nonlinear, this reveals a serious problem with evaluating stability-
complexity relationships in ecology. 
 
2. Adequacy Criteria for the Concept of Ecological Diversity.105
 Like most systems studied in science, biological communities can be 
represented with different degrees of specificity. With low representational 
specificity, a community can be represented in terms of the species it contains and 
                                                 
 
105 The analysis in this section follows the strategy for analyzing the concept of ecological 
diversity which focuses on formulating adequacy conditions originally proposed by Sarkar (2007). 
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how individual organisms of the community are distributed among these 
species.106 This information is provided by the proportional species abundance 
vector, Vp, of a community: 
(1)  ;,...,,...,1 >=< nip pppV
in which n designates the number of species in the community, i.e. its species 
richness; pi designates the proportional abundance of the i-th species in the 
community; the pi are ordered from most to least abundant (ties broken by random 
selection), i.e.  and  Notice that the only properties 
of species V







p represents are their proportional abundances. Functional, trophic, 
and taxonomic differences (besides the species level) are not represented by Vp. 
Proportional abundances of species in a community often change over time for a 
variety of reasons (e.g. migration, interspecific interactions such as predation, 
competition, etc.) so Vp must be updated as communities change.  
 ‘Abundance’ is an ambiguous term. Besides referring to the number of 
individual organisms of a species (a discrete variable), it can also refer to their 
biomass (a continuous variable). Accordingly, pi can designate either (i) the 
proportion of individuals of species i in a community, such as the proportion of 
                                                 
 
106 Greater representational specificity is achieved, for example, if interactions between species in 
a community are described with differential or difference equations in addition to how individuals 
are distributed among species (see Ch. 4, Section 1 and Justus 2006). 
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wolves in an island community, given by 
N
Ni  where Ni is the number of 
individuals of species i and N is the total number of community individuals; or, 
(ii) species i’s proportion of total community biomass, such as dry weight of a 
particular plant species in a forest community. pi may differ significantly on these 
two interpretations, so ideally Vp should be calculated according to both 
interpretations for a given biological community. However, for some species, 
such as clonal plant species or some asexually reproducing marine species, it is 
unclear how to count individual organisms so the biomass interpretation of pi is 
preferable. 
 Mathematically, of course, components of Vp could take values of zero to 
represent species with zero abundance. Unlike species for which  adding 
or subtracting these species from V
,0>ip
p need not change the other proportional 






ip i = 0 
cannot be part of the community represented by Vp. To be one of the species 
comprising a community, the community must contain at least one individual of 
that species. As a biological collection, to deny this stipulation for communities 
would commit one to the idea that a community can be represented to contain a 
species not instantiated by any of its members. Depending on the interpretation of 




≥  or 
B
b
p ii ≥  for all i, 
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where N designates the total number of individuals in the community, B 
designates the total community biomass, and bi designates the minimum biomass 
of an individual of species i.107 Of course, in modeling contexts with different 
goals, such as in studies of extinction processes, it may be useful to allow zero 
components of Vp to represent when species have gone locally extinct. Similarly 
for species that have emigrated completely from a community. Once a species 
disappears from a community, however, it is no longer part of the community and 
does not contribute to the community’s diversity.108
 Ecologists widely agree that at least two independent properties of a 
community should be part of its diversity: species richness and evenness (Pielou 
1966, 1975, 1977; Tramer 1969; Patil and Taillie 1982a, 1982b; Margurann 1988, 
2004).109 For a clearer understanding of these concepts, consider two simple 
communities, A and B, both composed of two species s1 and s2. A and B have the 
same species richness (two). If the proportions of individuals distributed among 
the two species are p1 = 0.02% and p2 = 99.98% for A and p1 = 50% and p2 = 50% 
for B, B is said to be more even than A. 
                                                 
107 For expositional convenience, only interpretation (i) from above will be discussed in the 
following unless otherwise specified. 
108 Alternatively, the stipulation against zero pi could be rejected with the proviso that species 
richness is determined by the number of nonzero pi in Vp. I owe Sahotra Sarkar for stressing the 
importance of making this option clear. 
109 McIntosh (1967) was probably the first to coin the term ‘species richness’ to refer to the 
number of species in a community. ‘Evenness’ and ‘equitability’ are used interchangeably in the 
ecological literature (e.g. Lloyd and Ghelardi 1964; McIntosh 1967; Tramer 1969; Peet 1974, 
1975). 
 155
 The widespread beliefs that species richness and evenness are components 
of diversity reflect intuitive constraints on the concept that can be formulated as 
explicit adequacy conditions. Specifically: 
(A1) for a given evenness, diversity should increase as species richness 
 increases (i.e. as n from [1] above increases); and, 
(A2) for a given species richness, diversity should increase as evenness 
 increases. 
 
Note that neither (A1) nor (A2) necessitate a particular mathematical form to the 
increase in diversity required. 
 The first condition codifies an incontestable feature of the diversity 
concept: the diversity of a collection increases as the number of different types of 
entities in the collection increases. Applied to a biological collection such as a 
community, (A1) therefore captures the intuitive idea that a community composed 
of one thousand species is more diverse than one composed of ten. 
 There is a difficulty with (A1) as formulated, however. Unlike the clause 
“for a given species richness” in (A2), (A1) contains a qualification, “for a given 
evenness,” for which Vp does not provide a quantitative characterization.110 The 
problem is that increases in species richness necessitate changes in the pi of Vp 
since the pi must sum to unity following any change in species richness. This does 
not necessitate a change in evenness, but absence of a quantitative 
                                                 
110 n from (1) provides a quantitative characterization of species richness. 
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characterization of evenness makes it unclear how evenness can remain static as 
species richness changes.111 To avoid this difficulty, (A1) is often formulated as: 
(A1′) of two maximally even communities, the more species rich community is 
 more diverse (Pielou 1975, 7). 
 
A quantitative characterization of ‘maximally even’ is provided by (A3) below. 
 To motivate the second condition consider two communities, each 
composed of 100 species and 10 000 total individual organisms. A community in 
which there are 100 individuals of each species seems more diverse than one in 
which there are 9901 individuals of one species and one individual each of the 
other 99. The reason seems to be that besides a consideration of the number of 
types of entities in a collection, diversity also involves a consideration of how 
well they are represented in it. For this reason, diversity is often equated with the 
apparent or effective number of species present in a community (e.g. Hill 1973; 
Peet 1974). For instance, to an external observer with imperfect faculties of 
perception, or an ecologist with insufficient time, money, and employing 
sampling methods with unavoidable limitations, the first community with evenly 
distributed individuals will usually appear to contain more species than the second 
community, even though they share the same species richness.112 In this way, 
                                                 
111 Similarly, although the simple example discussed above (and below) provides an informal 
grasp of how communities can differ in evenness, absence of a quantitative characterization also 
makes the clause “as evenness increases” of (A2) unclear. The remainder of this section proposes 
adequacy conditions which help precisify the evenness concept. 
112 A different line of thought also motivates (A2). A biological community is a set of organisms 
of different species. Sets are characterized by properties of their members. Members of an uneven 
community poorly represent some species, while each species of an even community is equally 
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(A2) captures the intuitive idea that community B is more diverse than 
community A from above. 
 Thus far, evenness has not been explicitly characterized and (A1) and (A2) 
place no constraints on the concept. Evenness is clearly maximized for a given 
species richness, however, when individuals of the community are equally 




=  for all i. This constraint on evenness 
corresponds to another adequacy condition for diversity:  
(A3) for a given species richness, diversity is maximal when individuals of the 
 community are distributed equally among species (i.e. when evenness is 
 maximal).  
 
For future reference, let  designate the maximally even proportional species 
abundance vector for a given species richness.  
max
pV
 Similarly, diversity is clearly minimized when individuals of a community 
are maximally unequally distributed among species. Specifically, diversity is 
minimal when all but (n – 1) of the individual organisms comprising the 
community are of one species and the rest are equally distributed (one each) 
among the other (n – 1) species, i.e. when .)1(1 N
nNp −−= 113 This constraint can 
also be formulated as an explicit adequacy condition for diversity: 
                                                                                                                                     
represented by its members. As a set, the characterization of a community with evenly distributed 
individuals therefore depends more significantly on a greater number of species-types than an 
uneven community. 
113 Recall from above that lower case n designates numbers of species and upper case N 
designates numbers of individual organisms. 
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(A4) for a given species richness, diversity is minimal when individuals of the 
 community are distributed maximally unequally among species (i.e. when 
 evenness is minimal). 
 
For future reference, let  designate the minimally even proportional species 
abundance vector for a given species richness. 
min
pV
 Adequacy conditions (A1)–(A4) are found throughout the ecological 
literature (Hill 1973; Pielou 1975, 1977; Magurran 1988, 2004; Lande 1996; 
Sarkar 2007). Building on (A2)–(A4), however, a further constraint on the 
concept of evenness, and thus on diversity, can be formulated. Focusing on 
(A3),114 if evenness is maximal for  evenness must decrease as V,maxpV p diverges 
from it. This decrease can be quantified in many ways. One rationale for doing so, 
however, restricts the range of possible methods of quantification. Recall that the 
only differences between species being considered are their proportional 
abundances; Vp does not represent taxonomic, trophic, functional, and other 
interspecific differences. Besides their proportional abundances, species are 
therefore being treated as equally important in assessing the diversity of a 
community. Thus, if evenness decreases because one species in a community 
deviates from its maximally even proportional abundance ),1(
n
 for example if its 
                                                 
114 Similar reasoning applies for (A4).  
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115 an equal deviation from the 
maximally even proportional abundance by another species should induce an 
identical decrease in evenness and thus in diversity. Formulated as an explicit 
adequacy condition: 
(A5) for a given species richness, if  and  are proportional species 
 abundance vectors that deviate from  because species i and species j, 








1  proportional abundance, evenness 
 decreases by the same amount in both cases. 
 
Put informally, (A5) stipulates that assessment of diversity is blind to species 
identity. It thereby captures the frequently made assumption that the evaluation of 
diversity requires treating species as equals (Magurran 2004, 11). Only the extent 
a species’ proportional abundance deviates, not what species it is, is relevant 
when assessing the diversity of a community.116 (A5) is neutral, however, about 
whether rare or abundant species are more important to the diversity of a 
                                                 
115 Other species’ proportional abundances are assumed to change uniformly so that  








116 Strictly speaking, (A5) follows from the way Vp is constructed. Recall that the pi are ordered 
from most to least abundant. This was intended to impose a nonarbitrary ordering on the 






i and pj would fall at the same place in the ordering for  and , respectively. If the 





p prior to 
determination of their proportional abundances, (A5) would constitute an independent requirement 
on diversity. As is, (A5) is retained to make what it requires explicit. I owe this incisive 
observation to Samir Okasha. 
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community. It requires merely that equal increases in the rarity of two species 
necessitate equal decreases in diversity. 
 Even with this further constraint, (A1)–(A5) are weak adequacy conditions 
for diversity in the sense that they do not determine a unique quantitative measure 
of diversity. In fact, many common quantitative indices satisfy these adequacy 
conditions (see §§3–5). Distinct quantitative diversity indices result from different 
ways of integrating and quantifying species richness and evenness consistent with 
(A1)–(A5). Before discussing the two most common such indices in the next 
sections, it is therefore important to consider whether any other reasonable 
adequacy conditions would necessitate a particular quantitative index of diversity. 
 Notice that (A5) does not entail different types of deviations from  
(or ), such as those involving different numbers of species, must be accorded 
the same import for diversity. Of course, unequal deviations of the same type 
should necessitate different values of diversity. Consider, for example, the type of 







 If pi decreases from 
n
1  to 
n2
1 , 
diversity should decrease less than if pi decreases to 
n3
1  all else being equal 
because the decrease in evenness is greater in the latter case (see [A2]). If pi 
decreases from 
n
1  to 
n4
1 , however, (A5) entails nothing about whether diversity 
 161
should decrease more or less than in a case in which pi decreases from n
1  to 
n2
1  
and some other pk decreases from 
n
1  to 
n2
1 . 
 What’s needed is an method for evaluating evenness that would adjudicate 
between different types of deviations from  (or ) for a given species 





terms of the distance from . A function pV →×GGd : R is a distance metric if 
it possesses three properties for all x, y, z ∈ M: 
(P1) d(x,y) ≥ 0, and d(x,y) = 0 if and only if x = y; 
(P2) d(x,y) = d(y,x) (symmetry); and, 
(P3) d(x,z) ≤ d(x,y) + d(y,z) (triangle inequality) (Kaplansky 1977). 
Of course, an infinite number of different functions satisfy these conditions and 
could therefore be used to measure deviation of Vp from . For instance, an 
especially simplistic distance metric that satisfies (P1)–(P3) is d(x,y) = 0 if x = y, 
and 1 otherwise, which is plainly inappropriate as a metric for measuring the 
distance between biological communities represented by V
max
max
                                                
pV
p and .pV 117
 
117 According to this metric, for instance, communities A and B from above are at the same 
distance from . maxpV
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 Since components of Vp and  take real values so that they are vectors 
within n-dimensional Euclidean space R
max
pV
n (i.e. G from above is Rn), an appropriate 
distance metric, and certainly the most common, is the Euclidean metric: 














Measured in this way, evenness of a community is inversely related to the 








119 For example, if the diversity of  and  for a 
given species richness are set at 1 and 0, respectively (see [A3] and [A4] above), 
the diversity of a community represented by V
pV pV
p would take values on [0,1] 
determined by the Euclidean distance (2) between Vp and . Species 
abundance vectors that deviate from  in different ways but at the same 
distance from it would thereby have the same evenness; those at different 
distances from  would have different evenness. In particular, for the two 




i for one species 
decreases from 
n
1  to 
n4
1
                                                
 and another in which pi and pk for two species decrease 
 












                                                                                                                                    
, the latter would be accorded greater evenness because its distance 
from  is smaller than the former.  pV
 This requirement can be codified in an explicit adequacy condition: 
(A6) for a given species richness: (i) evenness decreases (increases) as the 
 Euclidean distance from  ( ) increases; and, (ii) communities 
 represented by species abundance vectors at the same Euclidean distance 
 from max  (or ) have the same evenness.
pV pV
pV pV 120
Similar to the way in which (A5) stipulates that diversity is blind to species 
identity, (A6) stipulates diversity is blind to the type of deviation from  (or 
). (A6) does not necessitate a unique quantification of evenness and thus 
diversity because the decrease (or increase) required in the first clause of (A6) 
may take many mathematical forms (e.g. concave vs. convex, linear vs. nonlinear, 




 Together with (A2), however, (A6) imposes a significant constraint on the 




119 Similarly, since evenness is inversely related to the Euclidean distance, evenness is directly 
related to the Euclidean distance from V . 
 
120 Since Euclidean distance is not the only defensible distance metric (see footnote above), (A6) 
need not be formulated with the former. I focus on Euclidean distance because it is the most 
common metric for Rn and clearly defensible. 
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rare and common species as equally important to diversity. According to (A6), for 
instance, diversity must decrease the same amount with a decrease in pi for an 
extremely rare species and with an identical decrease in a much more common 
species.121 Thus, (A6) precludes diversity from being partially sensitive to the 
proportional abundances of rare or common species, unlike some common 
diversity indices in the ecological literature (see §4), and thereby captures the 
same idea underlying (A5): that diversity requires treating all species as equals. 
 Similarly, (A6) imposes a symmetry constraint on diversity because it 
requires that species abundance vectors in which several species are very 
abundant and a few are very rare, and in which several species are very rare and a 
few are very abundant have the same diversity if their distances from  are 














7  with the same species richness (three). The first contains one 
abundant species and two rarer species (the maximally even pi for each species is 
                                                 
121 This holds for common species with proportional abundances 
n
1


















i max j max
j max
                                                
), and the second contains two abundant species and one rare species. The 
distances between each vector and , however, are identical and hence both 
are accorded the same evenness and hence diversity by (A6).
pV
122
 For the same reason diversity should be blind to species identity (see [A5]) 
and blind to the type of deviation from  (or ) (see [A6]), it also seems 
reasonable that diversity should not be partial to particular distances between V
pV pV
p 
and  (or ) in the sense that diversity should decrease uniformly (i.e. 
linearly) as the distance between V
pV pV
p and  increases. This can be formulated 
as an explicit adequacy condition :  
pV
(A7) for a given species richness, evenness decreases (increases) linearly as 
 the Euclidean distance between Vp and  (or ) increases. pV pV
(A7) requires equal intervals of distance (as measured by equation [2]) to 
correspond to equal differences in diversity values, regardless of the distance 
between Vp and . Specifically, if d( , ) = x and the difference in 
diversity value between  and  is y, then if d( , ) = x as well, the 
difference in diversity value between  and  is also y. Note that (A7) 
obtains only if (A6) does as well. 
pV pV pV
pV pV pV pV
pV pV
 
122 Smith and Wilson (1996, 79) suggest a similar adequacy condition for indices of evenness. 
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 (A6) and (A7) both follow from an underlying principle sometimes 
mentioned in discussions of ecological diversity (e.g. Krebs 1989; Magurran 
2004). The principle is that diversity should not be partial among individual 
organisms, just as it should not be partial among species in a community. 
Specifically, in assessments of diversity, individual organisms should contribute 
to diversity in proportion only to the proportional abundance of the species to 
which they belong. If different types of deviations from  are weighted 
differently than as dictated by equation (2) in assessing diversity, i.e. (A6) is 
violated, some individuals will contribute more (or less) to diversity merely 






 in a way 
favored (or disfavored) by the candidate diversity index. Similarly, if different 
distances from  are weighted differently in assessing diversity, i.e. (A7) is 
violated, some individuals will contribute more (or less) to diversity merely 





                                                
 that is favored (or disfavored) by the candidate diversity index. 
In either case, individual organisms would not be treated as equals in determining 
the diversity of a community composed of them.123
 
123 There can be reasons to treat individuals of different species differently. Individuals of rare 
species (and their proportional abundances) are usually weighed more significantly in assessing 
the diversity of communities as the concept is utilized in conservation biology, for instance. Rare 
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 Before evaluating some common diversity indices against (A1)–(A7) in 
the next section, this section concludes by considering another adequacy 
condition for diversity proposed by Lewontin (1972) and recently endorsed by 
Lande (1996).124 It concerns the relationship between the diversity of individual 
communities and the diversity of sets of different communities. Specifically, if a 
super-collection of individuals is formed by pooling the individuals of several 
distinct smaller collections, the idea is that the diversity of the super-collection 
must be at least as great as the average diversity of the distinct collections. 
Applied to biological communities, this requires the diversity of the super-
community  formed by pooling the individuals of each community CUi iC1 }{=
z
i to 
be greater than or equal to the mean diversity of the Ci (z is an index of the 
















in which equality holds only if the Ci are compositionally identical, i.e.  






                                                                                                                                     
species are typically more likely to go extinct. Indices that accord changes in their proportional 
abundances more import than changes in common species are likely favored in conservation 
contexts because changes in the former are more likely to influence species persistence than 
changes in the latter (see §§3-5).  
124 Lewontin (1972) may have been the first to formulate this as an adequacy condition for the 
concept of diversity. 
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 Lewontin did not provide a rationale for this constraint on ecological 
diversity, called strict concavity, and there are reasons to reject it as an adequacy 
condition. To illustrate, consider two simple communities C and D composed of 
four different species (two each) with absolute (not proportional) abundances 
<2,2> and <1000,1000>. The absolute species abundance vector for the super 
community C∪D with species richness four is <1000,1000,2,2>. Equation (3) 
requires the diversity of C∪D be greater than the average diversity of C and D, 
but it is unclear why this is defensible, certainly as an adequacy condition on the 
concept of diversity. C∪D contains more species than either C or D, and in this 
respect seems more diverse. It is also, however, highly uneven compared with C 
or D. The proportional species abundance vector for C∪D is approximately 
<0.499,0.499,0.001,0.001> which is a highly uneven distribution, unlike the 
highly even distribution of C and D, <0.5,0.5>. Equation (3) therefore forces a 
strong rank order of species richness over evenness in assessments of diversity. 
 This may be a defensible property of a proposed diversity index.125 In the 
context of conservation biology, for example, there may be advantages to 
prioritizing species richness over evenness in assessments of the diversity of 
communities targeted for conservation. Equation (3) is not, however, a defensible 
adequacy criterion for any potential quantitative specification of diversity. Species 
                                                 
125 Note that this property is consistent with (A1)–(A7) from above, which do not compel any 
relationship between species richness and evenness in assessments of diversity. 
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richness and evenness are independent properties. Though this does not entail one 
is not more important than another in evaluations of a community’s diversity, 
nothing about the pre-theoretic concept of ecological diversity seems to suggest 
otherwise. Pielou (1977, 292), for instance, explicitly rejected the constraint 
imposed by (3): “since diversity depends on two independent properties of a 
collection … a collection with few species and high evenness could have the same 
diversity as another collection with many species and low evenness.”126
 
3. Simpson’s Index. 
 The first index that included species richness and evenness as components 
of diversity found in the ecological literature was proposed by Simpson (1949). 
Simpson claimed that the probability two individuals drawn at random (with 
replacement) from an indefinitely large collection are of the same group is , 
















                                                 
126 In passing, Lande (1996, 8) motivates strict concavity as an adequacy condition by pointing 
out that its denial, “implies the possibility of a negative diversity among communities.” But it is 
unclear why this is problematic. It does not, for instance, entail the diversity of any individual 
community is negative, which would clearly be problematic.  
127 Simpson’s claim assumes the probability of selecting two individuals from the same group is 
directly proportional to their relative abundances, which is violated under a variety of plausible 
biological conditions (see below). I owe Sahotra Sarkar for highlighting this implicit assumption. 
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measures the dominance (in terms of abundance) of species within the community 
(Pielou 1977) and is at its minimal value (
n
1 ) for a given species richness n when 
individuals of the community are equally distributed among the n species, i.e. 
when Vp = . maxpV









represents the probability two randomly selected individuals belong to different 
species, which is an intuitive measure of diversity.129 D is at its maximal value for 
a given species richness n (
n
D 11−= ) when individuals are maximally equally 
distributed among species, i.e. when , and at its minimal value when 




. This minimum is not the value of D, however, when all individuals of the minpV
                                                 







 is also commonly used as an index 
of diversity (Williams 1964; Levins 1968; Hurlbert 1971; MacArthur 1972; Hill 1973; May 1975; 
Pielou 1977; Magurran 1988, 2004; Lande 1996). 
 
129 The counterpart of D that does not make the idealization that the two individuals are drawn 












1  and will not be discussed here 
(Pielou 1977; Magurran 2004). 
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community are of the same species, which is 0. D = 0 when all but one  is zero, 







≥  for all i stipulated above.130  
 Several ecologists have suggested a stronger, but similarly inaccurate 
interpretation of D. Hurlbert (1971), for instance, proposed that if D is multiplied 
by 
1−N
N  the resulting index represents the probability of interspecific encounter 
in the community, rather than just the probability two randomly selected 
individuals belong to different species. Patil and Taillie (1982a) made a similar 
claim and showed how quantities such as the waiting time for intra and 
interspecific encounter are related to D on this stronger interpretation. Recently, 
Ricotta (2000, 246) has suggested the same interpretation: “Simpson’s diversity 
index is generally defined as the complement to the total probability of 
interspecific interactions in the community.” This interpretation is only sound, 
however, if an additional assumption is made about community structure. In 
response to Patil and Taillie’s analysis, Sugihara (1982) correctly pointed out that 
D represents the probability of interspecific interaction only if the frequencies of 
interspecific encounters are directly proportional to the relative abundances of the 
species interacting. The problem, Sugihara (1982, 565) emphasized, is that: 
                                                 
130 See the discussion preceding (A4) in Section 2. 
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None of these interpretations [of D], however, has yet proved to be very fruitful, 
as they suffer from such real-world concerns as spatial patchiness and clumping 
in species distributions, differential mobility, and problems associated with 
interpreting niche overlap between species from their spatial covariance. 
Approaching the study of species diversity through a priori models is a valid 
enterprise, but requires a clear intuition of how communities operate, which thus 
far seems to be lacking. 
 
D may be a good estimator of the probability of interspecific encounter if species 
are spatially distributed relatively uniformly throughout the area occupied by the 
community. If distributed in this way, species are likely to interact in direct 
proportion to their abundances. But without knowing this, and without a thorough 
understanding of the factors Sugihara mentioned that may prevent such a 
distribution, the legitimacy of the stronger interpretation of D cannot be reliably 
verified. 
 As has been noted throughout the ecological literature, D satisfies (A1)–
(A4) (Hill 1973; Pielou 1975, 1977; Magurran 1988, 2004; Lande 1996).131 D 
also clearly satisfies (A5). As the similar mathematical structure of D and (2) 
from above suggest, D also satisfies (A6). To see this, recall that (A6) requires 
that: (i) the diversity of the community represented by Vp be inversely related to 
d(Vp, ); and, (ii) that if d( , ) = d( , ) for a given species 















                                                 









 is not. 
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Diversity is directly related to – d(Vp, ) given (i), so what is first needed is to 
show that D exhibits the same relationship with – d(V
max
pV
p, ). The following 
algebraic identities demonstrate the required relationship: 
max
pV
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D 1)1( −− , 
which equals 
n
nD 1−+− .132 Since 
n
n 1−  is constant and nonnegative for a 















+−  where Di and Dj represent the 
complement of Simpson’s index for the proportional abundances of  and , 





i = Dj (given that D must be positive). 
(A6) is thereby satisfied.133
 That d(Vp, ) = maxpV n
nD 1−+−  also shows, however, that D does not 
satisfy (A7). (A7) requires diversity decrease linearly with d(Vp, ), but D 
scales quadratically with d(V
max
pV
p, ). Thus, D violates (A7) because it is more 
sensitive to changes in proportional species abundance vectors at greater distances 
from . In particular, D is more sensitive to the proportional abundances of 
especially abundant or especially rare species. If diversity were specified with 
Simpson’s index, (A7) would therefore not be satisfied and diversity would fail to 










nD 1−+−132 The term  is well defined because  is nonnegative. Specifically, 




D 11−= , in which case .  














 from above, which have the same distance (0.3887) 
according to equation (2), also have the same value (0.6044) according to Simpson’s index. 
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4. Shannon’s Index. 
 Probably the most popular index of community diversity is the Shannon 
index (H), so-called after Claude Shannon, who developed it in the context of 
what came to be called information theory.134 The index was originally 
formulated to quantify the amount of information in a communicated message 
(Shannon 1948; Shannon and Weaver 1949), and despite Margalef’s (1958) claim 
to priority, Good (1953) was the first to use it as an index of ecological diversity. 









Within information theory, H is used to measure the information of a message 
composed of n types of symbols whose individual probability of occurrence is pi, 
. Within ecology, however, pni ,...,1= i represents the familiar proportional 
abundance of species i and n represents the community’s species richness. 
 H is at its maximal value (ln n) for a given species richness n when 
individual organisms are equally distributed among species, thereby satisfying 
                                                 
134 Aczél and Daróczy (1975) suggest Norbert Wiener independently developed an index which is 
a special case of Shannon’s more general index in 1948 (Wiener 1948). 
135 Shannon’s index assumes pi is a proportional species abundance from an infinitely large 
community (Magurran 2004). This idealization, and the emendation needed to correct it for finite 
communities, will not be discussed here. The sampling estimator of H which does not make this 











 (Brillouin 1962). Horn (1966) 
developed two measures of overlap between samples of communities based on Simpson’s and 
Shannon indices, respectively. 
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adequacy condition (A3) (Pielou 1977). H satisfies (A1), (A2), and (A4) (Hill 
1973; Pielou 1975, 1977; Magurran 1988, 2004; Lande 1996), and H obviously 
satisfies (A5). Compared with D, however, H is less sensitive to proportional 
abundances of species (and hence evenness) and more sensitive to species 
richness than Simpson’s index D (May 1975; Magurran 1988, 2004).  
 Shannon’s index is also more sensitive than Simpson’s index to the 
abundances of rare species (Peet 1974), as a simple example demonstrates. 
Consider a four species community E composed of one abundant, one rare, and 







12 >. D = 0.7188 and 











13 >, then evenness decreases and both D and H decrease to 0.6758 
and 1.1878, respectively. If the abundant species becomes more abundant, so that 







15 >, then evenness also decreases and both D and 
H decrease to 0.6758 and 1.2420, respectively. That H decreases more than D for 
 or  does not necessarily show it is more sensitive to rare or abundant 
species because the range of values D and H take between  and  differ, 
so that differences in their values may be due merely to a scaling effect. The way 













that H is more sensitive to abundances of rare species. Specifically, H decreases 
more between Vp and  (1.3209 – 1.1878 = 0.1331) than between VrpV p and  




and , and VrpV p and . H is therefore more sensitive to the abundances of rare 
species than D, which is equally sensitive to either. Note that since d( , ) = 
d( , ), a diversity index should decrease by the same amount for  and 















 Despite these and other differences (see below), Simpson’s and Shannon’s 












, in which 1 and 0 ≠> αα  (Rényi 1961; Pielou 1975). Rényi (1961) 
showed, for example, that . Pielou (1975) showed that 
if 








2=α , Hq = , which is equivalent to the inverse form of Simpson’s 









q is equivalent to the 
exponential transform of species richness (ln n) when 2=α . 
 Before considering whether H satisfies (A6) and (A7), a clear ecological 
interpretation of it is needed. Pielou (1977) provided a particularly simple, and 
probably the clearest interpretation. As an entropy measure, Pielou suggested H 
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accurately measures uncertainty, and that diversity and uncertainty are closely 
related concepts.136 Specifically, as the diversity of a community increases, the 
uncertainty about which species a randomly selected individual belongs to 
increases. It is difficult to deny this claim, but the crucial issue is whether H is the 
uniquely appropriate measure of uncertainty. After all, given the interpretation of 
D described in Section 3, it also seems to measure a similar, if not identical, kind 
of uncertainty about a biological community. 
 Pielou’s argument that H is a uniquely appropriate index of ecological 
diversity relied on a mathematical fact about H proved in a non-ecological context 
by Shannon. Shannon (1948) showed that H is the only function (up to a 
multiplicative constant) which exhibits three properties he thought reasonable to 
require of the concept of information.137 These properties include that an 
information function should be continuous in pi, that it should monotonically 
increase with n for maximally even pi (see [A1′] from above), and an additive 
property which was the basis of Pielou’s argument for preferring H over other 
diversity indices and, even stronger, that it constitutes an adequacy condition for 
                                                 
136 Pielou’s view of the proper ecological interpretation of Shannon’s index shifted markedly in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In 1966, Pielou suggested there was an “obvious analogy” between a 
biological community and a coded message, and that, “the actions of a biologist are formally 
identical with those of a man observing, one after another, the symbols of a message” (1966, 164). 
(A very similar characterization had been suggested by Margalef (1958) almost a decade before.) 
By 1975, however, Pielou’s view of such analogies was decidedly negative: “it cannot be too 
strongly emphasized that fancied links between the information-theoretic concept of ‘information’ 
and the diversity of an ecological community are merely fancies and nothing more” (1975, 9). 
137 In a later review of information theory, Aczél and Daróczy (1975, 29) called these properties, 
“natural properties which are essential from the point of view of information theory.” Shannon, 
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any index of diversity (Pielou 1977, 293-294). The interpretation of this property 
as applied to biological communities requires some elaboration.  
 Just as Vp is based on a classification P of individuals of a biological 
community into n species, let Vq be a proportional abundance vector with m 
components based on a different classification Q. The second classification could 
be derived from further taxonomic information, information on habitat 
requirements or other properties of individual organisms, etc. As with the pi, 
assume that the proportional abundances qj of the second classification are such 
that , and that each individual organism falls into only one class. Like 
the information concept, if the two classifications are independent, Pielou (1977, 
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in which DIV(PQ) is the diversity of a biological community with individuals 
classified into both P and Q for a total of m×n classes, and DIV(P) and DIV(Q) 
are the diversity of the community with individuals classified by only P or Q, 
respectively.138 Mathematically, it can be shown that H is the only continuous 
function of the pi up to a multiplicative constant that satisfies (A1′), (A3), and for 
which equation (4) holds (Khinchin 1957). 
                                                                                                                                     
however, only called them “reasonable” and emphasized that, “The real justification of these 
definitions, however, will reside in their implications,” (Shannon and Weaver 1949, 50). 
138 Equation (4) can be generalized to any finite number of independent classifications. 
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 In general, (4) is a desirable mathematical property because it permits the 
additive decomposition of a function of two combined input arguments. Together 
with its intuitive plausibility for the concept of information, this motivated 
Shannon (1948), Khinshin (1957), Rényi (1961), Aczél and Daróczy (1975), and 
others to stipulate it as an adequacy condition for any information measure. What 
is needed to show it is an appropriate adequacy condition for the concept of 
ecological diversity, however, is an account of why this is a necessary property of 
diversity, which Pielou (1977) did not supply. If diversity were specified as H, (4) 
logically follows given its logarithmic form, and it can be agreed that there are 
benefits of being able to additively decompose ecological diversity in this way 
(Pielou 1977, 303-307). This is insufficient, however, to establish the stronger 
claim that (4) is a defensible adequacy condition, especially given that there are 
other methods with attractive features in which ecological properties besides 
proportional species abundances can be integrated into a measure of diversity of a 
community (e.g. Rao 1982; Ricotta 2002).  
 It remains to assess whether H satisfies (A6) and (A7). Unlike D, H does 




























15  from above provide clear 
counterexamples. Although their distances as determined from equation (2) are 
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equal, their H values differ (1.0096 and 0.9908, 1.1878 and 1.3209, respectively). 
Since (A6) is a necessary condition of (A7), H also fails to satisfy (A7).139
 
5. The Role of the Diversity Concept within Ecology. 
 Simpson’s and Shannon’s diversity indices emerged within ecology in the 
late 1940s and 1950s. By the late 1960s, a large number of diversity indices had 
been formulated, and numerous empirical studies of different ecological systems 
were being conducted to estimate diversity using these indices.140 Table 2 
provides a list of some common diversity indices found in the ecological 
literature. Enough attention was being devoted to indices of diversity by the early 
1970s to spark criticism, perhaps the most incisive from Hurlbert (1971). In his 
influential critique of this research agenda, Hurlbert (1971, 577) argued that, “the 
term ‘species diversity’ has been defined in such various and disparate ways that 
it now conveys no information other than ‘something to do with community 
structure’,” and that this indicated a fundamental vagueness of the underlying 
concept. He thought ecologists had further exacerbated this problem by 
appropriating statistical measures of diversity developed in nonbiological 
contexts, such as information theory, with dubious ecological relevance. 
MacArthur (1972, 197) voiced the same criticism of the concept of ecological 
                                                 
139 This result complements Lande’s (1996) preference for D over H on the basis that there is an 
unbiased estimator for D, but none for H. 
140 See Pielou 1975, 1977; Magurran 1988, 2004; Sarkar 2007; and Drake 2007 for 
comprehensive reviews. 
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diversity independently around the same time: “Applying a formula and 
calculating a ‘species diversity’ from a census does not reveal very much; only by 
relating this diversity to something else – something about the environment 
perhaps – does it become science.” Other ecologists were similarly skeptical of 
the role of the concept of diversity within ecology, and especially of the 
ecological utility of information theory (e.g. Hill 1973). 
 Rather than attempt to rehabilitate the concept by proposing adequacy 
conditions by which to evaluate relative merits and weaknesses of different 
diversity indices as attempted in Section 2, Hurlbert suggested the search for 
relationships between diversity and other community properties, such as stability, 
should be refocused on the relationship between those properties and indices that 
reflect biologically meaningful properties that might influence community 
dynamics. His proposed index of the probability of interspecific encounter is one 
example. As a measure of ecological diversity, note that species richness alone 
fails this test since it is generally unlikely that extremely rare species (e.g. s1 in 
community A from Section 2) play an important role in community dynamics.141 
Since it does not consider evenness, furthermore, species richness fares very 
poorly as a specification of ecological diversity; it fails adequacy conditions 
(A2)–(A7). Species richness was and remains, however, the predominant 
                                                 
 
141 Potentially important exceptions include keystone species and so-called “ecosystem engineers” 
(see Paine 1969, Jones et al. 1994; and Power et al. 1996).  
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surrogate for diversity in analyses of stability-diversity relationships (e.g. Tilman 
1996, 1999). These studies therefore offer negligible insights into possible 
relationships between the stability and diversity in biological communities. 
 Since Hurlbert’s critique, ecologists have proposed a multitude of new 
diversity indices to satisfy different proposed adequacy conditions besides those 
about species richness and evenness (see Magurran 2004, Ricotta 2005, and 
Sarkar 2007 for reviews). Diversity indices should increase, for instance, as 
interspecific taxonomic and functional differences increase. Besides properties of 
species, spatial properties of their geographical distribution could also be included 
in an index of ecological diversity. Since species distributions are significantly 
influenced by regional geology and environmental gradients, however, including 
these properties would expand the scope of ecological diversity beyond just the 
biological properties of communities. Expanded in this way, the “diversity” of the 
physical environment in which a community resided would also contribute to the 
value of indices of diversity. However, properties of the spatial extent of species, 
such as their geographical rarity, are clearly relevant to the concept of diversity 
utilized in the context of biodiversity conservation, and therefore must be 
integrated into any defensible measure of biodiversity (Sarkar 2002, 2005b, 
2007).  
 How compatible these additional adequacy conditions are with one 
another, or with the other conditions is not yet clear. Some conditions appear to be 
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conceptually independent, but some formal diversity indices suggest that others 
are not. Rao’s (1982) “quadratic entropy” diversity index, for instance, which 
generalizes the Simpson index (Ricotta and Avena 2003), incorporates 
interspecific taxonomic and functional differences as well as evenness and species 
richness into a single quantitative measure. Unlike the Shannon and Simpson 
indices, however, quadratic entropy violates the adequacy condition (A3) that 
diversity should be maximal for a given species richness when individuals are 
equally distributed among species (Ricotta 2005). (A4) is also violated. This is as 
it should be. If functional or taxonomic information is included in assessments of 
diversity, then high functional or taxonomic diversity may make a less even 
community more diverse overall than a more even one. In effect, functional or 
taxonomic diversity can trump evenness.  
 As new indices are devised, similar incompatibilities between other 
adequacy conditions may be revealed. Absent a general proof that plausible 
adequacy criteria are themselves incompatible, however, the formulation of a 
uniquely defensible diversity index satisfying all of them remains possible. In any 
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case, adequacy conditions (A1)–(A7) are compatible and thus a defensible 
diversity measure satisfying them exists.142
 
6. Problems with Formulating a Concept of Ecological Complexity. 
 Focusing solely on diversity when considering what properties of 
communities may make them stable is unjustifiable because intra- and inter-
specific dynamics largely determine a community’s stability properties. As a 
function of properties of individual organisms in a community, such as what 
taxonomic classes they exhibit, how they are distributed among these classes, etc., 
even biologically meaningful diversity indices may reveal little about community 
dynamics. Individuals in species rich communities with high evenness and 
taxonomic variety may interact rarely and weakly (intra- and inter-specifically); 
thus, the former entails nothing about the latter. Hurlbert’s (1971) claim that D 
(multiplied by 
1−N
N ) measures the probability of interspecific encounter, for 
instance, is true only if individuals of different species meet in proportion to their 
relative abundances (Sugihara 1982). The likelihood may be higher, of course, 
that species in more even communities will interact more frequently, but the latter 
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cannot be inferred from the former alone. A high or low diversity does not, 
moreover, reveal anything about how strongly species interact. May (1974) may 
have focused on complexity rather than diversity for precisely these reasons.143
 Unlike diversity, complexity is defined in terms of community dynamics. 
The more species, the more frequently they interact, and the stronger they do, the 
more complex the community. As a function of intra and inter-specific dynamics, 
complexity can only be assessed against a description of these dynamics, usually 
in the form of a mathematical model. With respect to the simple linear models 
analyzed by May (1974), for instance, complexity is a function of species richness 
(n), connectance (C), and mean linear interaction strength (s) (see Ch. 2, §4).144 
How complexity should be assessed for more complicated nonlinear models, 
however, is unclear. Determining species richness is obviously unproblematic, 
and connectance can be determined from functional dependencies between 
variables in the model. The problem is assessing mean interaction strength. For 
linear models, the growth rate of each species is a linear function of the 
abundances of species with which they interact, so s is simply the average of the 
interaction coefficients. Variables in nonlinear models, however, may interact in 
















, which both also satisfy (A1)–(A5). 
143 May (1974) was no explicit on this point. See Chapter 2, Section 4. 
 
144 May did not specify an explicit function for complexity. 
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disparate ways and may exhibit different functional relationships, which precludes 
simply averaging to determine s. Different methods of integrating strengths of 
distinct types of relationships into a single quantitative complexity value, 
assuming there is a defensible way of doing this, would beget different measures 
of complexity. 
 Restricting complexity to just n, C, and s is also unduly restrictive. The 
variety of relationships exhibited between variables, the number of parameters, 
how complicated their relations are with variables, and other properties of 
community models that represent important features of community dynamics 
should be part of any defensible measure of ecological complexity. Whether they 
can be codified into a general complexity index remains to be seen. Without such 
a codification, however, whether a relationship between ecological stability and 
complexity exists is a poorly formed question. 
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Table 2. A list of common diversity indices in the ecological literature. 
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 n = species richness; 
 pi    =   the proportional abundance of species i; 
 Ni    =   the abundance of species i;  
 N    =   the abundance of all species in the community;  
 Nmax =   abundance of the most abundant species; 
 dij     =   distance (e.g. taxonomic, functional, etc.) between species i and j; 
 ri      =   rank of species i in Vp; 
 a       =   a constant ≥ 0. 
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 As with many unresolved scientific debates, the stability-diversity-
complexity (SDC) debate has many facets, each of which complicates its 
evaluation in several ways. The first complication is that a biological community 
can be represented in a multitude of ways. One of the most common types of 
representation in ecology, and science in general, are mathematical models, rather 
than verbal, diagrammatic, mechanical, or other types of models. Mathematical 
models of biological communities take a wide array of functional forms and can 
contain many different types of variables. As Chapter 4, Section 1.1 showed, 
assessments of stability properties such as resistance, resilience, and tolerance 
depend upon the details of these models, and thus conclusions drawn from 
analyses of stability-diversity and stability-complexity relationships are limited by 
the type of model and variables used to represent the community, as well as the 
model’s accuracy. Similarly, Chapter 5, Section 6 showed why the details of these 
models are critically relevant in assessments of a community’s complexity, 
particularly the way in which factors that drive its dynamics are represented. 
Different models used to represent the same biological community may therefore 
exhibit different stability properties and degrees of complexity. 
 A second complication is that stability must be evaluated with respect to a 
reference state or dynamic. A wide variety of different reference states or 
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dynamics, however, can be specified for a biological community that reflect an 
intuitive sense of stability, such as a point equilibrium, a limit cycle, a more 
complicated attractor set, ranges of allowed fluctuation in the abundances of 
species comprising the community, etc. What state or dynamic is an appropriate 
reference for a given community depends partly on the state or dynamic it 
exhibits in the absence of perturbations, and partly on the objectives of the 
analysis of the community. As Chapter 4, Section 1.1 argued, stability properties 
of a community must be gauged against the reference state or dynamic specified 
for it, so different specifications for the same biological community can lead to 
different conclusions about its stability. 
 As Chapter 4, Section 1.2 showed, a third complication is that the concept 
of ecological stability is multifaceted, comprised of three properties: resistance, 
resilience, and tolerance. Since these properties are conceptually independent, 
they may be related to the complexity or diversity of biological communities in 
disparate ways.145 These properties can also be operationalized with quantitative 
measures in numerous ways, and the value of each measure also depends upon 
how the biological community is represented in a model and what reference state 
or dynamic is specified for it.146 Thus, besides the type of representation and 
reference state or dynamic specified for a community, generalizations that can be 
                                                 
145 Of course, with respect to a specified system description and reference state or dynamic, 
dependencies may exist between quantitative measures of these properties. 
146 Operationalization is a kind of explication (see Ch. 3). 
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drawn from particular studies of stability-diversity and stability-complexity 
relationships are also constrained by the specific stability property being 
analyzed, as well as the measure used to quantify it. 
 As Chapter 5, Sections 3–5 (and Table 1 therein) showed, a fourth 
complication is that numerous operationalizations of ecological diversity, many 
with significantly different properties, have been proposed in the ecological 
literature. Despite this multitude of diversity indices, almost no study of stability-
diversity relationships has used a defensible index of diversity, for instance, one 
that satisfies at least the uncontroversial adequacy conditions found in the 
ecological literature ([A1]–[A4]; see Ch. 5, §2). Instead, a simplistic and 
demonstrably unsatisfactory measure of ecological diversity, species richness, is 
most often used in analyses of stability-diversity relationships because the number 
of species composing a community is much easier to estimate empirically than the 
proportional species abundances required to measure its evenness (see below). 
 For the same reason, Chapter 4, Section 1.3 argues poor measures of 
ecological stability such as constancy are often used in studies of stability-
diversity and stability-complexity relationships. Empirically, it is much easier to 
acquire data about the variability of species abundances in a community, for 
example, than data about properties of the community’s dynamic response to 
perturbation, such as resistance, resilience, and tolerance. Similarly, Chapter 4, 
Section 2.6 explains why it is theoretically much easier to evaluate the Lyapunov 
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stability of a mathematical model of a community using well-developed analytic 
techniques than it is to evaluate the kind of structural stability required by 
ecological stability (see below).147
 As might be expected for a debate with the complexity outlined above and 
discussed in detail in preceding chapters, the SDC debate remains unresolved 
after more than half a century of ecological research. Given the debate’s 
complexity, it is also unsurprising that only a few of the total possible 
relationships between ecological stability, complexity, and diversity have been 
analyzed, or that there has been confusion about how these concepts should be 
defined and their relationships evaluated. In particular, only two relationships 
have been the predominant focus of research thus far: (i) the relationship between 
local Lyapunov stability and complexity of models representing biological 
communities with linear differential equations; and, (ii) the relationship between 
constancy of species abundances of communities and their species richness (see 
Ch. 2). The tractability of these concepts as compared with more defensible 
characterizations of stability, diversity, and complexity accounts for the selective 
scrutiny. 
 The history recounted in Chapter 2 demonstrated that the focus on these 
two relationships also reflects disparate approaches empirically and theoretically 
                                                 
147 Though it has received little research focus in the SDC debate, structural stability could be 
analyzed through simulation, thereby avoiding the difficulties confronting its analytic evaluation. 
Thanks to Sahotra Sarkar for calling this possibility to my attention. 
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oriented ecologists have taken to the debate, as exemplified, for example, by 
studies such as MacArthur (1955), Elton (1958), Pimentel (1961), May (1974), 
and Tilman (1996, 1999). Theoretical ecologists principally focus on 
mathematical models of biological communities. Since these models usually 
describe mechanisms driving the dynamics of communities that ecological 
complexity depends upon but not the distribution of individual organisms among 
species that ecological diversity depends upon, their research has been primarily 
concerned with the role complexity, rather than diversity, may have in generating 
or prohibiting stability. Food web models, for instance, are perhaps the most 
common type of model used to represent biological communities in ecology 
today. They usually represent interspecific species interactions by linear 
relationships between variables, which has two advantages.148 First, assessing the 
complexity of these models is straightforward (see Ch. 2, §4; Ch. 5, §6). Second, 
a well-developed mathematical theory of Lyapunov stability and well-known 
techniques for evaluating it, such as the indirect method, ensure evaluation of the 
stability of these models is similarly straightforward (Hastings 1988; Paine 1988; 
Ch. 4, §2.4). A large body of work on food webs since May’s (1974) influential 
monograph has subsequently exploited these facts to uncover properties of 
community structure that might produce Lyapunov stability.149
                                                 
148 Graphically, links between nodes represent interspecific species interactions in a food web 
graph; the nodes represent the species comprising the community. 
149 See Paine 1980, Pimm 1982, Cohen et al. 1990, Pimm et al. 1991, and McCann 2005 for 
reviews. 
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 These two advantages obviously encourage this modeling strategy, but at 
the cost of decreasing ecological realism.150 The problem is that actual species 
interactions probably rarely take the linear form presupposed by these models, 
which means food webs typically poorly represent the dynamics of real-world 
biological communities.151 Species interactions can be linearized in the 
infinitesimal neighborhood of an equilibrium (or any other point of state space), 
but Chapter 4, Section 2.5 explains why this severe restriction precludes reliable 
inference about how actual communities respond to perturbations, which are not 
of infinitesimal magnitude. It is unreasonable to suggest, for example, that a 
system like a biological community initially at equilibrium would remain in an 
infinitesimal neighborhood of it following typical real-world perturbations, such 
as frosts, droughts, increases in certain compounds (as caused by fertilizer runoff 
or a chemical spill for instance), etc. Thus, the fact that structural properties of 
food webs generate or jeopardize local Lyapunov stability indicates little about 
the relation between stability and complexity in actual biological communities, 
especially since ecological stability is poorly defined as local Lyapunov stability 
(see Ch. 4, §2). For precisely this reason, Hastings (1988, 1665) warned, “food 
web theory is not an adequate approach for understanding questions of stability in 
                                                 
150 For a more detailed analysis of tradeoffs involved in scientific modeling see Levins (1966), 
Orzack and Sober (1993), Weisberg (2004), and Justus (2005). 
 
151 Some ecologists also criticize that most food webs are drastically incomplete and poorly 
constructed (see Paine 1988 for example). Thanks to Eric Pianka for bringing this criticism to my 
attention. 
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nature.” It certainly tempers claims that recent advances in food web theory 
suggest a resolution of the SDC debate (e.g. McCann 2000; see Sarkar 2005a). 
 The evaluation of stability-complexity relationships for models that more 
accurately represent community dynamics presents different difficulties. One is 
the challenge of integrating different types of model properties into a general 
measure of ecological complexity for realistic, nonlinear models of biological 
communities as opposed to unrealistic models that represent species interactions 
with linear differential equations (see Ch. 5, §6). Another difficulty is evaluating 
the stability of these models. If, as is commonly assumed within mathematical 
ecology, Lyapunov stability adequately defines ecological stability, the ecological 
stability of nonlinear community models can be assessed with analytic techniques 
such as the direct method (Hirsh and Smale 1974; see Ch. 4, §§2.3–2.4). An 
unequivocal relationship between Lyapunov stability and model complexity 
(gauged informally), however, has not emerged. Realistic increases in model 
complexity sometimes decrease the likelihood of stability, but sometimes increase 
it. May (1974), for instance, found that including environmental stochasticity and 
realistic time delays in Lotka-Volterra models of predator-prey communities 
destabilized them, while incorporating spatial heterogeneity and more realistic 
predator responses to prey were stabilizing. The more realistic and complex the 
community model, moreover, the less mathematically tractable it and the 
assessment of its stability properties become. Since no general method for 
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evaluating the non-local Lyapunov stability for nonlinear systems is known (see 
Ch. 4, §2.5), the ultimate verdict on the relationship between Lyapunov stability 
and complexity remains unclear.152
 The common assumption that ecological stability is adequately defined as 
Lyapunov stability, however, should be rejected. The reason, Chapter 4, Section 2 
argues, is that Lyapunov stability only considers a community’s response to 
perturbations that are accurately represented as temporary changes in species 
abundances (i.e. Pv perturbations), whereas ecological stability also concerns the 
community’s response to perturbations that are only accurately represented by 
temporary changes in environmental parameters as well as species abundances 
(i.e. Pp and Pvp perturbations). As such, Lyapunov stability provides only a partial 
account of the kind of perturbation response ecological stability requires of a 
biological community. Unfortunately, a mathematical theory of stability for this 
more general class of perturbations has not yet been applied within ecology.  
 A recent study of realistic community models that does not presuppose 
that Lyapunov stability adequately defines ecological stability found that 
communities with many weak and few strong interspecific interactions exhibit 
fewer, and less severe oscillations, and therefore have a higher likelihood of 
                                                 
152 Serious doubts about the robustness of May’s (1974) finding of an inverse relationship 
between local Lyapunov stability and the complexity of linearized models of biological 
communities have also been raised. Besides the criticisms of DeAngelis (1975), Lawlor (1978), 
and Yodzis (1981) (see Chapter 2, §4), Haydon (1994, 2000) has also recently shown that if the 
linear differential equations May (1974) analyzed are made more biologically realistic, a positive 
relationship between stability and complexity emerges. 
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persistence (McCann et al. 1998). As a hypothesis about a putative positive 
stability-complexity relationship, however, results of this analysis are limited by: 
(i) the small size of the communities modeled (at most four species); and, (ii) the 
inadequacy of measuring ecological stability as persistence. As Chapter 4, Section 
1.3 explained, however, persistence is clearly a plausible necessary condition for a 
community to be ecologically stable, but it is also much weaker than what 
ecological stability requires of biological communities. 
 Besides these difficulties, accurate empirical estimation of parameters of 
difference or differential equations used to model biological communities is often 
practically impossible given the significant monetary and temporal constraints on 
ecological research, especially for more complicated and realistic models. 
Community dynamics are even less likely, moreover, to be simply discernable 
from the limited data usually available.153 For these reasons, more empirically 
oriented ecologists have focused instead on evaluating stability-diversity 
relationships with statistical measures of both concepts derived from data, rather 
than relying on difference or differential equations to model biological 
communities.  
 Like the theoretical approach, this strategy also faces difficulties, the most 
daunting of which is the lack of sufficient data. Their absence explains why 
                                                 
 
153 See Connell and Sousa 1983 for a review of methodological problems confronting this 
undertaking. 
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species richness, which is a poor measure of ecological diversity, has been used in 
almost all studies of stability-diversity relationships:154 the data on species 
abundances required to assess the evenness of a community can rarely be 
collected, whereas the numbers of species often can be determined empirically. 
For instance, most of David Tilman’s analyses of Minnesota grasslands (e.g. 
Tilman 1996, 1999; Lehman and Tilman 2000), which are probably the most 
spatially and temporally extensive empirical studies of stability-diversity 
relationships, measure diversity as species richness. His finding of a positive 
correlation between grassland species richness and the constancy of the total 
biomass of the grassland therefore shows little about the relationship between 
diversity and ecological stability because species richness is a flawed measure of 
ecological diversity. Pfisterer and Schmid (2002), for example, found that 
resistance and species richness were inversely related with respect to drought 
perturbations in a grassland in Switzerland. 
 Absence of adequate data also accounts for the prevalence of constancy as 
the measure of ecological stability in most empirical studies of the SDC debate, 
David Tilman’s “temporal stability” being the most prominent example (see Ch. 
4, §1.3). Lehman and Tilman (2000, 535) suggest that temporal stability is 
“readily observable in nature,” as one reason for using it to measure ecological 
                                                 
154 A recent study by Tilman et al. (2006) that uses the Shannon index to measure the diversity of 
a Minnesota grassland and finds the same positive correlation between species richness and 
temporal stability may be the only exception. 
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stability. It only requires, specifically, data on species biomasses. This contrasts 
with the fact that stability analyses of common community models only reliably 
indicate stability properties of real-world communities if models’ parameters can 
be empirically estimated with sufficient accuracy. The problem, they suggest, is 
that sufficiently accurate parameter estimation is usually infeasible. 
 Enhancing measurability, however, does little to overcome the significant 
shortcomings of defining ecological stability as constancy, and the serious 
limitations of constancy measures like temporal stability as measures of 
ecological stability (see Ch. 4, §1.3). Specifically, their suitability depends upon:  
    (i)  whether (and how diversely) the community is perturbed during the time 
 period its constancy is assessed, which determines the measure’s accuracy 
 as an indicator of the community’s response to perturbation; and, 
 
    (ii)  whether the reference state is a point equilibrium, so that species 
 biomasses will remain constant if unperturbed.  
 
A community that resides in a relatively unvarying, unperturbing environment 
over the period it is assayed violates (i). In addition, data are usually collected 
over short time periods given the usually significant temporal and monetary 
constraints on ecological research, so (i) is rarely satisfied. 
 With respect to (ii), the predominant focus on equilibrium models in 
ecology in the 1960s and 1970s has also been supplanted with a recognition that 
nonequilibrium models with complex dynamics like limit cycles and strange 
attractor sets may best represent many types of ecological systems (Wiens 1984; 
Chesson and Case 1986; DeAngelis and Waterhouse 1987). Since communities 
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exhibiting such limit cycles or strange attractors violate (ii), there may be 
widespread violation of (ii) across biological communities. 
 The concept of temporal stability has also catalyzed controversy about 
whether it biases the stability-diversity debate in the positive. Doak et al. (1998) 
argued that temporal stability necessarily increases with species richness because 
statistical averaging of fluctuations in species abundances (measured as biomass) 
will necessarily decrease fluctuations in overall community abundance (thereby 
increasing temporal stability), as species richness increases.155 One assumption of 
Doak et al.’s argument was that the variance of each species abundance  is 
proportional to the square of its mean abundance µ (i.e. , where z = 2 
and c is a constant). In response, Tilman et al. (1998) pointed out that the value of 
z for a given biological community is an empirical question, and its value 
determines whether temporal stability increases with species richness in the 
absence of other factors or not. For example, May (1974) analyzed a logistic 
community model that included random environmental “noise” in which   If 
, temporal stability increases with species richness; it decreases with species 
richness if . Tilman (1999) also showed that temporal stability may increase 






                                                 
 
155 Tilman (1999, 1458) called this the “portfolio effect” in analogy with the well-known 
economic principle that diversified portfolios are less volatile. 
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increases because total community abundance increases with the number of 
species it contains (see Ch. 4, §1.3).  
 Regardless of the ultimate validity of the portfolio or overyielding effect 
hypotheses as explanations of Tilman’s grassland data, they have limited bearing 
on the general stability-diversity debate. Since temporal stability and species 
richness are inadequate measures of ecological stability and diversity, respectively 
(see Ch. 4, §1.3; Ch. 5, §5), causes of relationships between them provide little 
insight into possible relationships between stability properties such as resistance, 
resilience, and tolerance, and defensible measures of ecological diversity, which 
must take evenness of a biological community into account. For these reasons, 
Tilman’s (1999) careful analysis of how species richness can increase temporal 
stability should probably not be considered as even, “a partial resolution of the 
long-standing diversity-stability debate” (Lehman and Tilman 2000, 548). 
 In conjunction with chapters 2, 4, and 5, the above discussion helps 
explain why the SDC debate remains unresolved. The concepts of ecological 
stability, diversity, and complexity are multifaceted and difficult to evaluate, 
theoretically or empirically. Consequently, only a few of the total possible 
stability-diversity and stability-complexity relationships have been analyzed thus 
far. These analyses, moreover, have focused on relations between tractable, but 
poor measures for the three concepts. Since ecologists disagree about how 
ecological stability and diversity should be defined, Chapters 4 and 5 propose and 
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defend adequacy conditions that help in the formulation of defensible definitions. 
The broad scope of the SDC debate and its potential implications for applied 
biological fields such as conservation, pest control, and resource management 
ensure its continued scientific scrutiny. The conceptual and methodological issues 
it raises merit more attention than thus far devoted to it by philosophers of 
science.  
 The SDC debate also broaches an issue fundamental to both science and 
philosophy, which is addressed in Chapter 3. At the core of the debate is the issue 
of how three specific ecological concepts should be defined. Abstracting from this 
specific issue, the debate raises the more basic question of how concepts should 
be defined in general. The views of scientists and philosophers generally diverge 
about the appropriate answer to this question, and reflect fundamentally different 
conceptions of the purpose of definition. 
 The main disagreement concerns the relationship between the meaning of 
the definiendum (the concept being defined) and its definiens (the concept(s) 
doing the defining), specifically, how similar their meanings should be. Typifying 
the views of most scientists but few philosophers, Rudolf Carnap’s (1950) theory 
of explication answered this question in favor of requiring only a weak 
relationship between them (see Ch. 3, §2). Carnap (1950) presented explications 
of some simple empirical concepts such as ‘fish’ and ‘temperature,’ but the 
primary emphasis throughout his career was on the explication of theoretical 
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concepts such as analyticity, degree of confirmation, semantic information, etc. 
As a complex empirical concept, however, Chapter 3, Section 3 shows how 
proposed definitions of ecological stability also illustrate Carnap’s most important 
adequacy criteria for explication: precision, fruitfulness, and similarity between 
the concept being explicated (the explicandum) and the concept(s) providing the 
explication (the explicata). It also suggests priority relations between them. 
Different definitions of the concept specifically show how these criteria can be 
satisfied in different ways. 
 Within philosophy, Carnap’s account of explication attracted criticism, 
most notably from P. F. Strawson (1963), who objected that without strong 
similarity, perhaps even synonymy, between explicandum and explicata, 
explication is “utterly irrelevant” to the goal of philosophical clarification of 
concepts (see Chapter 3, §4). Carnap, on the other hand, was willing to sacrifice 
strong similarity to increase precision or fruitfulness with an explication. Their 
disagreement therefore turned on the relative import of different adequacy criteria 
for definition, specifically, similarity vs. precision and fruitfulness. 
 Chapter 3, Section 5 argues that this disagreement about how definitional 
adequacy should be assessed stems partly from different views of the purpose of 
definition and partly from disagreements about what best achieves those purposes. 
Definitions found in philosophy often attempt to maximize intuitive similarity 
with the imprecise concept being defined (DePaul and Ramsey 1998) – usually an 
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ordinary concept of natural language that philosophical scrutiny has shown to be 
problematic in some way – in an attempt to clarify and systematize relations 
between it and other natural language concepts. Analyses of intuitions about these 
concepts, though they often diverge significantly among philosophers, are 
therefore assumed to provide the main guidance about definitional content. 
 Definitions in scientific contexts, on the other hand, often sacrifice 
intuitive accord with the imprecise concept being defined to enhance formal rigor, 
experimental testability, measurability in the field, theoretical unification, 
integration with well-developed mathematical theories, etc. Proposed definitions 
of ecological stability provide a clear example of this. The objective is to improve 
against these benchmarks by establishing a relationship between concepts used in 
nonscientific contexts or in earlier stages of scientific development that fare 
poorly with respect to the benchmarks and concepts (ideally of well-confirmed 
scientific theories) that fare better against them. In other words, definitions should 
help facilitate in determining the structure of the world, which is not reliably 
achieved by inspecting intuitions.156 Given this goal, Chapter 3, Section 5 argues 
definitions should be judged according to how they contribute to scientific 
practice – in helping generate predictions for instance – because science, rather 
                                                 
156 The idea that some concepts better facilitate in determining the structure of the world than 
others should not be taken to presuppose some type of scientific realism. The facilitation in 
question could be evaluated in terms of empirical adequacy or the generation of new technologies, 
for instance, by instrumentalists. 
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than philosophical intuition, has best accomplished this goal. This was the 
principal motivation underlying Carnap’s conception of explication. 
 Strawson (1963, 1992) and philosophers such as Moore (1942) and 
Sorenson (1991), however, regard definitions as the end products of conceptual 
analysis in which intuitions provide the primary guidance, and therefore should 
play the main role in constructing and evaluating definitions. This view of 
definition, or at least the idea that intuitions should play some nontrivial role in 
the formulation of definitions, is unproblematic if the definitional goal is simply 
to clarify the meanings of ordinary concepts of natural language. Besides 
intuitions, linguistic studies of how words are actually used by speakers of natural 
language (Jackson 1998), and studies of the mental representation of concepts in 
the cognitive sciences (Goldman and Pust 1998) also help achieve this goal. 
Results of such studies therefore could (and should) inform the defining process 
on this view. On the other hand, if the definitional objective is to improve our 
conceptual framework’s ability to describe or determine what the world is like, 
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